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The conventional wisdom is that the international system in the Cold War was defined by the 
struggle between East and West. While this was certainly the case, voting patterns in the UN 
Security Council present a more nuanced picture. Counterintuitively, France, the United 
Kingdom and the United States—three of the five permanent members of the Security Council 
(the Permanent 3 or P3) and members of the NATO alliance—voted apart on Council resolutions 
far more frequently in the Cold War, when they faced the common threat of the Soviet Union, 
than in the post-Cold War era. This dissertation observes that they were frequently divided on 
issues related to colonialism and Israel/Palestine, among other matters. It argues that the voting 
differences among them largely had to do with the way the Council functioned, as negotiating 
processes were underdeveloped and assertive Council members from the Non-aligned Movement 
(NAM) often proposed draft resolutions which made bold political statements but had little 
chance of being adopted. As the Cold War ended, however, the permanent members—the P3, as 
well as Russia and China—gained a newfound appreciation for the potential of a Security 
Council unhindered by significant East-West tensions. They sought to consolidate their control 
of the Council’s work. In part because of the perception expressed by permanent and elected 
members alike that a unified Council is a more effective one, voting unanimity has been 
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achieved on nearly 92 percent of adopted resolutions since 1992. The dissertation further 
maintains that the NAM has lost its unity and political clout in the post-Cold War, with its 
members (or for that matter, any other group of members in the Council) less likely to propose 
draft resolutions destined to be vetoed.  At the same time, it posits that the elected members (the 
Elected 10 or E10), in spite of the differing views among them, at times play a constructive role 
in the Council’s work, including by building bridges among the permanent members when they 
are divided.   
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The popular conception of the Cold War period is that the world was divided into two 
ideological camps, with the foreign policies of states closely aligned with either superpower. 
Some scholars also argued that with the end of the Cold War, the Western alliance would fall 
apart, as the Soviet threat no longer bound them together.1 However, voting patterns in the UN 
Security Council, the international organ entrusted with the primary responsibility for 
maintaining international peace and security, demonstrate that the opposite has occurred. France, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States—the three most powerful members of the NATO 
alliance—have voted together with greater frequency in the post-Cold War era than during the 
Cold War era. One might have expected that the former Soviet Union (Russia) and the United 
States would vote together a higher percentage of the time after the end of the Cold War. But the 
fact that these three countries (known as the “Permanent 3” or the “P3” in the Council) have 
voted together a high percentage of time in the post-Cold War years, without the threat of the 
Soviet Union to bind them together, would seem counter-intuitive.   
The evidence of P3 voting divergence in the Security Council in the Cold War, followed 
by P3 voting convergence in the post-Cold War era, is striking. Through the end of 1991, they 
did not vote together as a bloc on approximately one of every six resolutions (slightly under 17 
percent of the time), whereas they have voted apart on only one of roughly every fifty resolutions 
(approximately 2 percent of the time) between 1992 and 2016.2   
                                                           
1 See, for example, John J. Mearsheimer, “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War,” The Atlantic 266, no. 2 (1990): 
35-50; and Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security 18, no. 2 
(1993): 75-76.  
2 These figures relate to resolutions that were adopted or vetoed.  They do not include the handful of resolutions that 
failed to be adopted because of insufficient votes, which are difficult to track. Furthermore, while there were 725 
resolutions adopted in the Cold War, 11 of these were omitted from the analysis because the voting record was 
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Determining why this change in P3 voting patterns has occurred raises several interesting 
questions. Some of these are relevant to the evolution of P3 policy positions, but there is also 
much to be said about changes in how the Council has functioned as an institution, how the 
perceptions of this organ among its members (permanent and elected alike) has changed, and 
how its working methods have evolved during the history of the United Nations. Why did the P3 
often vote apart in the Cold War? To what extent is unity among the P3 in voting in the post-
Cold War era a reflection of their shared values and policy positions, and to what extent is it a 
reflection of a broader trend toward consensus within the Council as a whole? Why has this trend 
toward unanimous voting occurred in recent decades? Council members value unity in decision-
making, but precisely why is this so? Given the trend toward unanimous voting in the Council, 
why does this organ seem so divided on so many issues? Does unanimity in voting reflect 
widespread commitment to the outcomes produced? Has the movement toward unanimity 
improved the quality of the Council’s decision-making or not? In other words has increased 
voting consensus been a positive or negative development, or a bit of both? And when does 
unanimity break down?  
The Argument 
This thesis will attempt to answer the questions posed above. In doing so, it will make five main 
arguments. First, in the Cold War, the Council members in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) 
coalesced around a strong anti-colonial, anti-Zionist agenda and frequently proposed draft 
resolutions that exposed the different views among the permanent members and led to voting 
differences and resulted in frequent vetoes.  In the post-Cold war period, there is no similar bloc 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
unclear.  Voting in the Council includes positive votes, negative votes (which, in the case of permanent members is 
a veto on all but procedural matters) and abstentions.   
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of elected members that will consistently table controversial drafts that undermine the pursuit of 
consensus. To the contrary, the elected members frequently come together in an effort to build 
bridges among the permanent members, even though the E10 (as the 10 elected members are 
called) often have divergent policy positions.   
Second, Council members place significant value in this organ’s stature as a decision-
making body, an arbiter of difficult matters related to international peace and security. This has 
especially been the case in the post-Cold War era when perceptions of the Council’s problem-
solving capacity have by and large been more favorable among permanent and elected members 
alike than in the Cold War.  The effort to achieve unanimity is a reflection of the importance that 
members attribute to the organ’s work. In particular, as I outline in Chapter IV, there are four key 
reasons why unanimity is so desired by Council members: the legitimacy it accords to decisions;3 
the notion that a consensus document is the product of the good stewardship of the negotiation 
process by those leading it; the perceived impact of unanimous resolutions on the party or parties 
who are the object of the resolution; and the fear of isolation of those members considering 
breaking the consensus.   
Third, institutions and processes have been developed by the permanent members to 
manage the Council’s workload that have reinforced the trend toward greater consensus since the 
late Cold War era. Interactions among the permanent members have increased as a result, 
                                                           
3 This part of the argument is consistent with the work of several scholars who have written about the Council’s 
legitimating role.  These include, for example, Mats Berdal, “The UN Security Council: Ineffective but 
Indispensable,” Survival 45, no. 2 (2003): 9; Inis L. Claude, Jr., “Collective Legitimation as a Political Function of 
the United Nations,” International Organization 20, no. 3 (1996): 367-379; Bruce Cronin, “International consensus 
and the changing legal authority of the UN Security Council,” in The UN Security Council and the Politics of 
International Authority, ed. Bruce Cronin and Ian Hurd (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008), 57-79; and Ian Hurd, 




creating more opportunities to strike agreements or at least achieve acquiescence than had been 
the case in the Cold War.4   
Fourth, unanimous decisions do not necessarily have the desired effect of exerting more 
leverage on the subject parties. The voting landscape is littered with unanimously adopted 
resolutions, which have done little to support international peace and security. Compromises 
struck to achieve the agreement of all 15 Council members often lead to weak resolutions or 
resolutions that are difficult to implement because they are not backed by sufficient political will.     
Fifth, while elected members can play an important role in the Council’s work, this organ 
is managed by and for the permanent members, whose veto privilege gives them an enormous 
advantage over the E10 in determining how and whether decisions are made. If the “Permanent 
5” or the “P5” (which consists of the P3 and Russia and China) have fundamental disagreements 
on issues of importance to them, the unity of the Council will be sacrificed.  
Cold War Divisions 
The general view is that East-West tensions in the Cold War severely hampered the Council’s 
ability to carry out its responsibilities. The Soviet-US confrontation was the key fault line in 
international relations, one that played out in Council deliberations. But as some scholars have 
noted, tensions within the Western camp also hindered the Council’s work.5 Among the P3, the 
United States viewed itself as an anti-colonial power that supported self-determination, while 
                                                           
4 Council outcomes refer to resolutions and presidential statements. Press statements and press elements are also 
products produced by Council members, but they are not considered formal Council outcomes.  
Unlike resolutions, presidential statements, press statements, and press elements require agreement among all 15 
members of the Council.  
5 See, for example, Andrew Boyd, Fifteen Men on a Powder Keg: A History of the UN Security Council (New York: 
Stein and Day, 1971); and David Bosco, Five to Rule Them All: The UN Security Council and the Making of the 
Modern World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
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France and the United Kingdom were reluctant to give up their empires and supported the 
colonial policies of other European states as well.6 Wilsonian idealism may have informed the 
US perspective on self-determination to a certain extent; however, the United States had 
important strategic reasons for supporting this ideal as well. It was concerned that if it did not 
espouse self-determination, the former colonial states that entered the UN General Assembly as 
independent states in the 1950s and 1960s would fall into the hands of the Soviet Union, leading 
to the “possibility of an adverse balance of power in the General Assembly.”7 It is not by mistake 
then that the P3 frequently diverged in their Council voting in cases in which the colonial 
interests of the United Kingdom and France—or other colonial powers to which they were 
sympathetic—were at stake, including with regard to Suez, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Southern Rhodesia, and the Comoros.   
The United States may not have had a colonial empire, but it did behave imperiously with 
regard to many states in Central and South America during the Cold War.  In the tradition of the 
Monroe Doctrine, it was particularly sensitive to what it perceived as communist or otherwise 
threatening behavior by states in its neighborhood, a perception that was reflected in how the 
United States voted in the Council and one which at times separated it from France and the 
United Kingdom. Thus, the United States voted apart from the other two Western permanent 
members on a number of country-specific resolutions in the Cold War pertaining to the 
Americas, including, for example, Grenada and Nicaragua. 
                                                           
6 On the difference in worldviews between the United States and NATO’s colonial powers over the reluctance of 
these colonials states to relinquish their possessions, see Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO Divided, NATO United: The 
Evolution of an Alliance (Westport, Calif.: Praeger Publishers, 2004), 12-13, 21, 24; William Roger Louis, 
“American Anti-Colonialism and the Dissolution of the British Empire,” International Affairs 61, no. 3 (1985); and 
C.M. Woodhouse, “Attitudes of NATO Countries Towards the United States,” World Politics 10, no. 2 (1953): 209. 
7 Woodhouse, “Attitudes of NATO Countries,” 209.  
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Another consistent area of disagreement among the P3 during the Cold War (and since), 
reflected in Security Council voting patterns, has been the US’s unique relationship with Israel.  
The United States stands largely apart from the overwhelming majority of UN member states on 
this issue. Over the years, the United States has made a habit of either vetoing or abstaining 
resolutions condemning Israel. Infrequently the United Kingdom has joined the United States in 
abstaining on such resolutions, but it has never cast a joint veto with the United States on such 
votes. While US support of Israel in the Council has spanned the Cold War and post-Cold War 
periods, the United States nonetheless resorted to the veto more frequently to protect Israeli 
interests in the Cold War era than it has during the post-Cold War era. During the 23 year period 
from 1967 (the year of the Six Day War) through 1989, the US vetoed 27 resolutions critical of 
Israel; however, in the 26-year period from 1990 through 2016, it vetoed only 14 resolutions 
opposed to Israel in a Council that was more active in terms of volume of resolutions adopted 
than it was during the Cold War.8    
The voting divergences among the P3 in the Cold War reflected tangible policy 
disagreements on discrete issues. But, at times, these differences also reflected an uncertainty 
about the merits of the Security Council as a foreign policy instrument. In particular, France’s 
ambivalence toward the UN during Charles de Gaulle’s years as president (1959-1969) impacted 
on the way it voted in the Council.  De Gaulle viewed the UN as a tool for the United States to 
exercise its dominance in world affairs.9 As Andrew Boyd has written, “the French councilman’s 
basic instructions during these years seemed to run something like this: Do not take initiatives. If 
somebody else does, say that the action contemplated is illegal or at least improper. But do not 
                                                           
8 List of Security Council vetoes compiled by the Dag Hammarskjöld Library, available at 
http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick/veto. 
9 Boyd, Fifteen Men on a Powder Keg, 29. 
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vote against it. As a rule, abstain.”10 True to Boyd’s claim, France did not veto any texts in the de 
Gaulle years, but it did issue a rash of abstentions (18) on adopted resolutions in this time period. 
However, it did veto draft resolutions at other periods of the Cold War, while it has yet to 
exercise its veto privilege in the post-Cold War era.    
A key factor that generated voting disunity in the Council was the assertiveness of the 
developing world. By the 1960’s, the NAM had become a significant force in international 
affairs, advocating for the interests of developing countries. Sheer numbers ensured that the 
NAM would wield considerable power in the UN General Assembly. Although the P5 veto 
diminished the NAM’s influence in the UN Security Council, non-aligned states were 
nonetheless able to push their anti-colonial, anti-Zionist agenda as a unified bloc.  At times, the 
NAM got its way in the Council, as Council action on Southern Rhodesia and South Africa 
demonstrated in some instances. Usually, however, on these and other issues, NAM positions led 
to frequent vetoes on draft resolutions.  Since the end of the Cold War, the NAM’s influence in 
global affairs has receded. Whereas several NAM members would coalesce around common 
positions in the Council in the last two and one half decades of the Cold War, the elected 
membership in the post-Cold War era has been less unified, detracting from the E10’s impact on 
the deliberations of the UN’s peace and security organ.    
A more active Council and efforts to build consensus: late Cold War to the 
present 
As the Cold War waned, there was a newfound appreciation of the possibilities of 
multilateralism and a sense of excitement at what the UN could accomplish without superpower 
tensions. The ending of the Cold War led the permanent members to reevaluate their foreign 
                                                           
10 Ibid, 29-30.   
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policies. In a September 1987 article published in Pravda and Izvestiia, Soviet Chairman Mikhail 
Gorbachev argued in favor of a “comprehensive system of international security” with the UN at 
its core.11  US President George H.W. Bush proclaimed a New World Order “where diverse 
nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind—
peace and security, freedom and the rule of law.”12 The handling of the First Gulf War seemed to 
confirm this optimism, with the Council authorizing a broad military coalition to expel Saddam 
Hussein’s forces from Kuwait in 1991, the first such Chapter VII action since the disputed Korea 
decision in 1950.13  
As this seismic shift in the international system began to unfold and the permanent 
members of the Security Council began to envision a United Nations that might be able to live 
up to the promise of its founders, the potential for a revitalized multilateral system meant that 
these states had a vested interest in ensuring that the Security Council achieved the sometimes 
incompatible and sometimes compatible goals of operating effectively and serving their foreign 
policy interests. Of course, the permanent members had always wanted the Council to serve 
these dual purposes, but this suddenly appeared more possible than in the past.    
The enthusiasm about the Security Council in the aftermath of the First Gulf War soon 
waned amidst numerous peacekeeping failures of the 1990s, including in Somalia, Rwanda, and 
Srebrenica. The record of the ensuing years has also been rocky, occasioned with some successes 
(e.g., East Timor and Sierra Leone) but also littered by many failures (e.g., Darfur and Syria).  
But the Council has continued to survive and, in spite of its shortcomings, it has maintained a 
                                                           
11 Mikhail Gorbachev, Realities and Guarantees for a Secure World (Moscow, Russia: Novosti Press Agency 
Publishing House, 1987). 
12 George H.W. Bush, “Address to the US Congress,” (11 September 1990).  




heightened status in the foreign policies of the permanent members. This is why they invest so 
much energy in making it work for them.   
Since the late Cold War years, all the permanent members have viewed unanimity in 
decision-making as a means to promote a better functioning Security Council. As Kendall W. 
Stiles has written, albeit in reference to the entire UN system and not just the Council, “the norm 
of consensus” had taken hold by the end of the Cold War.14 For the permanent members, it has 
made no sense for the Council to be hindered by the frequent use of the veto, as this only 
weakens the institution that they need to achieve their goals. Resort to the veto is to be done 
sparingly, only in exceptional circumstances, when core national interests are perceived to be at 
stake. While the veto continues to be employed and at times can cripple Council action with 
devastating consequences for people on the ground, the general trend in the post-Cold War era 
has been toward its less frequent use. (China is the sole exception on this count among the 
permanent members.) Abstentions on resolutions have also been used more sparingly in the post-
Cold War era than during the Cold War era.  
There will always be disagreements among the permanent members, even the P3, which 
have generally formed a highly cohesive voting bloc in the past 25 years. At times, the 
differences among the permanent members will be irreconcilable, forcing divergent votes among 
them, as we have seen in recent years with issues such as Israel/Palestine, Syria, and Ukraine. In 
some instances, when it becomes clear in negotiations that unanimity cannot be achieved and a 
permanent member threatens to use the veto, the member(s) proposing a resolution will withdraw 
the draft. At other times, drafts may not even be proposed for discussion out of fear that they will 
                                                           
14 Kendall W. Stiles, “The Power of Procedure and the Procedures of the Powerful: Anti-Terror Law in the United 
Nations,” Journal of Peace Research 43, no. 1 (2006): 41-42. 
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be vetoed. This so-called “hidden” or “pocket” veto looms large in deliberations and has a 
deleterious effect on decision-making. However, notwithstanding Russia’s recent assertiveness, 
painstaking efforts have been taken in the post-Cold War era to promote consensus, although the 
quality of the outcomes is often questionable. The Council’s level of engagement in peace and 
security issues and the volume of its outcomes (resolutions and presidential statements) have 
soared in the last 25 years. In fact, the Council of today would be almost unrecognizable to 
diplomats of the Cold War era. In 1971, Boyd observed: while “organized…to function 
continuously,” according to article 28 of the Charter, “the Security Council is not sitting 
anywhere, most of time. It averages one formal meeting a week.”15 By way of comparison, the 
Council held 256 formal meetings and 169 informal meetings in 2016.16 The Council’s 
production in terms of written outcomes has also proliferated. From January 1946 to December 
1991 (the month the Soviet Union officially collapsed), the Council adopted a mere 725 
resolutions, in comparison to more than 1,600 since January 1992.   
The permanent members also have taken a strong interest in developing mechanisms and 
processes to help them to run this very active Council. Whether through ad-hoc closed meetings, 
serving as penholders (i.e., drafting resolutions), or appointing chairs of sanctions committees 
among the elected members, they have tried to steward the Council’s work through what I call 
“managed multilateralism.”17 They collaborate to exert as much leverage and control over 
Council decision-making as they can, an approach that has become increasingly pronounced in 
recent years. These enhanced interactions among them have reinforced the general tendency 
                                                           
15 Boyd, Fifteen Men on a Powder Keg, 8.  
16 Security Council Report, “The Security Council in 2016,” February 2017 Monthly Forecast, 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-02/the_security_council_in_2016.php.    
17 These mechanisms and processes are synonymous with “international regimes.” Lisa L. Martin notes that regimes 
can be “defined as sets of principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures,” referring to Stephen Krasner’s 
early work on the subject. Lisa Martin, “Neoliberalism,” in International Relations Theories: Discipline and 
Diversity, ed. Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 111. 
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toward unanimous decision-making, as they have provided forums in which they can uphold 
common policy positions, hammer out differences, and if necessary, make deals with one 
another.   
Managed multilateralism has taken various forms in the context of the Security Council’s 
work. Most informally, the P5 from time to time meet to discuss critical issues of common 
concern. This phenomenon began in earnest soon after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the 
Soviet Union, and there was an easing of East-West friction. In late 1986, seeking a way to end 
the Iran/Iraq War, the permanent members began meeting informally at the residence of UK 
Ambassador John Thompson to discuss strategies for ending the Iraq-Iran War.18 While there 
have been some periods of the post-Cold War era when meetings among the permanent members 
occurred more infrequently than others,19 the P3 in particular have consistently played a 
significant role in drafting outcomes and leading negotiations, thus having an important impact 
on decision-making in the Council.  
 At times, the elected members have not passively accepted their subordinate role.  They 
have been known at times to take the initiative to make their mark on the Council’s work.  In the 
instances when they take the lead in drafting outcomes, they frequently work hard to promote 
agreement among all members, at times spending months leading negotiation processes in an 
effort to break impasses among the permanent members and to unite the Council.   
However, in spite of the frequent efforts by permanent and elected members to achieve 
unity, unity in and of itself is not necessarily a good thing. Concessions made to achieve 
                                                           
18 David M. Malone, “Introduction,” in The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century, ed. David 
M. Malone (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 4.   
19 For example, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, UK Ambassador from 1997-2003, has said the P3 rarely met as a group 




agreement on a resolution may lead to that resolution being so weak as to be useless or even 
counter-productive. Permanent members that acquiesce to a particular resolution to avoid a veto 
may be reluctant to implement its measures. For example, as several reports of the Sudan 
Sanctions Committee Panel of Experts have demonstrated in recent years, weapons produced 
after 2005 (when the arms embargo was expanded through resolution 1591 of 29 March 2005 to 
include the government of Sudan and other signatories of the N’Djamena Agreement) manage to 
find their way into Darfur, in violation of the arms embargo.20 And yet, resolutions reauthorizing 
the Panel of Experts of the Darfur Sanctions Committee annually have been unanimously 
adopted nearly every year since 2008; the one exception was resolution 1945 of 14 October 
2010, which was adopted with 14 affirmative votes and one abstention by China.21 In 2010, the 
final report of the Panel of Experts maintained that Chinese bullets had been used in Darfur,22 a 
likely explanation for the abstention.     
The P3 versus China and Russia 
In spite of the trend toward unanimous voting among the permanent members in the post-Cold 
War era, there are nonetheless key differences between the P3, on the on hand, and China and 
Russia, on the other hand: how they have voted since the end of the Cold War, what issues 
matter to them in negotiations on Council outcomes, and what this reflects about their 
worldviews. As demonstrated by their voting patterns, one of the key differences is that China 
and Russia generally hold a more restrictive view of what constitutes a threat to international 
peace and security than the P3, sometimes resulting in irreconcilable differences during 
                                                           
20 See, for example: Report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) 
(S/2013/79), 12 February 2013; Ibid, (S/2014/87), 7 February 2014; and Ibid, (S/2015/31), 16 January 2015.   
21 UN Security Council resolution 1945, 14 October 2010. 




negotiations. This has become a more noticeable factor since 2007,23 with China and especially 
Russia increasingly asserting their great power status in words and deeds and clashing with the 
P3 in the process.  
One manifestation of China’s and Russia’s more restrictive view of international peace 
and security is that they adhere more closely to traditional sovereignty norms than the P3. They 
are generally uncomfortable with efforts to focus the Council’s work on human rights issues, 
especially when they believe that doing so constitutes interference in the domestic affairs of 
sovereign states. Between 2007 and 2016, there were seven joint China-Russia vetoes:  five on 
Syria, one on Myanmar, and one on Zimbabwe—in all of these cases, significant human rights 
violations were committed by the regimes in power.24 In these cases, China and Russia 
frequently employed arguments emphasizing the importance of upholding the territorial integrity 
and domestic jurisdiction of the states in question, reluctant to criticize these states in any 
meaningful way. Of course, the P3 are often averse to exerting strong leverage on close allies 
that commit human rights violations in order to improve their behavior (for example, the limited 
pressure they have placed on the Saudi-led coalition for the cynical way it has prosecuted its war 
in Yemen).  However, they are more willing to discuss human rights issues in the Council than 
China and Russia, and in general, they do not hold the same level of commitment to norms of 
sovereignty and non-interference as China and Russia in cases where human rights violations are 
being committed.   
                                                           
23 2007 was the year of the first joint China-Russia veto, which focused on Myanmar.  See UN Security Council 
document S/2007/14, 12 January 2007.  
24 Jared Genser and Bruno Stagno Ugarte, “Evolution of the Security Council’s Engagement on Human Rights,” in 
The United Nations Security Council in the Age of Human Rights, ed. Jared Genser and Bruno Stagno Ugarte (New 
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 26.  Genser and Stagno Ugarte noted that “…the Russian Federation 
and China have, to date, always acted in tandem in using the veto to defeat draft resolutions that contained human-
rights elements. These were on the situations in Myanmar…, Syria…, and Zimbabwe…, all of which contained 
contextual references to ‘human rights.’” 
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Disagreements on policy aside, there is also a difference in how the P3 engage in the 
Council’s work compared with Russia and China. The P3 tend to be more assertive in managing 
the Council’s workload. Russia actively engages in negotiations, makes frequent proposals to 
draft Council outcomes, and on matters of strong strategic interest, will sometimes present its 
own draft products for consideration. However, the P3 currently holds the pen (i.e. drafts and 
leads the negotiations) on the overwhelming majority of issues on the Council’s agenda, with 
Russia drafting less frequently. China takes the most low-key approach to the Council’s work of 
any permanent member. It is not the penholder on any issue, it rarely makes its own proposals on 
draft texts, and it does not engage as actively in negotiations as the other permanent members.    
Methodology and Sources 
The first part of my analysis extends to the late Cold War period, while the second part explores 
the late Cold War period to the present. In studying the first period, one challenge is that there is 
a dearth of information on how Council resolutions and other outcomes were negotiated and 
more broadly, on how the Council functioned. I have relied heavily on the formal records of 
Council debates to fill this gap. Also helpful are memoirs of key UN Secretariat officials, US 
State Department documents, and the Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council,25 which 
provides descriptions of Council proceedings on all agenda items. Secondary sources covering 
the early history of the Council are useful as well in capturing the positions of different members 
on key issues on the agenda and providing historical background on these issues.  
                                                           
25 Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council is available at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/. 
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Much of the same source material is used to cover the late Cold War to the present in my 
analysis.26 However, I have benefited as well from a significant number of interviews with UN 
Secretariat officials and diplomats who have served in the Council during the past 25 years.  
Interviews with diplomats, Council debate records, and public statements by diplomats have 
been especially useful in demonstrating the value that members place on Council unity. Another 
key source of information on Council deliberations in recent years has been the not-for-profit 
organization Security Council Report, which has provided analysis of the Council’s work since 
2005.27   
While much of my analysis investigates the sources of unity in the Council since the late 
Cold War era, it is impossible to ignore the growing divide in policy positions between the P3, 
on the one hand, and Russia and China, on the other hand, especially since China and Russia cast 
their first joint veto on Myanmar in January 2007. Through an analysis of public statements by 
China and Russia—in addition to their voting records—I demonstrate that principles of 
sovereignty and non-intervention are often the reasons for their divergent positions from the P3, 
and indeed, several other Council members.    
I further describe the different processes and mechanisms which are relevant to how 
Council members conceptualize, produce and vote on resolutions, and how they have promoted 
greater cohesion in Council voting. I rely on interviews from Council members involved in the 
negotiations on resolutions and seek their views about how processes have affected negotiations.  
The Security Council Report’s What’s In Blue site, which has been in service since 2011, has 
                                                           
26 However, I have not made use of US State Department documents from this period.   
27 See Security Council Report’s website at: www.securitycouncilreport.org.  
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been particularly useful in shedding light on the processes by which resolutions have been 
negotiated over the past seven years, providing real time analysis of the Council’s work.28   
Alternative explanations 
The crux of my puzzle relates to why P3 voting convergence has grown in the post-Cold War 
era, without the threat of the Soviet Union to bind these countries together. I argue that there are 
three reasons why this is so: there is no group of members willing to table controversial drafts 
that might be vetoed like the NAM did in the Cold War; members value consensus because a 
unified Council is perceived as a more effective one in a multi-polar world in which this organ 
plays a key foreign policy role for its members; and working methods have evolved to enable 
more considered negotiations on drafts, in particular among Council members (usually the 
permanent members) with a key stake in the issue under discussion. Taken together, these 
reasons help to explain why voting convergence has increased in the post-Cold War era not just 
among the P3, but in the Council as whole.  
 However, there are plausible alternative explanations regarding why there has been such 
strong voting convergence among the P3 in the Council in the post-Cold War era. But these 
explanations ultimately fall short.   
An obvious alternative explanation is that the policy positions of the P3 have simply been 
more closely aligned over the past 25 years than they were in the Cold War.  This argument has 
strong merits and at least partially explains the decrease in voting divisions among the P3. After 
all, many of the issues on which the P3 had voting differences in the Cold War—e.g., Suez, 
Southern Rhodesia, or Nicaragua—are no longer on the agenda.  Nonetheless, the argument tells 
                                                           
28 See Security Council Report’s What’s In Blue site at: http://www.whatsinblue.org/. 
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only part of the story, as it fails to account for the changes in the working methods of the 
Council.  As I attempt to demonstrate in this dissertation, the evidence suggests that on divisive 
issues (i.e., those on which there was a strong chance of a veto) draft resolutions were put to a 
vote more frequently in the Cold War than has been the case since the end of the Cold War, as a 
result of the assertiveness of the non-aligned members from the 1960s to the 1980s. In current 
times, Council members still force a veto from time to time—as was done, for example, with the 
December 2017 Egyptian draft on Jerusalem29—but this occurs with less regularity than in the 
Cold War.    
Another alternative argument that could be made is that the P3 have converged in their 
voting in the post-Cold War era around burgeoning human security norms that have increasingly 
been a focus of the Council’s work. Most UN peacekeeping missions now have protection of 
civilians’ mandates. “Women, Peace and Security,” “Children and Armed Conflict,” and 
“Protection of Civilians” are thematic issues on the Council’s agenda, and language related to 
protecting civilians in general or more specifically related to protecting women and children has 
become common in Council resolutions and other outcomes. 
The P3 consistently profess support for human security norms in the Security Council, 
although one could question their level of commitment in cases in which core strategic interests 
are at stake. However, it is important to note that these issues only entered the mainstream of the 
Council’s work in earnest in the late 1990s, while voting convergence among the P3—and 
several other Council members—began roughly a decade earlier. For example, the P3, along 
with China and Russia, were united in blocking constructive action by the Council in the midst of 
the 1994 Rwandan genocide, although one could argue that the French-led, controversial 
                                                           
29 UN Security Council document (S/2017/1060), 18 December 2017. 
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Opération Turquoise during the later stages of the genocide was motivated by protection 
concerns.   
A final alternative explanation for P3 voting convergence in the Council during the post-
Cold War era is that the global power of France and the United Kingdom has diminished to the 
point where they are uncomfortable in taking public positions that vary from their more powerful 
western ally, the United States.30 This would seem plausible on the surface, but it does not stand 
up to closer analysis. First, France and the United Kingdom were already waning powers in the 
Cold War, and yet they frequently voted apart from the United States, in spite of the fact that the 
Soviet Union was a common threat to them. Second, even though voting discrepancies among 
the P3 have been rare in the post-Cold War Council, they have not been non-existent, and there 
have been significant arguments among them on issues such as Bosnia and Iraq, which will be 
discussed in Chapter IV.   
About this project 
This project attempts to fill several unexplored or under-explored areas in the literature on the 
Security Council. The dissertation discusses the impact of the NAM on the Council’s 
deliberations during the Cold War.  In particular, it describes how the NAM members shaped the 
voting agenda of this organ. While it is a truism that decolonization had a significant impact on 
deliberations in the UN General Assembly, this project analyzes the underexplored role of the 
NAM in Council deliberations.  It further provides a case study on the evolution of the Council’s 
working methods. Efforts to analyze working methods have only provided snapshots of 
                                                           




particular periods.31 This project, in contrast, aims to explore the significant changes in this 
organ’s working methods spanning the Cold War period to the present. The durability of the 
Council and its adaptability to the changing demands of the international security environment 
are visible.32 Another contribution is additional evidence for the political science literature about 
how processes can have an impact on outcomes. The permanent members have assiduously 
worked together to shape Council working methods to serve their interests. Their impact is clear 
on how Council decisions are made, including how resolutions and presidential statements are 
conceived, drafted and negotiated. Furthermore, the dissertation explores why the Council is 
important to elected members and how they can play a constructive role in its work, issues that 
are not adequately explored in the literature.  
Six chapters follow this introduction.  Chapter I provides a survey and assessment of the 
literature on the Security Council and its role in world affairs. It describes how both normative 
and rational choice factors are relevant to an analysis of Security Council voting patterns over 
time.  
Chapter II offers a brief statistical overview of voting patterns in the Security Council 
from 1946 to 2016. It provides some raw data to substantiate greater voting convergence on 
                                                           
31 See, for example, the in-depth research on working methods by Security Council Report during the post-Cold War 
period.  This includes: Security Council Report, “Security Council Working Methods: A Tale of Two Councils?” 
Special Research Report No. 1 (25 March 2014): 13-14, available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/special-
research-report/security-council-working-methods-a-tale-of-two-councils.php; Security Council Report, “Security 
Council Working Methods—A Work in Progress,” Special Research Report No. 1 (30 March 2012), available at 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/special-research-report/lookup-c-glKWLeMTIsG-b-5906427.php; Security 
Council Report, “Security Council Transparency, Legitimacy and Effectiveness: Efforts to Reform Council Working 
Methods, 1993-2007,” Special Research Report No. 3 (18 October 2007), available at 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/special-research-report/lookup-c-glKWLeMTIsG-b-3506555.php; and 
Security Council Report, “Security Council Working Methods: Provisional Progress,” Research Report (22 January 
2018), available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/research_report_working_methods_2018.pdf. 
32  Security Council Report, “Security Council Working Methods: Provisional Progress,” 3.  Security Council 
Report has noted: “…it could be argued that throughout its post-Cold War history, the Council has continued to be 
the most adaptable international body, at times capable of modifying its working methods literally on the spot.”  
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resolutions among the P3, and indeed within the Council as a whole, since the late Cold War 
period. The chapter also briefly summarizes the significance of these statistics, arguing that 
voting unity does not necessarily translate into quality outcomes. It seemed appropriate to end 
the broad statistical overview of voting patterns in the post-Cold War era with the last calendar 
year of the Obama administration and to be cautious throughout the dissertation about making 
definitive statements about the dynamics among the P3—and between the United States and the 
rest of the Council—beyond Obama’s tenure, given the lack of clarity of the Trump White 
House’s long-term foreign policy vision only one year into the president’s term. Nonetheless, 
references to events in 2017 and early 2018 in the empirical chapters of the dissertation largely 
serve to highlight continuities in Council practice. Furthermore, some preliminary analysis 
(including statistical analysis) is provided on the Trump administration’s early engagement with 
the Council in the conclusion (Chapter VI), although it would be premature to guess the course 
that this relationship will have taken by the time the current president leaves office.  
Chapter III explores some of the issues that divided the permanent members, including 
the P3, during the Cold War.  A key focus of this chapter is the impact of the NAM on Council 
deliberations, as non-aligned Council members frequently joined together to propose 
controversial resolutions that often resulted in vetoes or non-unanimous adoptions.  
Chapter IV describes how the permanent members have consolidated their control over 
Council decision-making since the late Cold War period. It describes the factors that have led to 
increased voting unity. Finally, the chapter compares the different perspectives of the Council’s 
role in world affairs among the permanent members, focusing on the divisions between the P3 
and Russia and China.   
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Chapter V analyzes the role that elected members have played in recent years in the 
Council’s work; it explores why Council membership is important to them, and how they have 
made efforts to promote unanimity. Three cases studies are presented to demonstrate the efforts 
of elected members to shape the Council’s work: one on humanitarian issues in Syria, a second 
on the protection of health care workers and facilities in armed conflict, and a third on sanctions.      
Chapter VI summarizes the findings of the dissertation and offers some suggestions for 
future research. It poses questions that researchers should consider in order to determine the 
price for achieving consensus, specifically in terms of the quality of resolutions and the 
Council’s mixed record in spite of voting unanimity on so many issues. Among the issues 
explored are the impact of unanimously adopted resolutions, the dominance of the P3 in drafting 
outcomes, and China’s role in the Council, in addition to the above mentioned discussion of the 














I:  An evolving institution 
Hampered by superpower conflict, the Council was not particularly active in its early decades of 
existence. As I argue in Chapter III, from the 1960s through the late 1980s, Council deliberations 
were often driven by the interests of developing countries, even though the veto always ensured 
that the permanent members could protect their interests. The first part of this chapter focuses on 
the evolution of the Council’s work since the end of the Cold War and explores the literature on 
this organ. It makes two key observations regarding the evolving role of the Council since the 
end of the Cold War: first, the organ has experienced (and continues to experience) a high-level 
of activity in comparison with earlier years; second, it has addressed an expanding range of 
issues as part of its international peace and security responsibilities. The literature on the 
Security Council is wide in scope and touches on many different aspects of this organ’s work. In 
surveying the literature, I explore issues such as how the Council has been characterized; how it 
has been assessed as a tool for legitimation; how its voting procedures have been described and 
analyzed; and what role its members play. The second part of this chapter assesses the literature, 
notes some the existing gaps, and describes ways in which the dissertation strives to addresses 
these gaps.  It argues that the dissertation is helpful in assessing why greater consensus has been 
achieved in the post-Cold War era as compared to the Cold War; in exploring the relations 
among all Council members; and in describing how resolutions are drafted and negotiated. A 
final section provides an analytical framework for my argument. It maintains that both normative 
and instrumental factors can be used to explain the behavior of Council members, while positing 
that the pull of strategic interests ultimately dictates how decisions are made. 
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Literature on the Security Council  
From Cold War to Today 
The Council of the post-Cold War era bears little likeness to the Council of the Cold War.33  
First, it has been much more active in recent years than it was during the Cold War.34 
Unhindered by the gridlock of superpower competition, adopting resolutions and statements is 
less difficult today than it was 30 years ago. Edward Luck’s observation that “the Council moved 
in slow motion for four decades of Cold War and has been hyperactive since its end” is just as 
relevant today as it was when he wrote those words in 2006.35 From January 1946 to December 
1991, the Council adopted 725 resolutions; since then, it has adopted over 1,600 resolutions.   
Second, the Council’s perception of international peace and security has evolved 
significantly over the past 25 years. Prior to 1990, the Council rarely made decisions on internal 
conflicts.36 Since the 1990s, internal disputes that would likely have been considered off limits 
during the Cold War because of more restrictive sovereignty norms have filled the Council’s 
agenda. Thus, the Council has addressed several human rights violations and humanitarian crises 
in domestic situations since the 1990s,37 even though implementation of its decisions on these 
matters has been lacking. Human security issues such as the Protection of Civilians in Armed 
Conflict, Children and Armed Conflict, and Women, Peace and Security have also become 
fixtures on the agenda in recent years. 38 Even Climate Change and HIV/AIDS have been 
                                                           
33 David M. Malone, ed., The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2004), 1-15. 
34 Edward C. Luck, UN Security Council: Practice and Promise (New York: Routledge, 2006), 8. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Karel Wellens, “The UN Security Council and New Threats to the Peace: Back to the Future,” Journal of Conflict 
and Security Law 8, no. 1 (2003): 56. 
37 Malone, ed., From the Cold War to the 21st Century, 644-645.  
38 Bruce Cronin, “International Consensus and the Changing Legal Authority of the UN Security Council,” in The 
UN Security Council and the Politics of International Authority, ed. Bruce Cronin and Ian Hurd (New York, NY: 
24 
 
considered threats to international peace and security by many Council members, and have been 
the focus of Council debates and outcomes. Third, the Council resorts much more frequently to 
coercive measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in the post-Cold War era than during the 
Cold War.39 In the entire Cold War period, there were only two sanctions regimes, one on South 
Africa and one on Southern Rhodesia; today, there are 14. While most UN peace operations 
during the Cold War were designed to separate warring parties and monitor a ceasefire to create 
time and space for political dialogue, nine of the 15 peace operations today have been mandated 
by the Council under Chapter VII. According to the non-governmental organization Security 
Council Report, “Whereas only 10 of the 37 resolutions adopted in 1990 were under Chapter VII 
(27.0 percent), 32 of the 53 resolutions adopted in 2012 made reference to Chapter VII 
(60.4%).”40  
In recent years, several scholars have also argued that the Council is assuming a 
legislative role.41 In the response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Council 
adopted resolution 1373, which placed broad obligations on all states to take steps to prevent 
financing to terrorists (2001) that are not time-bound. On April 28, 2004, it adopted resolution 
1540, imposing wide-ranging, temporally open-ended obligations on all states to prevent the 
spread of weapons of mass destruction to non-state actors. These resolutions have been widely 
interpreted as legislation. As Stefan Talmon states, the “hallmark of any international legislation 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
Routledge, 2008), 57-79. Cronin has noted that the increased range of the Council’s work to include human 
protection issues in internal conflicts reflects the evolution of international law that has upheld these issues and has 
been embraced by states.   
39 Luck, Practice and Promise, 8. 
40 Security Council Report, “In Hindsight: Chapter VII,” October 2013 Monthly Forecast, 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2013-10/in_hindsight_chapter_vii.php. 
41 José E. Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-makers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 196-198;  
Ian Johnstone, “Legislation and Adjudication in the UN Security Council: Bringing Down the Deliberative Deficit,” 
The American Journal of International Law 102, no. 2 (2008): 275-308; Paul C. Szasz, “The Security Council Starts 
Legislating,” The American Journal of International Law 96, no. 4 (2002): 901-905; and Stefan Talmon, “The 
Security Council as World Legislature,” The American Journal of International Law 99, no. 1 (2005): 175-193.   
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is the general and abstract character of the obligation imposed.”42 Talmon argues that in cases 
in which the Council considers making legislation—as it did with the adoption of resolutions 
1373 and 1540—it must include non-Council members in its deliberations. Otherwise, the 
“legitimacy and acceptance of its legislative acts” will be problematic, and “they may remain 
dead letters.”43 Indeed, laws promulgated by the Council that do not reflect “the general will of 
the world community” of states will be difficult to enforce.44    
While few would dispute that the Council has held an important place in international 
affairs since 1946 and that its norms and practices have evolved greatly, there are differing 
perspectives on how well it has discharged its duties over the years. Realists are generally the 
harshest critics, as they believe that international institutions like the Council merely serve the 
interests of the great powers.45 However, many scholars of the Council have a less critical 
assessment. David Bosco believes that the Council is good at defusing crises among the big 
powers but ineffective in managing many other tasks46, while Erik Voeten maintains that its 
value lies in its ability to constrain US power and maintain equilibrium in the international 
system.47 Vaughan Lowe et al. write that while the Council has handled a number of issues 
“deplorably”—including the Arab-Israeli situation since 1947, the 1994 Rwanda crisis, the 1980 
Iraq invasion of Iran, and the situation in Darfur from 2003 onward—it is nonetheless a “partial 
success” because it has “contributed to a modest degree of stability and progress in international 
                                                           
42 Talmon, “Council as World Legislature,” 176. 
43 Ibid., 187. 
44 Szasz, “Council Starts Legislating,” 905.  
45 Michael J. Glennon, “Why the Security Council Failed,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2013); and John J. 
Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19, no. 3 (Winter 
1994/1995): 7. 
46 David Bosco, Five to Rule Them All: The UN Security Council and the Making of the Modern World (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2009). 
47 Erik Voeten, “The Political Origins of the UN Security Council’s Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force,” 
International Organization 59, no. 3 (2005): 527-557. 
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relations.”48 In particular, among other achievements, they believe that the Council has played a 
role in reducing inter-state conflict since 1945, in stabilizing inter- and intra-state conflicts 
through its authorization of UN peacekeeping operations, and in promoting cooperation among 
the major powers.49  
Characterizations of the Council 
The UN is generally considered a collective security organization. In theory, this is true. Article 
1.1 of the UN Charter states that among the purposes of the organization is “to maintain 
international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the 
prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or 
other breaches of the peace.”50 In practice, however, this is far from the truth. Several scholars 
have recognized this discrepancy in their attempts to characterize the work of the Security 
Council.  Among other things, the Council has been likened to a “concert system,”51 “an elite 
pact,”52 “a Roman model,”53 and a “selective security”54 institution.     
David Bosco has suggested that the permanent members of the Security Council have 
collaborated with a sense of comity to solve major crises since the end of World War II. Bosco 
has likened the Council to the 19th century Concert of Europe, the informal grouping of major 
powers that kept the peace for nearly half a century.55 Throughout its history, according to 
                                                           
48 Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh, and Dominik Zaum, ed., The United Nations Security Council: 
The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 53. 
49 Ibid., 54-55.   
50 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations.  
51 David Bosco, “Assessing the UN Security Council: A Concert Perspective,” Global Governance 20 (2014): 547; 
and Bosco, Five to Rule Them All. 
52 Voeten, “Political Origins,” 541-553. 
53 Malone, ed., From the Cold War to the 21st Century, 3. 
54 Adam Roberts and Dominik Zaum, Selective Security: War and the United Nations Security Council since 1945, 
The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 395 (London: Routledge, 2008).  
55 Bosco, Five to Rule Them All, 5. 
27 
 
Bosco, the Council has been effective at providing a mechanism for the big powers (i.e., the 
permanent five members) to manage tensions among themselves and to preserve order during 
major crises.56 Bosco suggests that it is in part because of their deliberations at the UN that major 
war has been avoided among the permanent members since the organization’s founding.57  
However, he argues that the Council has not been particularly good at “defusing local conflicts, 
stabilizing unstable states, preventing the proliferation of dangerous weapons, punishing war 
criminals, and enforcing international sanctions.”58  
Eric Voeten has written that, since the first Gulf War, the Council has functioned like an 
“elite pact” in regard to decisions by states, especially the United States, to use force.59 If the 
Council authorizes the use of force, then member states are likely to view the use of force by the 
United States (or another power) as legitimate and not oppose military action; however, force 
employed without the approval of the Council is viewed as illegitimate by member states, which 
will retaliate with foreign policy decisions detrimental to the state(s) carrying out the military 
operation.60 In this way, the Council helps to maintain equilibrium in the international system 
and to restrain the United States.61 
In his 2004 edited volume, David Malone writes that when he and his coauthors 
considered how to characterize the post-Cold War Council, they thought that a “Roman model” 
might be appropriate, whereby “the Council serves as a senate constraining the emperor”62 (i.e., 
the US). However, Malone (and his coauthors) ultimately backs away from this assessment, 
                                                           
56 Ibid. 
57 Bosco, “A Concert Perspective,” 547. 
58 Bosco, Five to Rule Them All, 4. 
59 Voeten, “Political Origins,” 529.  
60 Ibid., 543. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Malone, ed., From the Cold War to the 21st Century, 3. 
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writing that history moves far too quickly to make such a theoretical approach for analyzing the 
Council fruitful.63 In a subsequent edited volume on the Council published in 2016, Malone and 
his co-editors recognized the changes in greater power politics that had occurred since the 2004 
volume, describing the relationship between the United States and Russia and China as a major 
factor in determining Council’s influence rather than the importance of constraining US power.64   
The “selective security” characterization of Adam Roberts and Dominik Zaum is based 
on the fact that the Council is selective in how it addresses peace and security issues.  According 
to the authors, the P5 veto and “the limited willingness of all states—whether or not members of 
the Council—to provide resources and trained personnel to resolve conflicts that they may 
perceive as distant, complex and resistant to outside involvement” are among the elements 
contributing to this selectivity.65      
Tool for Legitimation  
Several academics have argued that the Council is an instrument that can be used to legitimate 
the policies and actions of states.66 These scholars challenge realists who believe that decisions 
and actions of international institutions merely reflect the distribution of power in the 
international system.67 As far back as 1966, Inis Claude wrote that “collective legitimization is 
                                                           
63 Malone, ed., From the Cold War to the 21st Century, 3. 
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one of the most significant elements in the pattern of political activity that the United Nations has 
evolved in response to the set of limitations and possibilities posed by the political realities of 
our time.”68 States accrue political capital based on the approval of the General Assembly and 
the Security Council for their actions.69 He argued that member states had themselves accorded 
the organization this role, which reflects not “what the United Nations can do but…how it can be 
used.”70 Writing in 2003, soon after the US’s failed attempt to gain Council approval for military 
action in Iraq, Mats Berdal likewise argued that a “vital political function of the Council has 
been to serve as an instrument for collective legitimation of state action.”71    
Ian Hurd’s analysis of the Council masterfully weaves together rationalist and 
constructivist perspectives: regardless of their own positive or negative perceptions of the 
Council, individual states make a calculated effort to employ the legitimacy provided by its 
approval precisely because the wider international community of states has accorded it with that 
normative power.72 Hurd defines legitimacy as “an actor’s normative belief that a rule or 
institution ought to be obeyed.”73 He argues that rules and institutions have power because they 
exert leverage on the decision-making of states, which make an effort to appropriate the 
symbols74 of the institutions to their benefit.75 Thus, Russia sought and obtained the Council’s 
support for its deployment of peacekeepers in Georgia and Tajikistan in the 1990s because of the 
symbolic value attached to this approval, even though Russian troops generally did not adhere to 
the core principles of UN peacekeeping (i.e.: impartiality, host-country consent and use of force 
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73 Ibid., 7. 
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as a last resort).76 Whereas realists emphasize anarchy in the international system, Hurd uses the 
term “after anarchy” to describe the system, because of the leverage that international institutions 
such as the Council have over states’ decision-making, meaning that “sovereignty exists in 
international organization.”77    
Voting in the Security Council 
A number of scholars have studied voting in the Security Council.  Early work on this issue often 
focused on interpretations of article 27 (3) of the UN Charter, which outlines the organ’s voting 
procedures.78 More recently, scholars have used game theory to interpret voting in the Council as 
it is currently constituted, as well as under different scenarios for a structurally reformed 
Council.79 The definitive work on Council procedure in general—including voting procedures 
and processes—from the time of the UN’s founding to the present remains The Procedure of the 
UN Security Council, now in its fourth edition.80     
Security Council voting procedures are outlined in article 27 of the UN Charter, which states:  
1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote. 
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2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative 
vote of nine members. 
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative 
vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; 
provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party 
to a dispute shall abstain from voting.81  
The meaning of article 27 (3) was a source of debate in the UN’s early years. One issue 
that was often raised was the meaning of “concurring votes.” In particular, if the “concurring 
votes” of the permanent members were required for the adoption of a resolution, did this mean 
that an abstention by a permanent member should prevent the adoption of a resolution? Through 
analysis of voting patterns, scholars demonstrated that the regular practice has been to consider a 
P5 abstention a “concurring vote,” signifying that an abstention cannot block the adoption of a 
resolution so long as the draft receives the requisite majority of votes and is not vetoed.82 The 
first case of this occurring was the adoption of resolution 4 on 29 April 1946, when the Council 
adopted a resolution on “the Spanish question,”83 which received affirmative votes of ten of the 
11 Council members, with the Soviet Union abstaining.84  
Today, this discussion is outdated, as even a casual UN observer would not question the 
validity of a resolution adopted with a P5 abstention. However, as late as April 1966—more than 
20 years after the founding of the UN and following the adoption of numerous Council 
resolutions with one or more P5 abstentions—Portugal and Spain questioned whether resolution 
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221, which called on Portugal to prevent the transport of oil from Beira in Mozambique (a 
Portuguese colony) to Southern Rhodesia, was legally binding because France and the Soviet 
Union had abstained on the vote.85   
Another interpretive matter regarding article 27 (3) is the question of mandatory 
abstentions by parties to a dispute, in cases pertaining to Chapter VI and paragraph 3 of article 
52. In 1974, Sydney Bailey wrote that this provision of the Charter has not generally been 
honored: “There have…been a few cases where parties have abstained on peaceful settlement 
proposals, or not taken part in the vote—but only when it was pretty certain that this would not 
affect the outcome. The idea that a state should not be a judge in its own cause has been largely 
forgotten.”86  
Subsequent history has confirmed Bailey’s observation. On 5 February 1976, France 
vetoed a draft resolution that would have “consider[ed] the holding of…a referendum by the 
French Government in Mayotte…interference in the internal affairs of the Comoros.”87 More 
recently, prior to annexing the Crimea in March 2014, Russia vetoed a draft resolution that 
would have reaffirmed the Council’s “commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and 
territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders” and declared that the 
planned referendum in the Crimea “can have no validity.”88 In both cases, France (with regard to 
the Comoros) and Russia (with regard to the Ukraine) were parties to a dispute and should have 
abstained from voting in adherence to article 27 (3).   
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Game theorists have sometimes operated in the context of the debates on structural 
reform of the Council, which highlight the unfairness of the veto and the perception that the 
permanent membership does not accurately represent the geopolitical realities of the modern 
world. Barry O’Neill explores the relationship between “power” (“the probability that changing 
[a member’s] vote would change the outcome”89) and “satisfaction” (“the probability that the 
Council would pass a resolution the member wants passed or reject a resolution the member 
wants rejected”90) under different reform scenarios.91 He concludes that several of the reform 
proposals on voting would not have much effect on voting influence.92 Increasing the number of 
veto-wielding members could hinder the organ’s ability to act, although “this effect is small if 
the new members stand near positions already occupied by current veto members.”93 He also 
writes that increasing the number of non-veto holding members on the Council could “diminish 
their total power,” although “their absolute power is so small before and after that change makes 
little real difference.”94 Jonathan R. Strand and David P. Rapkin analyze the potential impact of 
weighted voting, accounting for factors such as population size and contributions to the UN, 
under different reform scenarios.95 The authors conclude that “the selection of a majority 
decision rule is a critical factor for both individual voting power and the probability that the 
organ will be able to pass a resolution.”96  
Other scholars using game theory have analyzed voting in the Council under its current 
configuration. Steve Chan measures voting “satisfaction” of veto-holding members, defined as 
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“the probability of finding oneself on the winning side,”97 in relationship to their “popularity,” 
defined as the level of “general support”98 from their peers on the 15-member organ.99 He 
concludes that “satisfaction and popularity can be inversely related in the politics of the Security 
Council.”100 Analyzing the Council’s decision-making in the 1990s, Voeten argues that while the 
United States preferred to operate through the UN, it had other options for action, either 
unilaterally or bilaterally with allies.101 As such, other veto-wielding members of the Council, 
like China and Russia, recognizing the range of options available to the United States and that 
their use of the veto could not prevent it from exercising those options, would abstain in 
exchange for concessions from the United States and some influence over actions made within a 
UN framework.102 Voeten suggests that this is why there were infrequent vetoes but a high 
number of abstentions among permanent members in the 1990s.103 
Loraine Sievers and Sam Daws provide an overview of the Council’s voting rules, 
procedures, and processes through examples demonstrating the evolution of practice over 
time.104 Among other things, the authors address issues such as the use of vetoes and abstentions, 
the difference between substantive and procedural votes, interpretations of article 27 (3) of the 
UN Charter, and the different types of Council decisions.105 Voting is only one aspect of 
procedure covered in this volume, a detailed reference book that also explores different types of 
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meeting formats, the relationship of the Council to its subsidiary bodies and other organs of the 
UN, and the roles of permanent and elected members.106   
Roles of Different Members  
There have been some efforts to analyze the role of specific states or groups of states in 
the context of their work on the Security Council. Bosco’s book is the authoritative work on the 
P5. Ilya Gaiduk writes about the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union in 
the UN from 1945-1965.107 Similar to Bosco, Gaiduk highlights to the role of the UN as a forum 
for negotiation and compromise that helped to diffuse many crises. He notes, for example, that: 
“The Suez and Cuban missile crises stand out as the most dangerous upheavals that could have 
resulted in direct encounters between the two superpowers. The UN helped to prevent these 
outcomes.”108  
Book chapters have been written on the role of the United States,109 the United Kingdom 
and France,110 Russia,111 and China112 in the Security Council, as well as on the relationship 
between the permanent and the elected members.113 Stephen John Stedman argues that the 
United States has faced a key challenge in the Council in the post-Cold War era. It values 
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Council approval of its actions, but this approval comes at a price in the form of concessions and 
constraints on action.114 The standing of the United States also suffers when it acts without this 
organ’s blessing.115 During the Cold War, when the Council was gridlocked, bypassing it may 
have been more permissible, but since it has been less obstructed over the past 25 years, such 
action sparks greater examination.116    
Thierry Tardy and Dominik Zaum underscore that the Security Council plays an 
important part in the foreign policies of France and United Kingdom today, “helping them to 
maintain a privileged position in international society that exceeds their military and economic 
clout.”117 In the early Cold War years, unlike in current times, they maintain that “an active 
Council…was at times seen as threatening core colonial interests of both France and the UK.”118 
Today, according to Tardy and Zaum, the Council promotes liberal values espoused by both 
countries119 and, given that the two countries are no longer significant military powers, “an 
active Security Council does not pose a major constraint on their foreign and security 
policies.”120   
Zhu Wenqi and Leng Xinyu note that there has been a transformation in China’s 
approach to the Council since 1990s, when it often deferred to “the Western-driven 
transformation of the Council into an interventionist organ mandating a wide range of highly 
intrusive measures in a significant number of civil wars.”121 They maintain that in more recent 
years “China has become increasingly active and assertive in the Security Council, both in 
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defending its own interests as well as in displaying a greater readiness to challenge Western 
agendas.” 122  
Dmitri Trenin argues that “Russian officials reject criticism that Moscow’s frequent use 
of the veto destroys consensus among the permanent members and renders the Security Council 
dysfunctional.”123 Rather, he maintains, Russia envisions itself as “the guardian of international 
law and thus a pillar of global stability”124 in a world in which “such actions as the 2003 invasion 
of Iraq, undertaken without a Council mandate…undermine the international system and global 
security.”125   
In discussing the relationship between the P5 and the E10, Kishore Mahbubani argues: 
“the P-5 have been given power without responsibility; the E10 have been given responsibility 
without power.”126 He notes, for example, the irresponsibility of the P5 with regard to the 
Rwanda and Srebrenica crises in the mid-1990s, adding that the Council could have learned by 
conducting its own assessment of its handling of these situations, but that such an assessment 
was likely not conducted because it would have heavily implicated the permanent members.127 
While Mahbubani’s chapter was written over 10 years ago, many of his observations about the 
disparities between the permanent and elected members still ring true today, such as the hidden 
veto (i.e., the threat of veto, which stymies engagement on certain issues before they are even 
voted on) and the limited institutional memory of the elected members.128        
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Assessment of Literature 
Several key conclusions can be drawn from assessing the literature on the Council. First, there is 
a dearth of analysis of why there has been an increase in voting unanimity since the end of the 
Cold War. Second, efforts to characterize the Council often focus on limited aspects of its work, 
rather than viewing its activities holistically. Third, the literature provides little description of 
how the Council’s outcomes (i.e. its resolutions and statements) are conceived, negotiated and 
drafted.   
Consensus, but Why?  
As I argue in Chapter III, much of the division among Council members in the Cold War— 
including among the P3, who have been closely aligned in the post-Cold War era—had to do 
with developing countries tabling draft resolutions on divisive issues. While a number of 
scholars have observed the trend toward more consensual decision-making in the Council in the 
post-Cold War era,129 little effort has been made to explore why this is so.    
Voeten provides the one exception in his article on the Council in the 1990s. He correctly 
notes that the United States struck deals with other permanent members to avoid vetoes from 
being cast, arguing that decisions are often the result of bargaining rather than “harmonious 
interests.”130  
Concessions and bargaining are an important element of decision-making in the Council. 
But they are not the only reasons why greater unanimity has been achieved. Permanent members 
value the Council as a foreign policy instrument, so they are generally reluctant to veto 
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resolutions, and will often work with other P5 colleagues to avoid vetoes where possible. A more 
united Council legitimizes policies more effectively, a point Claude made in his famous article 
on the legitimating role of the UN.131 He stated that a resolution that has the support of all the 
permanent members “is taken more seriously than one on which three of them abstain.”132 He 
likewise wrote that members valued the “significance of resolutions [in the UN’s political 
organs] according to the size and composition of the majorities supporting them and the 
forcefulness of the language in which they are couched.”133 What Claude did not adequately 
capture was the fact that clarity and precision in language is sometimes the price to be paid for 
securing large majorities, which can lead to implementation challenges. The “forcefulness of the 
language”134 that he alluded to is often sacrificed to achieve unanimity.   
Claude is correct in that permanent members value unanimous voting because they 
believe it gives greater political weight to the organ’s outcomes. However, at the time of 
Claude’s article, unanimous decision-making was not as prevalent as it has been in the Council 
since the end of the Cold War, and its pursuit was frequently not possible in the same way. 
Difficult geopolitical conditions, under-developed processes for negotiation and dialogue, and 
ambivalence among some permanent members about the role of the UN in their foreign policies 
hampered efforts to achieve unanimity.     
Characterizations of the Council  
Given the Council’s broad peace and security mandate, it is very difficult to characterize the 
scope and complexity of its activities. This is why so much of the scholarship on the Council 
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focuses on discrete aspects of its work, such as its engagement in particular country cases, its 
handling of particularly thematic issues, or its legislative role (which is limited to specific 
counter-terrorism resolutions.) Bosco persuasively argues that the Council is more effective if 
assessed as a “concert”—i.e., a bargaining mechanism to diffuse tensions among the permanent 
members—than as a tool for “governance” to maintain international peace and security.135 He 
correctly maintains that the Councils’ governance functions include “suppress[ing] the insecurity 
that besets much of the globe by resisting aggression, defusing local conflicts, stabilizing 
unstable states, preventing the proliferation of dangerous weapons, punishing war criminals, and 
enforcing international sanctions.”136 At same time, it should be noted that such “governance” 
efforts constitute a significant portion of the Council’s work. Furthermore, many of the 
“governance” functions that Bosco describes have implications for great power relations if they 
are not addressed at an early point, so that the “governance” work of the Council can potentially 
overlap with its “concert” role.      
Describing the Council as an “elite pact”137 or as a “Roman model”138 is a way of using 
the power of the United States as a starting point for characterizing the Council. This view tends 
to give short shrift to the power and influence of the other veto-wielding members, particularly 
China and Russia, in a multipolar international system. It may be that the “elite pact” and 
“Roman model” characterizations, made in the mid-2000s, were influenced by the still-raw 
memories of the Iraq intervention of 2003, and in retrospective, Malone and his coauthors were 
wise to ultimately retract the assessment of the Council as a “Roman model,” correctly noting 
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that the rapid pace of historical events made theorizing about such models unproductive.139 
Russia’s actions in Syria and the Ukraine—and its blockage of an effective Council response—
are a grim reminder that the United States is not the only great power with influence in the 
United Nations.  By the time Malone and his colleagues published a successor volume in 2016, 
they acknowledged that the primary concern in the Council is no longer harnessing US power: 
“the shift in power and policies of the five permanent members, as well as the complex relations 
among them, have significantly altered the dynamics of the body, giving rise to a new set of 
concerns.”140 They conclude that at present “the greatest threat to the relevance of the Security 
Council is the possibility of a standoff between the newly assertive Russia and China and a 
United States…that is seen as increasingly unwilling to shoulder more international burdens than 
absolutely necessary.”141      
In this dissertation, I take a holistic view of the work of the Security Council. I look at a 
broad range of Council decisions, and while the focus is primarily on the P3, there is also 
discussion of the interactions among all five permanent members, as well as the interactions 
between and among permanent and elected members.  
Drafting and Negotiating 
Another area that I address is how resolutions and statements are drafted and negotiated. This 
issue is important because it provides a sense of how decisions are made; what kinds of leverage 
states exert over decision-making processes; and how members view their role on the Council.  
While some authors address different aspects of drafting and negotiating, they do not do so in 
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great detail. This dissertation provides a more thorough analysis of the different ways in which 
resolutions are conceived, drafted and negotiated than other works on the Council.     
Analytical Framework 
The framework for my argument has both normative and rational-choice elements. These two are 
often treated as distinct categories in political science, but as Hurd has noted, that need not be the 
case.142 The “collective legitimation” function of the Council has long been recognized by 
scholars.143 Having endowed the Council with a privileged place in their foreign policies, the 
permanent members have accepted the value of achieving consensus as a means of validating 
their decisions. Elected members have accepted this norm as well.  
Constructivist scholars have emphasized the importance of persuasion in the promotion 
of norms.144 In this sense, it seems logical that if powerful states in the international system, 
represented by the permanent members, emphasized the need to create greater harmony in the 
international system as the Cold War ended, and voting together in the Security Council was a 
reflection of this, then the permanent members would be able to influence other Council 
members to follow suit. As a norm gets more firmly entrenched, there are reputational costs that 
come into play with violating the norm, while peer pressure also helps the norm to gain 
acceptance.145 And the norm is not just accepted by elected members; permanent members as 
well become tied to the norm that they helped to create. The impact of peer pressure and the 
effects on their reputations of violating consensus helps to explain the voting behavior of both 
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permanent and elected members in recent decades, as nearly 92 percent of all resolutions since 
1992 have been unanimously adopted. At the same time, more often than not, unanimity is a goal 
to be achieved not merely for its normative value but because it is viewed as a means to an end. 
As I argue in Chapter IV, Council members believe that unanimous decisions are more likely to 
be adhered to by the subject parties and implemented by the broader UN membership.  
Neo-liberalism demonstrates how international institutions can help to enhance 
cooperation.146 Through iterative interactions, actors “learn about the preferences and constraints 
facing other governments;”147 make promises to others in exchange for their support148 and 
exercise prudence in their decision-making because of concerns about reciprocal measures.149   
These factors come into play in the Council, which is a forum for working through difficult 
issues in order to achieve mutually acceptable agreements. During the multiple rounds of 
negotiations on resolutions, red-lines are established by the veto-wielding members that can 
undermine the outcome if crossed, proposals are made representing members’ preferences, and 
compromises are struck on language that sometimes result in tortured prose. Permanent members 
make deals from time to time—or threaten consequences for non-compliance—to secure votes 
on issues of importance to them: for example, as Voeten has written, to ensure that China and 
Russia would not block the Council’s endorsement of the use of force to expel Iraq from Kuwait 
in 1990, the United States “incurred the cost of compromise, in terms of both the resolution text 
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and debt concessions, support for World Bank loans, and financial aid.”150 As Voeten correctly 
noted in 2001: “Agreement among the five permanent veto powers on multilateral action does 
not imply that these states have harmonious interests now that the Cold War has ended.”151 His 
observation still holds true today. It is consistent with Axelrod’s and Keohane’s observation that: 
“Cooperation is not equivalent to harmony.”152 On some issues, there is widespread agreement in 
the Council.  But on others, consensus is achieved at a price. 
While the Council often serves as a useful forum for negotiation and reaching agreement 
and there is a normative value to achieving unity, it is important to note that core strategic and 
domestic interests ultimately guide the behavior of states. In some cases, members may not be 
strongly wedded to a resolution, but they will vote in favor of it because they do not have a major 
interest at stake in opposing it and because they value the importance of a unified Council in 
having a positive impact in promoting peace and security. However, in cases in which the pull of 
their strategic interests or domestic politics is strong and contradicts the substance of a draft 
resolution—or in cases where little effort is made to compromise and there are fundamental 
disagreements on the content of a text—states will break the norm. In spite of the fact that 
Council members have unanimously adopted the overwhelming number of draft resolutions 
voted upon  in the post-Cold War era, this explains why the United States frequently vetoes draft 
resolutions critical of Israel or why Russia continues to veto resolutions on Syria. Furthermore, 
the support of the Council is desirable to legitimize major peace and security decisions or to 
convince the international community of states of the need to implement those decisions, but the 
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permanent members do not perceive it as a necessity.153 As Richard Haas has written, “…no 
country, much less a major power, is prepared to forgo the opportunity to act on behalf of what it 
perceives as its national interest simply because it lacks a blessing from the United Nations.”154 
Conclusion 
This chapter analyzed a range of literature on the Security Council. It found that there were gaps 
in the literature in terms of explaining the rise in post-Cold war unanimity in Council voting. It 
further explained that future chapters will explore interactions among the permanent and elected 
members alike, as well as the processes by which resolutions are conceived, negotiated and 
drafted, an area not adequately explored in scholarship on the Council. The chapter concluded by 
noting that while the Council has been an effective mechanism for bargaining, resolving 
differences, and deal-making, efforts to achieve unanimity are as a general rule usurped by the 
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II:  Statistics on Security Council resolutions and vetoes  
In October 2014, during a Security Council working methods debate, Wang Min, the Deputy 
Permanent Representative of China to the UN, stated the following: 
 [The Security Council] should continue to pursue democratic consultations and political 
collective decision-making. Council members share the same responsibilities for 
maintaining international peace and security. The more complex and urgent the crises and 
challenges are, the greater the need for Council members to work together to be united in 
purpose and efforts and to cooperate fully in ways that reflect the principles of justice and 
democracy. All Council members should have ample time for studying the draft 
resolutions and presidential statements presented and, through patient consultations and 
negotiations, reach broad consensus and preserve the solidarity of the Council, rather than 
forcing texts through on which there are still major differences.155 
While elected members would correctly dispute the notion that the Council’s deliberations are 
democratic, Ambassador Min accurately captures the efforts made to achieve widespread 
consensus that have typified Council decision-making in the post-Cold War era. As the data in 
this chapter demonstrates, there has been a noticeable trend toward unanimous outcomes over the 
past 25 years. A higher percentage of resolutions are adopted unanimously and a lower 
percentage of draft resolutions are vetoed as compared with the Cold War. This chapter traces 
the evolution of Council voting on resolutions and draft resolutions between 1946 and 2016; in 
the process, it charts the trajectory toward greater consensus from a statistical standpoint.   
At the same time, the chapter observes that the unanimity forged to adopt a resolution is 
not necessarily synonymous with agreement. A resolution receiving 15 affirmative votes is often 
a compromise document that may be poorly suited to the situation at hand or may conceal 
fundamental differences among members, at times resulting in implementation difficulties.      
                                                           




The statistical data on Security Council resolutions demonstrates a clear trend toward consensual 
decisions in the post-Cold War era.156 In the Cold War era, which officially ended with the 
implosion of the Soviet Union in December 1991, 725 resolutions were adopted, although the 
analysis here only includes 714 resolutions because the vote tally is unclear on 11 resolutions.157   
The Council achieved unanimity on 62.88 percent of the Cold War resolutions (449 of 714) in 
this analysis. In the post-Cold War era, from January 1992 through the end of 2016, the Council 
adopted 1611 resolutions; 91.93 percent of the resolutions were adopted (1481 of 1611) 
unanimously. Thus, there is a more than 29 percent increase in the percentage of resolutions 
adopted unanimously in the post-Cold War era as compared to the Cold War period.    
In my analysis, I have chosen to include as unanimous votes those in which the members 
present and voting have voted affirmatively. In some cases, the reason why a member does not 
participate in a vote is to reflect its displeasure with the Council’s work or with its handling of a 
matter. (Non-participation is different from an abstention, as it means that the member does not 
even cast a vote, whereas an abstention is a type of vote.) Assuming that non-participation 
undermines the spirit of consensus—even in cases where all those present and voting support a 
draft resolution—the Cold War is even more striking in terms of the level of divisiveness, as 
there were prolonged periods when the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union did not 
                                                           
156 Consensus decisions include those in which all members present and voting cast an affirmative vote, as well as 
rare instances in which resolutions are adopted without a vote.  
157 Eight of these resolutions were voted on in parts; the vote count on each of these parts is not reflected in the 
historical record.  The vote tally was not recorded in two resolutions. One resolution was adopted in a private 
meeting, without a public record of the vote count.   
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participate in Council meetings and votes. During the post-Cold War period, it has been rare for 
a member not to participate in a vote.158 
From early January through the end of July 1950, the Soviet Union did not participate in 
Council meetings in protest of the continued presence of Nationalist China on the Council as a 
permanent member, even though mainland China had fallen to the People’s Republic of China 
(i.e. the Communist forces of Mao Zedong) in December 1949.159 During this period, the Soviet 
Union was absent for seven votes, including “a series of resolutions setting up a military 
command to support the South Koreans” in the Korean War.160   
The People’s Republic of China (i.e. mainland or Communist China), like the Soviet 
Union, missed a significant number of votes; this occurred from late 1971, when it took over the 
seat previously belonging to the Republic of China (i.e. Taiwan or nationalist China) through 
1981.161 As Sievers and Daws write, the People’s Republic of China “began to refrain from 
participating in the vote on matters arising from decisions taken when Nationalist China 
occupied the Chinese seat on the Council, and this continued for almost a decade.”162 The 
Council adopted 52 resolutions in this period without China voting. It is worth noting that this 
change of seat, which had been opposed by the United States, was the result of a General 
Assembly vote that reflected the changing composition of the world body, with the rising 
                                                           
158 The one notable example of a member in the post-Cold War period not participating in Council deliberations was 
Rwanda in mid-1994.  After the Rwandan Patriotic Front wrested power from the Hutu-dominated government in 
July 2014, thus ending the genocide in the country, Rwanda’s seat was temporarily vacant, and it did not cast a vote 
on four resolutions: S/RES/937 of 21 July 1994 (Haiti); S/RES/938 of 28 July 1994 (Lebanon), S/RES/939 of 29 
July 1994 (Cyprus), and S/RES/940 of 31 July 1994 (Haiti).      
159 See David Bosco, Five to Rule Them All: The UN Security Council and the Making of the Modern World (New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009), 55-57, for a discussion of the Soviet Union’s absence.  
160 Ibid, 56. 
161 Loraine Sievers and Sam Daws, The Procedure of the UN Security Council, Fourth ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 351. 
162 Ibid., 350-351. 
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number of developing countries sympathetic to the People’s Republic of China in the General 
Assembly, helping Beijing to garner the requisite votes to unseat the Republic of China.163   
The move toward consensus-driven decisions in the Council in the post-Cold War era is 
often assumed to have resulted from the thaw in East-West relations. While this is a major part of 
the story, less well known is that the trend toward unity among the P3 in the Council is more 
pronounced in the post-Cold War era than during the Cold War. In the Cold War, the P3 voted 
together 88.80 percent of the time on adopted resolutions (634 of 714) in this analysis; they have 
voted as a bloc on adopted resolutions 99.01 percent (1595 of 1611) of the time from 1992 to 
2016.   
That the P3 profess shared values with regard to human rights, democracy and the rule of 
law is a truism and can explain in part why they have converged so often in their voting, 
especially since 1992. At the same time, however, their voting convergence is also part of the 
broader effort among the P5 to cultivate consensus in decisions since the end of the Cold War.  
While the P3 have voted together as a bloc approximately 99 percent of the time on adopted 
resolutions from 1992 to 2016, the P5 (i.e., the P3 and China and Russia) have voted as a bloc on 
adopted resolutions in the same period 93.97 percent of the time (1514 of 1611 resolutions), a 
striking statistic that demonstrates the frequency with which voting unity is struck among 
permanent members with divergent interests and ideological views.  
 
 
                                                           
163 Bosco, Five to Rule Them All, 123. Bosco notes that “…Beijing…had skillfully positioned itself as a champion of 




One might argue that analyzing the frequency of the veto’s use provides the best gage of how 
united or divided the Security Council is in its decisions. After all, an abstention by a permanent 
member cannot block the adoption of a resolution, while a veto on all but procedural matters 
does. Although the veto has been used frequently in the post-Cold War era in ways that 
undermine the Council’s effectiveness, it has been employed with much less frequency than 
during the Cold War. Unfortunately, there are no statistics on threatened vetoes, which have the 
same impact as a formal veto; information on threatened vetoes would help to increase our 
ability to gauge the level of divisiveness in the Council. Over all, the veto was used 239 times on 
195 draft resolutions from the founding of the UN through the end of 2016.164  Between 1946 
and 1991, the veto was used 201 times on 164 draft resolutions. Between 1992 and 2016, the 
veto was used 38 times on 31 resolutions. In other words, during the Cold War, the veto was 
employed an average of 4.47 times per year (201 times in 45 years), whereas since then it has 
been used an average of 1.58 times per year (38 times in 24 years).    
The P3 have not voted as a bloc on 81 of the 195 draft resolutions vetoed through 2016.  
During the Cold War, they did not vote together on 67 of 163 vetoed draft resolutions.165 In the 
post-Cold War era, they did not vote together on 14 of the 31 vetoed draft resolutions through 
2016. On the surface, this would indicate considerable division among the P3 on resolutions that 
have been vetoed in the post-Cold War era. However, it should be noted that 13 of 14 of these 
                                                           
164 The reason why there is a discrepancy between the number of vetoes and the number of draft resolutions vetoed 
is because in some cases two or three permanent members have vetoed the same draft resolution.  Veto statistics 
used in this chapter were generated by the Dag Hammarskjöld Library and are available at: 
http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick. 
165 One draft resolution on the Corfu Channel incident, which was vetoed by the USSR on 25 March 1947, is 
excluded from this analysis as the United Kingdom, a party to the dispute, recused itself from the vote in accordance 
with article 27 (3) of the UN Charter. 
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vetoes were on a single issue, Israel/Palestine, thus demonstrating the level of unity on the wide 
variety of other matters.    
Parsing further the data with regard to how the permanent members have used the veto 
reveals several interesting patterns since 1946: 
China 
The Republic of China (i.e., Nationalist China), which held a permanent seat on the Council until 
late 1971, never used the veto. The People’s Republic of China (i.e., Communist China) has only 
used the veto 10 times through 2016. In the Cold War, the People’s Republic of China used the 
veto only once, in order to block Bangladesh’s membership to the UN (1972). In the post-Cold 
War era, prior to China’s joint vetoes with Russia beginning in 2007, it employed the veto on 
two occasions to register its disapproval with countries hosting UN peace operations that 
recognized Taiwan.166 These included one draft resolution that would have enhanced the staffing 
capacity of the UN Mission for the Verification of Human Rights and of Compliance with the 
Comprehensive Agreement of Human Rights in Guatemala (MINUGUA) (1997) and another 
draft resolution that would have reauthorized the UN Preventive Deployment Force in the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (UNPREDEP) for an additional six months (1999).   
A general reluctance to employ the veto through the mid-2000s has given way to a 
greater willingness to exercise this prerogative in conjunction with Russia to defend states whose 
sovereignty it believes is being threatened. China has employed the veto seven times jointly with 
Russia between 2007 and 2016 on Myanmar (2007), on Zimbabwe (2008), and on Syria on five 
occasions (once in 2011, twice in 2012, once in 2014, and once in 2016).  
                                                           




France has employed the veto on 16 occasions, but not since December 1989, when it vetoed a 
draft resolution in conjunction with the United Kingdom and the United States that would have 
condemned the US intervention in Panama. It first exercised its veto during the Suez crisis of 
October 1956, when it jointly voted against two draft resolutions with the United Kingdom, 
putting it in direct political confrontation with the United States. Between 1974 and 1981, 
France, in conjunction with the United Kingdom and the United States, vetoed 10 draft 
resolutions that, if adopted, would have been detrimental to the interests of apartheid South 
Africa. It also joined with United States and the United Kingdom to veto draft resolutions in 
April 1986 and January 1989 that would have condemned the US bombing of Libya and the 
shooting down by the United States of Libyan reconnaissance planes, respectively. France cast 
its only sole veto in February 1976 on a draft resolution that would have considered France’s 
intention to organize a referendum in Mayotte, an island of the Comoros (a recently independent 
French colony), interference in the affairs of the Comoros.167   
Soviet Union/Russia 
The Soviet Union dominated the use of the veto in the early years of the UN. It was the only 
permanent member to take advantage of its veto prerogative during the first ten years of the 
UN’s existence; from February 16, 1946, the date of the first veto, to 15 December 1955, the 
Soviet Union cast the sole veto on 57 draft resolutions. The Soviet Union cast about 90 percent 
of vetoes (82 of the first 91) by all permanent members through 1971; thereafter, other 
permanent members increasingly use the veto. A common Soviet tactic through 1961 was to veto 
                                                           
167 Comoros gained independence from France in 1975. The referendum was to ascertain whether the population of 
Mayotte wanted to be part of the newly independent Comoros or be a part of France.  The referendum was 
conducted, with the population overwhelmingly choosing to remain part of the Comoros.   
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membership applications for countries trying to enter the UN that were not favorably disposed to 
Soviet policies.168 Russia has employed the veto 15 times between 1992 and 2016; in recent 
years, it has resorted to the veto more frequently, as 12 of these 15 have been cast in the last 
decade of this period (i.e., 2007-2016). As noted above, Russia cast seven joint vetoes with 
China between 2007 and 2016.  
United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom has used the veto 29 times, all during the Cold War era. Like France, it 
first employed the veto during the Suez crisis of October 1956. Also like France, the United 
Kingdom has not cast a veto since the December 1989 draft resolution on the US intervention in 
Panama. While it frequently cast vetoes in conjunction with France and the United States to 
defend the interests of apartheid South Africa, the United Kingdom often acted alone in casting 
negative votes on draft resolutions pertaining to Southern Rhodesia, a British colony that gained 
independence as Zimbabwe in 1980. Between 1963 and 1973, it vetoed seven draft resolutions 
on Southern Rhodesia, five of which were cast alone and two jointly with the United States.  
Another notable UK veto was on a draft resolution calling for a ceasefire during its military 
campaign in the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, cast in conjunction with the United States in June 
1982.   
 
 
                                                           
168 On the Soviet Union’s early use of the veto, see Sievers and Daws, The Procedure of the UN Security Council, 
298-299.  On the use of the veto with regard to membership applications, see Anjali V. Patil, The Veto, A Historical 
Necessity: A Comprehensive Record of the Use of the Veto in the UN Security Council 1946-2001, (in-house 





The United States cast its first veto in 1970 and has cast significantly more vetoes than any other 
permanent member since then, a total of 79 from 1970 to 2016, with the Soviet Union/Russia 
running a distant second with 25 vetoes in the same time period. The US cast 65 of its 79 vetoes 
from 1970 to 1991.  In the post-Cold War era, it cast 14 vetoes through the end of 2016.   
Most frequently, the US has employed its veto to defeat draft resolutions that it has 
perceived as being detrimental to the interests of Israel. Use of the veto to protect Israel has been 
a consistent trend of US policy since 1972. Between 1972 and 1991, it cast 66.12 percent (28 of 
43) of its sole vetoes on Israel/Palestine, or related issues (e.g., Israeli involvement in Lebanon).  
The 14 US vetoes cast in the post-Cold war era (1992-2016) have been sole vetoes, virtually all 
of which (13) have been on matters related to Israel/Palestine. The other veto was on a draft 
resolution in June 2002 on the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which the US voted 
against because it did not want US peacekeepers subject to the jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court.169   
The following chart shows the propensity of the permanent members to use the veto 
during the Cold War and post-Cold War eras.   
Table 1. Use of the Veto 
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post-Cold War 
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0 9 15 0 14 
Total 16 10 104 29 79 
 
Combining Abstentions and Vetoes170 
When combining the votes on draft resolutions that were either adopted or vetoed, Council 
members made unanimous decisions 76.59 percent of the time between 1946 and 2016 (1930 of 
2520 draft resolutions) in this analysis. As expected, there was considerable division during the 
Cold War, and there has been frequent unity in the overall voting patterns in the post-Cold War 
era.  During the Cold War (1946-1991), Council members voted unanimously in favor of draft 
resolutions 51.42 percent of the time (452 of 879 draft resolutions), taking into account adopted 
and vetoed draft resolutions. However, in the post-Cold War era (1992-2016), Council members 
have unanimously adopted 90.19 percent of draft resolutions (1481 of 1642) that were put to a 
vote and either adopted or vetoed.    
Combining vetoes and abstentions, the P3 voted together 92.98 percent (2345 of 2522 
draft resolutions) of the time between 1946 and 2016. However, there is a considerable 
discrepancy in their voting solidarity between the Cold War and the post-Cold War eras. In the 
Cold War (1946-1991), they voted as a bloc 83.30 percent (733 of 880 draft resolutions) of the 
time on adopted and vetoed draft resolutions; in the post-Cold War era (1992-2016), they have 
voted in unison 98.17 percent  (1612 of 1642 draft resolutions) of the time on adopted and vetoed 
draft resolutions.   
                                                           
170 This analysis does not include the handful of draft resolutions that were not vetoed but were not adopted because 
they failed to reach the required number of votes for adoption.     
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So What?  What Statistics Don’t Tell 
Statistically the trend toward unanimous voting is an indisputable element of Council decision-
making during the post-Cold War era. The caveat, of course, is that states still break this norm. 
The veto causes gridlock in the Council on situations in which one or more of the permanent 
members have a key stake, frequently having a devastating impact on the lives of people on the 
ground. For example, the trend toward greater voting unanimity matters little to populations 
suffering from vetoes pertaining to Syria and Ukraine.    
Another issue worth reiterating is that unanimous decisions are not necessarily good 
decisions. Sometimes the best compromise that can be made among all 15 Council members is a 
bad one for populations in need. Very weak resolutions are occasionally the price that is paid to 
avoid a veto.   
Council action during the early weeks of the Rwandan genocide makes this point.      
Resolution 912, which decreased the size of the force of UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda 
(UNAMIR) at the outset of the Rwandan genocide, was adopted unanimously on 21 April 1994; 
while it might have been better than no resolution at all, it was nonetheless a bad resolution for 
the people of Rwanda. Since much of the Council (including, most importantly, the permanent 
members) was not willing to take meaningful action to stop the genocide, it may have been the 
only way forward for the “small group of countries seeking to preserve the mandate, to keep the 
force in place, and to reinforce it as soon as possible…,” according to Colin Keating, the then-
Permanent Representative of New Zealand and the Council president in April 1994.171 
Nonetheless, it was not commensurate with the need for a more robust force willing to take 
                                                           
171 Colin Keating, “Rwanda: An Insider’s Account,” in The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st 
Century, ed. David M. Malone (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 508.  
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action to stop the genocide. Resolution 918, adopted on 17 May 1994, was another weak 
resolution, authorizing minimal reinforcements for UNAMIR. The resolution was voted on in 
two separate parts: the only negative vote cast on the first part of the resolution was by Rwanda, 
which was perpetrating the genocide and was a member of the Council at the time; the second 
part of the resolution was adopted unanimously.172 At that point, most of the Council was 
supportive of a stronger resolution than what resulted, but the veto-holding United States blocked 
more substantive action.173 The records will thus show that near consensus had been achieved on 
these resolutions, but this masked strong divisions on the Council, and ultimately helped to seal 
the fate of the victims of the genocide.  
There are also cases when resolutions are unanimously adopted, but the members will not 
make a concerted effort to implement the measures outlined, and may even undermine the 
resolutions that had their support. Since 2011, the Council has voted unanimously every year to 
renew the panel of experts of the Sudan Sanctions Committee.174 Yet some panel of experts 
reports in recent years have referred to violations of the arms embargo, with Sudan shipping 
weapons into Darfur produced by permanent members China and Russia after the embargo was 
imposed on all parties to the Darfur conflict in 2005.175 Admittedly the arms embargo is on the 
                                                           
172 UN Security Council meeting record (S/PV.3377), 16 May 1994.  
173 Keating, “Rwanda: An Insider’s Account,” 509. 
174 See UN Security Council resolution 2200, 12 February 2015; UN Security Council resolution 2138, 13 February 
2014; UN Security Council resolution 2091, 14 February 2013; UN Security Council resolution 2035, 17 February 
2012; and UN Security Council resolution 1982, 17 May 2011.   
175 See, for example, Letter dated 16 January 2015 from the Vice-Chair of the Security Council Committee 
established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan addressed to the President of the Security 
Council (UN Security Council document S/2015/31), 16 January 2015; Letter dated 7 February 2014 from the 
Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan 
addressed to the President of the Security Council (UN Security Council document S/2014/87), 7 February 2014; 
and Letter dated 5 February 2013 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to 
resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan addressed to the President of the Security Council (UN Security 
Council document S/2013/79), 12 February 2013.   
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Darfur region of Sudan, not the country as whole, but even a casual follower of events would 
realize that weapons shipped to Khartoum have been used in Darfur in violation of the embargo.  
A final point to be made is that the lack of data on the threatened veto is a further 
indication that it is difficult to tell how divided the Council is by looking at voting patterns alone.  
Kishore Mahbubani, who headed Singapore’s Council team in 2001-2002, has gone as far as to 
allege that “…while the formal veto is rarely used, the informal veto is used almost every day, 
especially in the frequent and more important informal consultations among Council 
members.”176 Although it is unclear just how often this hidden veto is used, it does appear that its 
use is not infrequent. It can cause the member or members that have proposed a draft to 
withdraw it. Likewise, members that are contemplating whether to produce a draft on a particular 
issue may not even proceed with their idea, if they suspect that their draft could be doomed by a 
veto. The hidden veto (like the formal veto) is part of what makes the Council a “selective 
security” institution, as Adam Roberts and Dominik Zaum have called it.177 For example, The 
New York Times reported in October 2015 that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had 
not been held accountable by the Council for its human rights violations because of the threat of 
a veto by China.178   
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that there has been a movement toward unanimity in Security 
Council voting during the post-Cold War era. This represents a departure from the Cold War, 
                                                           
176 Kishore Mahbubani, “Council Reform and the Emerging Powers,” in The UN Security Council in the 21st 
Century, ed. David M. Malone, Bruno Stagno Ugarte, and Sebastian von Einsiedel (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2016), 158. 
177 Adam Roberts and Dominik Zaum, Selective Security: War and the United Nations Security Council since 1945, 
The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 395 (London: Routledge, 2008). 
178 Somini Sengupta, “Calls Grow at U.N. for Security Council to Do Its Job: Keep the Peace,” World Section, The 
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when there was considerable more division in voting. Even states like the P3, which have 
generally been aligned on foreign policy since the end of World War II and faced a common 
Soviet threat in the Cold War, have been more aligned in their voting patterns in the post-Cold 
War era. At the same time, it is important to recognize that voting unity is different from 
agreement; sometimes the unanimity achieved on a resolution masks internal divisions among 
members that can lead to resolutions which are not suited to the needs required or which key 
states on and off the Council do not have the will to implement. Additionally, weak commitment 



















III: A rising developing world in the Council 
In the Cold War, some of the most contentious issues the Council addressed—the Suez crisis, the 
Congo, and Southern Rhodesia, among others—focused on crises in recently independent states 
or in states about to gain their independence. The greatest rupture among the P3 was the Suez 
crisis. During this crisis, France and the United Kingdom were directly opposed to the United 
States, which was on the same side as the Soviet Union for the first and only time in a major 
Cold War crisis. Differences in approach among the P3 were reflected in the UN’s engagement 
in the Congo in the early 1960s,179 although these were less pronounced than during the Suez 
crisis. US efforts to defend Israeli interests were another source of tension among the P3 that 
played out in Council deliberations in the 1970s and the 1980s and continue to this day. In a 
small number of instances, there were policy differences on agenda items in the Americas, 
largely resulting from heavy-handed US policies justified by fears about Communist interference 
in its backyard.   
By the early to mid-1960s, the rising membership in the world body of developing 
countries was shaping the work of the Council, forcing consideration and votes on issues like 
Southern Rhodesia, Angola, and South Africa. The conventional view of the Cold War is of an 
East-West confrontation, and in the Council, this tension was clear in a number of dramatic 
confrontations between the Soviet Union and the Western states over issues like the Korean 
conflict, Hungary, Berlin, and Cuba that put the Soviet Union and the US in direct confrontation 
with each other.   
                                                           
179 On these differences, see Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the UN: A Peculiar Relationship (Columbia: 
University of Missouri Press, 2010), 49-70. 
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Nonetheless, especially from the 1960s onward, much of this East-West tension played 
out in the context of the developing world’s struggle to break free from the shackles of colonial 
rule and its anti-Zionist approach to world affairs, with the Third World serving as a battlefield 
for superpower influence.180 Where there were disagreements among the P3, even subtle ones, 
these were often exposed by developing countries tabling draft resolutions, thus forcing the 
permanent members to show their hand through Council votes.    
The process by which resolutions were often negotiated in the Cold War would be 
unfamiliar to the modern day observer of the Council. On matters of great importance to the 
permanent members, there would be significant deliberations on texts. However, quite frequently 
resolutions would be voted upon with little, and on occasion, no substantive negotiation, leading 
to abstentions and vetoes that might have been avoided. Carefully managed negotiations are 
more typical of today’s Council than that of the Cold War.   
This chapter explores the Council’s deliberations and voting patterns of the P3 during the 
Cold War; historical background is provided as required to contextualize the analysis. The 
chapter starts with a discussion of the most significant rupture among the P3 in the Cold War, the 
Suez crisis of 1956, followed by a discussion of the Congo crisis of the early 1960s. After these 
two cases ensues an analysis of the developing world’s impact on the Council deliberations from 
the 1960s onwards. A final section focuses on the processes by which the Council negotiated 
resolutions until the waning years of the Cold War. 
 
                                                           
180 Ilya V. Gaiduk, Divided Together: The United States and the Soviet Union in the United Nations, 1945-1965 
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2012), 303. Gaiduk correctly notes, “…a great majority of the questions 
that arose starting in the mid-1960s were connected with the North-South divide, not the East-West conflict.  The 
competition between the United States and the Soviet Union did not subside, but both superpowers were now 
competing on North-South issues for the sympathies of the newly independent nations.”   
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Two post-colonial crises: the Suez and the Congo 
Crises in the Suez and the Congo predated the surge of activism in the Council by developing 
countries. This is largely because much of the developing world had yet to join the organization, 
and hence could not serve in the Council. The UN membership expansion was only beginning to 
rise in earnest at the time of the Suez crisis in 1956 and was still in the midst of rising by the time 
of the Congo crisis in 1960. Both Egypt and the Congo were recent post-colonial states, where 
France and the UK had considerable economic and political interests. These two issues are a 
useful place to start because they demonstrate how member states in the developing world would 
come to occupy much of the UN’s attention and cause friction among the permanent members, 
including the P3. The difficulties in the Suez and the Congo were a harbinger of the deep 
engagement the Council would have in the post-colonial world in the decades to come, and in 
fact, still has today. 181   
The Suez Crisis  
The Suez crisis represents the most significant rupture in relations among the P3 in the post-
World War II era, one that had the potential for perilous geopolitical consequences, given the 
military engagement of France and the United Kingdom and the political interests of the Soviet 
Union and the United States in the region. It also presaged one of the themes that would become 
an important characteristic of international affairs from the 1960s to the 1980s—the assertiveness 
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of the post-colonial states. In this instance, that assertiveness was embodied in Gamal Abdel 
Nasser, president of Egypt. 
The crisis was precipitated by Nasser’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal in July 
1956, threatening the political and economic interests of France and the United Kingdom, who 
were the Suez Canal Company’s key shareholders.182 Diplomatic efforts to come up with an 
acceptable formula for managing the canal, notably through the London Conference in August 
1956, were unsuccessful, as “proposals…for the continued international control of the Canal 
with the participation of Egypt were rejected by Nasser.”183 What France and the United 
Kingdom viewed as Egyptian intransigence prompted them to issue a joint letter to the Security 
Council on 12 September.184    
In the letter, the waning colonial powers maintained that Egypt had failed to negotiate on 
the basis of proposals that “offer[ed] a means for a just and equitable solution,” proposals that 
had been presented by 18 of the 22 states attending the conference, who “represent[ed] between 
them over ninety per cent of the user interest in the Canal.”185 Consequently, they argued that the 
rejection of these proposals was “an aggravation of the situation, which, if allowed to continue, 
would constitute a manifest danger to peace and security.”186  
In fact, both powers had already been planning with Israel, which continued to endure a 
series of small scale cross-border terrorist attacks from Egyptian fedayeen, a military operation to 
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take control of the Canal Zone.187 This ill-fated operation was concocted by Britain and France 
without the knowledge of their close ally, the United States, which had made it clear that military 
force was not an option to resolve the impasse.188 Operation Musketeer called for Israeli forces 
to attack Egypt, ostensibly in response to the fedayeen raids, followed by an Anglo-French 
ultimatum to both Egypt and Israel to cease hostilities within 48 hours, to disengage at least 10 
miles from the Canal Zone, and to permit British and French forces to take positions in Ismailia, 
Port Said, and Suez, in order to serve as a buffer between the parties and to protect shipping in 
the Canal Zone.189 If the parties did not stop fighting in the 48-hour period and withdraw their 
forces as dictated, then the United Kingdom and France would launch a military operation. The 
assumption, correct as it turned out, was that Egypt would resist a demand to stop defending its 
sovereign territory from invasion, which would enable the French and British governments to 
argue that their ultimatum had been violated and allow them to proceed with their military 
plan.190 
On 28 October, Operation Musketeer was put into motion when Israeli forces attacked 
Egypt through the Sinai Peninsula, and the Anglo-French ultimatum was issued on 30 October. 
Suspicious of Anglo-French collusion with Israel, the US government was alarmed at the 
potential political, economic and geostrategic consequences of such a plan. In a 29 October 1956 
telegram to the US embassy in Paris, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles posited that if 
France and the United Kingdom become involved in a conflict in the Middle East, “they will 
have started something they cannot finish and the end result may very well be an intensive anti-
Western sentiment throughout the Middle East and Africa and intimacy with [the] Soviet Union 
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which will impair…indispensable relations of Europe with [the] Middle East and Africa.”191 In 
addition to having grave economic consequences in France, the United Kingdom, and Western 
Europe, Dulles further expressed the view that the United States would be “unlikely” to help its 
allies, as it had in the two world wars, when “they were clearly victim[s] of armed 
aggression.”192   
Upon receiving news of the Israeli attack on Egypt, the United States quickly requested a 
Council meeting, wanting to gain the upper-hand in the arena of public opinion by going to the 
Council before the Soviet Union.193 During the public session of October 30, Soviet Ambassador 
Arkady Sobolev accurately described the Anglo-French-Israeli deception: “It is plain from 
everything that is happening that Israel could not have made this attack without encouragement 
and help from…aggressive circles which…are trying to find some pretext for moving their 
troops into this area.”194 He proceeded to read from an Associated Press article describing the 
Anglo-French ultimatum giving Egypt and Israel 12 hours to withdraw from the Canal Zone, and 
accurately concluded that the article “makes it quite clear that the intention is to intervene in the 
events taking place in the Middle East without waiting for United Nations action.”195  
While not unusual for a Soviet representative to chastise a NATO member, the divisions 
among members of the Western alliance in the subsequent public session later in the day were 
unusual. The United Kingdom and France clashed openly with the United States. UK 
Ambassador Pierson John Dixon dutifully defended the ultimatum that had been presented to 
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Egypt and Israel, maintaining the need to pressure the parties to end their hostilities and to ensure 
that the Canal Zone would remain open.196 Supported by French Ambassador Bernard Cornut-
Gentille,197 he urged action not to be taken on the draft resolution that had been proposed  by the 
United States,198 which called on Israel to immediately “withdraw its armed forces behind the 
established armistice lines” and called on member states “to refrain from giving any military, 
economic or financial assistance to Israel” as long as it failed to comply with the resolution.199   
US Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge refused to withdraw the draft from consideration, arguing: 
“If this draft resolution is adopted and complied with by Israel, then the basis for the ultimatum 
will have disappeared.”200 Just before the vote, Lodge posited that the vote would “have 
considerable moral effect” and represented “something we all should do.”201   
In the ensuing vote, France and the United Kingdom cast their first ever vetoes; in fact, 
their joint vetoes represented the first time any of the permanent members, other than the Soviet 
Union, had used their veto privilege. Australia, a Commonwealth nation, abstained, as did close 
French ally Belgium.  All other members voted in favor of the draft. 202  
Later the same day, France and the United Kingdom vetoed a second draft resolution,203  
which had been put forth by the Soviet Union with amendments from the Republic of China and 
Iran.204 According to Urquhart, the main difference in the second vetoed draft as compared to the 
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first one was that it “omitted the clause calling on all UN member states to refrain from the use 
or threat of force.”205   
The irony of this unseemly display of P3 disunity was that neither UK Ambassador 
Dixon nor French Ambassador Cornut-Gentille was informed of Operation Musketeer by their 
respective governments.206 Defending their countries’ interests at the UN took a heavy personal 
toll on them. Urquhart writes that: “On 31 October, Cornut-Gentille collapsed from heart trouble 
brought on by nervous exhaustion.”207 Adekeye Adebajo writes that Dixon “considered resigning 
over the issue” and quotes him as saying that defending the UK position in the UN General 
Assembly brought on “‘the severest moral and physical strain I have ever experienced.’”208 
Given the impasse in the Council, the matter was referred to the General Assembly 
through the Uniting for Peace procedure. Uniting for Peace, conceived during the Korean War by 
the United States to bypass a Soviet veto, was based on General Assembly resolution 377 (V) of 
3 November 1950, which stated that: “If the Security Council because of lack of unanimity of the 
permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security….the General Assembly shall consider the matter 
immediately…”.209 While France and the United Kingdom voted against resolution 119, which 
referred the Suez crisis to the General Assembly, they could not block the resolution because this 
was a procedural matter not subject to a veto.210   
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The General Assembly almost immediately played a constructive role.  On 2 November, 
with British and French troops in Egypt, it adopted a resolution urging an immediate ceasefire.211 
It then authorized the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) to “secure and supervise the cessation of 
hostilities”212 on November 4. The creation of a UN force facilitated UK and French cooperation 
in withdrawing their troops from Egypt.213  
While the crisis was over, its repercussions on France and the United Kingdom, on the 
Western alliance and on the functioning of the Council were considerable. With both the Soviet 
Union and the United States aligned against them, France and the United Kingdom had no choice 
but to retreat. The political fall-out in the United Kingdom resulted in Prime Minster Anthony 
Eden’s resignation.214 The United States vowed to block International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
funds to the United Kingdom, until French and UK soldiers had withdrawn from Egypt,215 and 
“British and French embassies all over the world were…attacked by infuriated mobs…”.216    
The Suez crisis occurred concurrently with the Soviet Union’s invasion of Hungary, 
impacting the Council’s treatment of the later issue. US ire at its French and UK allies with 
regard to Suez made it unwilling to co-sponsor with them a resolution condemning the Soviet 
attack on Hungary and calling for an emergency special session of the General Assembly.217 Ilya 
Gaiduk notes that US President Dwight Eisenhower and US Secretary State John Foster Dulles 
“suspected that this proposal by the Western allies was intended to deflect attention from events 
in the Middle East and claimed that they lacked adequate information about what was happening 
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in Hungary.”218 He even suggests that this “noncommittal attitude” by the United States resulted 
in the Hungarian issue being given short shrift both in the Security Council and in the 
Secretariat.219  
The Congo Crisis   
The Congo came onto the Council’s agenda within days of the Council’s adoption of resolution 
142 on 7 July 1960, admitting it as a UN member state. By this date, Congolese troops had 
already begun mutinying against Belgian officers (who had been kept in place to help train the 
new Congolese army) and committing violence against Belgian citizens.220 In response, the 
Belgian government deployed troops “to restore order and protect Europeans...”.221 To 
compound the challenges facing the newly independent country, Moise Tshombe, the head of the 
Congo’s mineral rich Katanga province, proclaimed Katanga’s secession on 11 July 1960.222   
Amidst ongoing violence in the new state and the attempted secession of Katanga 
province, Congolese President Joseph Kasavubu and Congolese Prime Minister Patrice 
Lumumba wrote to UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld requesting UN military 
intervention “to protect the national territory of the Congo against the present external 
aggression,” asserting that its “request [was] justified by the dispatch to the Congo of 
metropolitan Belgian troops in violation of the treaty of friendship signed between Belgium and 
the Republic of the Congo on 29 June” which indicated that “Belgian troops may only intervene 
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on the express request of the Congolese Government.”223 After receiving this request, 
Hammarskjold called an urgent meeting of the Council, invoking article 99 for the first time in 
the UN’s history. 224   
The great powers had different understandings of the Congo crisis and how to address it.    
The United States believed that that the UN could play a useful role in keeping Cold War politics 
out of the new state,225 an aspiration which ultimately failed. A US State Department briefing 
paper produced for a 19 January 1961 meeting between President Eisenhower D. Eisenhower 
and President-elect John F. Kennedy noted: “We believe a UN solution is still the best answer 
for the Congo and that the advantage of adherence to our policy of support for the UN outweighs 
possible advantages inherent in a program of unilateral action in the Congo.”226 Allowing the UN 
to take the lead in the Congo would further allow the United States to distance itself from 
charges of supporting colonialism;227 it would back the UN engagement in the Congo, while 
being less critical of the calls for the departure of Belgian troops than its British and French 
colleagues.228 The US desire to distance itself from pro-colonial sentiments was especially 
critical given the changing composition of the UN General Assembly;229 as Odd Arne Westad 
has written, “…the advent of new, independent Third World states began already in 1960 to 
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change the role of the United Nations into a more diverse forum, less susceptible to American 
influence than before.”230   
France and the United Kingdom were sympathetic to the initial Belgian intervention. 
They viewed it as a necessary measure to protect the lives of foreign nationals.231 Their views 
may have further reflected a sense of kinship with another colonial power and concerns with 
their economic interests in the Katanga region.232 However, the United Kingdom was ultimately 
more supportive of the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) than France,233 which “was opposed 
to U.N. intervention in principle,” according to Ernest W. Lefever.234 France registered its 
disagreement with the UN’s involvement in the Congo crisis by abstaining on five of six 
resolutions adopted on the issue in the early 1960s.235 In some cases, Paris maintained that the 
texts were too critical of what it perceived as Belgium’s efforts to protect its nationals and 
provide stability, a concern it shared with London. For example, France and the United Kingdom 
(along with the Republic of China) abstained on resolution 143 (14 July 1960) because the text 
called on Belgium “to withdraw its troops from the territory of the Republic of the Congo”236 
when UN forces were not yet in place. Both France and the United Kingdom believed that this 
condemned their NATO ally (Belgium), which they maintained was providing a humanitarian 
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service in the Congo, protecting foreigners from violence.237 Furthermore, resolution 143 
authorized the UN to provide military assistance to the Congo government, but for France and 
the United Kingdom, it was not sufficiently clear that this meant that Belgian troops should leave 
only once this military assistance came, an interpretation of the resolution held by the United 
States but not by the Soviet Union.238  
The French abstentions on the Congo, on drafts always supported by the United States 
and often supported by the United Kingdom, can also be explained by Charles de Gaulle’s 
negative view of ONUC and of the UN more broadly.239 De Gaulle believed that the UN’s 
involvement exacerbated the political and security problems of the Congo. Given that France had 
not voted in favor of the mission’s deployment, it decided to withhold financial support for 
ONUC.240 This dereliction of financial responsibility, along with that of the Soviet Union, helped 
to precipitate a financial crisis in the Organization.241  According to Lawrence Kaplan, the 
French unwillingness to financially support ONUC differentiated it from the United Kingdom: 
“…Britain’s weight ultimately fell on the UN side. Unlike France, it never withheld financial 
support for ONUC.”242 
De Gaulle believed that the great Western powers (France, the United Kingdom and the 
United States) could have done a better job of handling the Congo crisis than the United 
Nations.243  By September 1960, only two months into ONUC’s deployment, he argued that had 
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France, the United Kingdom, and the United States collaborated in a unified way, they could 
have resolved the Congo crisis in a manner that “‘would have been preferable to the bloody 
anarchy that…exists in the new state’” and one that would have ensured “‘the prestige and 
cohesion of the West’” better than “‘playing second fiddle to the so-called ‘United’ Nations.’”244 
According to Lefever, in de Gaulle’s view this would entail the three powers overseeing an 
orderly process by which “a significant cadre of Belgian administrators, technicians, and 
probably military officers would remain in the Congo to carry on the functions of the state until a 
sufficient number of Congolese had been trained to take over.”245 
Above and beyond the Congo crisis, de Gaulle resented what he thought was the world 
body’s meddling in the management of colonial matters, a particularly sensitive issue to him 
given the post-World War II decline of the French and the other European empires. According de 
Gaulle, “…the United Nations has no right according to its own Charter to intervene in an affair 
which is under the internal jurisdiction of France.”246 This attitude underscored France’s 
bitterness toward General Assembly engagement with Algeria and Hammarskjöld’s handling of 
the quarrel between France and Tunisia.247 In his biography of Hammarskjöld, Urquhart writes 
of the former secretary-general: “his admiration for de Gaulle seems to have made 
Hammarskjöld reluctant to recognize de Gaulle’s view of him as an international interloper 
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attempting under false pretenses to gain admission to the hollowed fraternity of leaders of 
powerful sovereign states.”248 
De Gaulle was appalled by the views of the newest members of the UN General 
Assembly, whom he maintained were more interested in airing their grievances and making 
demands than achieving results.249 He further lamented what he perceived as the encroachment 
of the General Assembly on Security Council responsibilities: “…the General Assembly…[has] 
assumed all powers. It can deliberate on everything, without and even against the advice of the 
Security Council which is thus disposed of its essential prerogative.”250 Meetings at the United 
Nations, according to de Gaulle, were no more than “riotous and scandalous sessions…filled 
with invectives and insults…especially by the Communists and those who are allied with them 
against the Western nations.”251   
The Soviet Union was also disillusioned with ONUC, but for different reasons than 
France. It would support UN engagement so long as it would hasten the departure of Belgian 
troops,252 as it maintained that the Belgian intervention was a colonial exercise supported by 
other Western powers designed to strip the Congo of its newfound independence.253 It quickly 
soured on the UN operation. It was troubled by delays in the departure of Belgian troops,254 the 
continued support of the Katanga rebellion by foreign mercenaries,255 and the view that the 
United Nations was pro-Western in its approach to the Congo.256 
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The Soviet Union vented its anger in Council meetings. At the 13 December 1960 
meeting, it complained that most of the UN military and administrative staff working in the 
Congo was from NATO and pro-Western states.257 The Soviet Union was also upset at the UN’s 
closure of the Congolese airports and the Leopoldville radio station in early September 1960.258 
The United Nations  took these measures to inhibit the mobility of Congolese Armed Forces and 
to prevent the airwaves from being used to incite violence;259 however, they disadvantaged the 
pro-Soviet Lumumba in his power struggle against Kasavubu, who had access to a strong radio 
transmitter in Congo (Brazzaville) due to his alliance with its leader, Abbé Youlé.260 
Ambassador Valerian Zorin of the Soviet Union implied that a double standard was at play, 
because the mission closed down the radio station and airfields, but did nothing to stop the forces 
of General Joseph Mobutu,261 a US ally.262   
Soviet anger at the UN’s handling of the Congo crisis culminated following the 
assassination of its client, Patrice Lumumba, on 12 February 1961. At the Council meeting on 15 
February 1961, it went so far as to introduce a draft resolution calling for an end to the Congo 
mission within a month and the dismissal of Secretary-General Hammarskjöld; this draft was 
voted down by the Council in a meeting on 20/21 February, 1961, with the Soviet Union casting 
the sole vote in favor of its own resolution.263  
Amidst contentious discussions in the Council, it was the elected members that filled the 
void by proposing draft resolutions that would garner enough support to be adopted. In the six 
                                                           
257 UN Security Council meeting record (S/PV.920), 13-14 December 1960, 6, para. 20-22.  
258 Ibid., 12, para. 48. 
259 Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, 445. 
260 Ibid., 445; and U Thant, View from the UN (London: David & Charles, 1978), 115. 
261 UN Security Council meeting record (S/PV.920), 13-14 December 1960, 12, para. 48-49. 
262 U Thant, View from the UN, 118. 
263 UN Security Council meeting record (S/PV.942), 20-21 February 1961, 18, para. 89. 
76 
 
resolutions adopted on the Congo between 14 July 1960 and 24 November 1961 on the Congo, 
five were proposed by elected members from the developing world.264 The other resolution, 
proposed by the United States, was adopted on 17 September 1960; its sole purpose was to call 
an emergency special session of the General Assembly, given that “the lack of unanimity” of the 
permanent members at a recent Council meeting had “prevented it from exercising its primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.”265   
The rise of the developing world 
The Congo crisis took place in the midst of a rapid expansion in the membership of the United 
Nations between the mid-1950s and the mid-1960s. In 1955, the organization consisted of 76 
member states.266 Over the next decade, its size nearly doubled, so that by 1965, the UN 
comprised of 117 member states.267 This expansion was largely the result of a rapid wave of 
decolonization that swept across Africa, Asia and the Middle East.   
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Coming from the developing world, many of the new members shared a deep sense of 
injustice at the wrongs suffered at the hands of colonial overseers. They coalesced around an 
agenda that emphasized economic and social justice, racial equality, and decolonization as a 
means to promote international peace and security. In essence, their wide-ranging agenda 
suggested that the three pillars of the UN Charter—human rights, development and peace and 
security—had been systematically violated by the developed world and that global political, 
economic and social inequities needed to be quickly redressed. This view had a strong impact on 
the politics of the UN from the 1960s through the end of the Cold War.   
By the early 1960s, a number of resolutions began to be adopted in the UN General 
Assembly criticizing the inequities of the international order. UN General Assembly resolution 
1514, which was adopted on 14 December 1960 and called for the independence of colonial 
countries and their people, provided an early exposition of the new members’ outlook. This 
resolution—entitled a “Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and 
peoples”—urged a rapid and “unconditional end [to] colonialism,” declaring that it “constitutes a 
denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an 
impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation.”268 Late the following year, the 
Assembly adopted Resolution 1698 on the “Racial discrimination in Non-Self Governing 
Territories,” condemning “the policy and practice of racial discrimination and segregation in 
Non-Self-Governing Territories.”269 In the ensuing years, the General Assembly increasingly 
demanded self-determination for subjugated populations in specific cases, including South 
Africa, South West Africa, and Southern Rhodesia, among other examples.   
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The policy aspirations of the developing world were largely represented by the Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM). The NAM provided an organizing platform for the developing 
world, enabling it to articulate unified policy positions on issues of common concern with the 
weight of a membership that continued to grow from the 1960s to the 1980s. Although the NAM 
alleged impartiality in the East-West Cold War confrontation, its demands for an end of 
colonialism and imperialism and for social and economic justice were consistent with Soviet 
ideology and propaganda. In UN fora, the NAM found useful allies in the Soviet Union and other 
eastern bloc countries, which frequently supported the NAM’s positions. 
The increasing percentage of developing countries in the General Assembly meant that 
the elected composition of the Security Council also changed. This impacted the work of the 
Council. The Soviet Union recognized that the UN membership was becoming more favorably 
inclined toward Soviet positions.270 This meant it was no longer compelled to use the veto in the 
Security Council to block membership applications to the world body, which was a common 
practice in the early years. Reflecting on this practice, long-time Soviet Ambassador to the UN 
Yakov Malik noted, “it was sad that the USSR veto was repeated many times, but this was a 
situation I could not help.” 271   
The chart below demonstrates the growth in membership of the UN between 1945 and 
1985, the year Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union. Concurrently, it 
demonstrates the increased participation of the NAM in the UN over this time period by 
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indicating which member states would become members of the Movement prior to 1990, the 
year before the Soviet Union collapsed. I do not chart the growth in UN membership through 
1990 because only a negligible number of states (i.e., only two) joined the organization between 
1985 and 1990; Liechtenstein and Namibia became UN member states in 1990. As indicated in 
chart, the number of UN member states that joined the NAM during the Cold War was 
significant; by 1985, 82 of the UN’s 159 member states (more than half) were part of the NAM.  
Table 2. Growth in UN Membership and NAM Representation in the UN 1945-1985272 
Founding member states of the United Nations in 1945 (51 founding UN member states):  19 of the founding 51 
members of the UN had become NAM members prior to 1990 
Argentina (NAM), Australia, Belgium, Bolivia (NAM), Brazil, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Chile 
(NAM)273, Republic of China, Colombia (NAM), Costa Rica, Cuba (NAM), Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador (NAM), Egypt (NAM), El Salvador, Ethiopia (NAM), France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, 
India (NAM), Iran (NAM), Iraq (NAM), Lebanon (NAM), Liberia (NAM), Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Nicaragua (NAM), Norway, Panama (NAM), Paraguay, Peru (NAM), Philippine Republic, Poland, Saudi 
Arabia (NAM), Syria (NAM), Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela (NAM), and Yugoslavia (NAM) 
Member states joining the UN between 1946 and 1955 (76 UN member states by 1955): 30 of the 76 members of 
the UN in 1955 had become NAM members prior to 1990 
Afghanistan (1946) (NAM), Albania (1955), Austria (1955), Bulgaria (1955), Burma (1948) (NAM), Cambodia (1955) 
(NAM), Ceylon (Sri Lanka) (1955) (NAM), Finland (1955), Hungary (1955), Iceland (1946), Indonesia (1950) (NAM), 
Ireland (1955), Israel (1949), Italy (1955), Jordan (1955) (NAM), Laos (1955) (NAM), Libya (1955) (NAM), Nepal 
(1955) (NAM), Pakistan (1947) (NAM), Portugal (1955), Romania (1955), Siam (Thailand) (1946), Spain (1955), 
Sweden (1946), and Yemen (1947) (NAM)  
Member states joining the UN between 1956 and 1965 (117 UN member states by 1965): 52 of 117 members of 
the UN in 1965 had become NAM members prior to 1990 
Cameroun (1960) (NAM), Central African Republic (1960) (NAM), Chad (1960) (NAM), Congo (Brazzaville) (NAM) 
(1960), Congo (Leopoldville) (1960) (DRC) (NAM), Cyprus (1960) (NAM), Dahomey (1960) (Benin) (NAM), Gabon 
(1960) (NAM), Ghana (1957) (NAM), Guinea (1958) (NAM), Ivory Coast (1960) (NAM), Japan (1956), Malagasy 
Republic (1960) (Madagascar) (NAM), Federation of Malaya (Malaysia) (1957) (NAM), Mali (1960) (NAM), Morocco 
(1956) (NAM), Niger (1960) (NAM), Nigeria (1960) (NAM), Senegal (1960) (NAM), Somalia (1960) (Somalia), Sudan 
(1956) (NAM), Togo (1960) (NAM), Tunisia (1956) (NAM), and Upper Volta (1960) (Burkina Faso) (NAM) 
Member states joining the UN between 1966 and 1975 (144 UN member states by 1975): 74 of 144 members of 
the UN in 1975 had become NAM members prior to 1990 
Bahamas (1973) (NAM), Bangladesh (1974) (NAM), Bahrain (1971) (NAM), Bhutan (1971) (NAM), Barbados (1966) 
(NAM), Botswana (1966) (NAM), Cape Verde (1975) (NAM), Comoros (1975) (NAM), Equatorial Guinea (1968) 
(NAM), Fiji (1970), German Democratic Republic (1973), Federal Republic of Germany (1973), Grenada (1974) 
(NAM), Guinea-Bissau (1974) (NAM), Guyana (1966) (NAM), Lesotho (1966) (NAM), Mauritius (1968) (NAM), 
                                                           
272 The chart was compiled using the following sources: United Nations website, “Growth in United Nations 
membership, 1945-present,” available at http://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/growth-united-nations-
membership-1945-present/index.html, and Nagaoka University of Technology, “Non-Aligned Movement 
Participants, Observers, and Guests,” available at http://kjs.nagaokaut.ac.jp/mikami/NAM/member_list.htm   
273 Chile was only briefly a NAM member in 1973.   
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Mozambique (1975) (NAM), Oman (1971) (NAM), Papua New Guinea (1975), Qatar (1971) (NAM), Sao Tome and 
Principe (1975) (NAM), Suriname (1975) (NAM), Swaziland (1968) (NAM), United Arab Emirates (1971) (NAM) and 
Yemen (1967)(NAM) 
Member states joining the UN between 1976 and 1985 (159 UN member states by 1985): 82 of 159 members of 
the UN in 1985 had become NAM members prior to 1990 
Angola (1976) (NAM), Antigua and Barbuda (1981), Belize (1981) (NAM), Brunei Darussalam (1984), Dominica 
(1978), Djibouti (1977) (NAM), Saint Lucia (1979) (NAM), Saint Christopher and Nevis (1983), Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines (1980), Samoa (1976), Seychelles (1976) (NAM), Solomon Islands (1978), Vanuatu (1981) (NAM), 
Vietnam (1977) (NAM) and Zimbabwe (1980) (NAM) 
 
The information in the above chart is consolidated in the one below.  
Table 2.1. Growth in UN Membership and NAM Representation in the UN 1945-1985 
(consolidated) 
Year  Number of UN member states that 
would join the NAM by 1990 
Number of total UN member 
states 
1945 19 51 
1955 30 76 
1965 52 117 
1975 74 144 
1985 82 159 
 
The Council was expanded in 1966 from 11 to 15 members with the addition of four 
more elected seats, as a result of P5 acquiescence and “proposed revisions to the charter [that] 
secured the needed ratifications” in the General Assembly in 1965.274 By 1967, four Council 
members were part of the NAM. From 1967 to 1990, the number of NAM members on the 
Council never went below four, and in some calendar years, was as a high as eight.275  
The chart below shows the number of Security Council members which were part of the 
NAM during their tenures from 1965 to 1990.  
                                                           
274  Bosco, Five to Rule Them All, 102. 
275 In 1983 and 1984, eight of the 15 Council members were part of the NAM.  
81 
 
Table 3. Security Council Members which were part of NAM (1965-1990) 
 






























As a result of the influx of developing countries in the UN with their activist approach, 
the “issues taken up by the Organization as a whole, and the approach to those issues...” 
changed.276 The permanent members, particularly France, the United Kingdom and the United 
States, were forced to react to anti-colonial initiatives spearheaded by the developing world. This 
significantly changed the pattern of vetoes in the Council, with the Soviet Union using the veto 
less and the Western states using the veto more. As Sievers and Daws have demonstrated, 
between 1 January 1966 and 1 May 2014, the United States and the United Kingdom cast more 
vetoes than the Soviet Union/Russia.277 Many of the more contentious issues on the Council’s 
agenda in the second half of the Cold War came onto the agenda of the Council during the 
1960s, such as Angola (1961), the Congo (1960), South Africa (1960), Southern Rhodesia 
(1963), and South West Africa (1968).   
The initial treatment of many agenda items resulted largely from the initiative of 
developing countries, rather than the permanent members, who were supposed to be the primary 
guardians of international peace and security. Likewise, many of the vetoed resolutions from this 
time period, and indeed, through the end of the Cold War, were based on texts proposed by 
developing countries; often times, the P3 would not vote together on these texts. The level of 
activity from elected members and their allies in the General Assembly calling for Council action 
and tabling controversial drafts is a far cry from the Council of the post-Cold War era, which has 
by and large been tightly managed by the permanent members.  
                                                           
276 Loraine Sievers and Sam Daws, The Procedure of the UN Security Council, Fourth ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 298. 
277 Sievers and Daws, The Procedure of the UN Security Council, 299. 
83 
 
In the 1960s, several developing countries would frequently ban together to alert the 
Council to potential threats to international peace and security. This was the case, for example, 
with agenda items related to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, disarmament, 
Namibia/Southwest Africa, Portuguese territories in Africa, South Africa, and Southern 
Rhodesia. These became controversial issues leading to several vetoes or non-unanimous 
resolutions. They came onto the agenda as follows:        
• On 25 March 1960, 30 developing states wrote to the Council requesting that it “consider 
the situation arising out of the large-scale killings of unarmed and peaceful demonstrators 
against racial discrimination and segregation in the Union of South Africa.”278 This 
became the agenda item “Complaint Concerning South Africa” on 30 March 1960.279   
• Following the collapse of the May 1960 Paris Summit, Argentina, Ceylon, Ecuador and 
Tunisia circulated to the Council a draft resolution urging the great powers (France, the 
Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom) to recommence negotiations as 
quickly as possible.280 The draft, focusing on disarmament, was adopted on 27 May 1960 
as resolution 135, with nine votes in favor and two abstentions (Poland and the Soviet 
Union.)281 
                                                           
278 Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, Complaint concerning South Africa (letter of 25 March 1960), 
155-156, http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/59-63/Chapter%208/59-63_08-4-
Complaint%20concerning%20South%20Africa%20(letter%20of%2025%20March%201960)%20.pdf. 
The thirty countries included Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Ghana, 
Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and Yemen.   
279 Ibid., 156. 
280 Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, Letter of 23 May 1960 from the representatives of Argentina, 
Ceylon, Ecuador and Tunisia, 158, http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/59-63/Chapter%208/59-63_08-6-
Letter%20of%2023%20May%201960%20from%20the%20representative%20of%20Argentina,%20Ceylon,%20Ecu
ador%20and%20Tunisia.pdf. 
281 Ibid., 159. 
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• On 11 July 1963, 32 developing states wrote to the Council saying that apartheid 
constituted a threat to peace and security, and the matter was placed on the agenda of the 
Council on 22 July 1963 as “The Question of Race Conflict in South Africa.”282  
•  On 22 July 1963, the Council included on its agenda the “Situation in Territories in 
Africa Under Portuguese Administration.” The impetus for the inclusion of this item was 
an 11 July 1963 letter forwarded the Council from 32 member states which maintained 
that Portugal’s colonial domination of its African territories, namely Angola, undermined 
international peace and security.283  
• “The situation in Southern Rhodesia” came onto the agenda on 9 September 1963, 
following the submission to the Council of a 2 August 1963 letter from Ghana, Guinea, 
Morocco, and the United Arab Republic calling for the Council to meet on this matter.284  
In a memorandum affixed to the letter, these member states argued that “the continuance 
of the situation was likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and 
security.”285   
                                                           
282  Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, The question of race conflict in South Africa, 213, 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/59-63/Chapter%208/59-63_08-25-
The%20question%20of%20race%20conflict%20in%20South%20Africa.pdf.  The 32 states were Algeria, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Dahomey, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanganyika, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic, and 
Upper Volta.  
283 Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, Situation in territories in Africa under Portuguese 
administration, 209, http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/59-63/Chapter%208/59-63_08-23-
Situation%20in%20territories%20in%20Africa%20under%20Portuguese%20administration.pdf.  The 32 members 
that were submitted by Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo 
(Leopoldville), Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanganyika, Togo, Tunisia, 
Uganda, United Arab Republic and Upper Volta.   
284 Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, Situation in Southern Rhodesia, 217-218, 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/59-63/Chapter%208/59-63_08-24-
Situation%20in%20Southern%20Rhodesia.pdf. 
285 Ibid., 217. 
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• On 1 December 1964, 22 members wrote a letter to the Council that “drew attention to 
the various attempts made by the Organization of African Unity with a view to the 
peaceful adjustment of the situation”—i.e. the Democratic Republic of the Congo.286 This 
was considered in the Council’s proceedings, beginning on December 9, 1964 when it 
became the agenda item, “Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”287 
• “The Question of Southwest Africa” was placed on the agenda on 25 January 1968 after a 
request for a meeting was made by 49 member states from the developing world,288 
“following the decision of the Government of South West Africa to resume the ‘illegal’ 
trial at Pretoria of thirty-five South West Africans in violation of their rights and of the 
international status of the Territory of South West Africa, and in persistent defiance of 
General Assembly resolutions on the question.”289 A little more than a year later, on 20 
March 1969, “the Situation in Namibia” was made an agenda item,290 following the 
submission of a 14 March 1969 letter to the Council from 40 developing world member 
states that maintained that the “General Assembly…had terminated the mandate of the 
                                                           




288 Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, The question of Southwest Africa, 164-165, 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/66-68/Chapter%208/66-68_08-10-
The%20question%20of%20South%20West%20Africa.pdf. 
289Ibid., 165. The 49 states included Algeria, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Congo (Brazzaville), Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, 
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Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, 
Togo, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volte, Yemen, Yugoslavia and 
Zambia.    
 




South African Government to administer Namibia” (Southwest Africa) and arguing that 
the Namibian people had the right to self-determination.291   
A number of other requests in the 1960s for Council consideration of issues that became agenda 
items were made by developing states, often in the form of complaints by individual states. Such 
complaints were frequently made by developing states concerned about their independence and 
sovereignty.292  
The assertiveness of the developing states in the Council’s work was further 
demonstrated by their willingness to propose draft resolutions for consideration, even when the 
outcome of votes was uncertain. In the early years of the United Nations, drafts that were vetoed 
were often proposed by permanent members France, the United Kingdom and the United States 
or their allies.293 Many of these were membership applications that were vetoed by the Soviet 
Union.  However, by the 1970s, the drafts that would be vetoed were increasingly proposed by 
Council members from the developing world and their counterparts among the wider UN 
membership, a trend that would last through the end of the Cold War.294   
Most of the vetoes from 1970 through the end of the Cold War were P3 vetoes, primarily 
cast by the United States. These vetoes were the product of the influence of the new members 
whose strength in numbers enabled them to push an agenda in the General Assembly that spilled 
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over into the Council. Their influence was limited in the Council because of the veto of the 
permanent members, but they were nonetheless able to shape the organ’s agenda, allowing them 
to voice their views in debates and propose draft resolutions that forced the permanent members 
to take a position on matters that they most likely would have preferred to handle on their own 
terms, not necessarily through the Council. Since the developing world’s policies frequently 
gained the sympathy of the Soviet Union (and after October 1971, the People’s Republic of 
China), the P3 was largely on the defensive in the Council’s consideration of many issues, 
compelling them to use their veto or to abstain on resolutions not entirely to their liking.      
Several P3 vetoes and abstentions were cast on unresolved colonial issues in Africa that 
had come onto the agenda in the 1960s—such as Angola, the Congo, Namibia, Southern 
Rhodesia, and South Africa—or from issues in the Americas that aroused US sensitivities (for 
example, Nicaragua, Panama, and Grenada). However, draft resolutions that were detrimental to 
the interests of Israel were vetoed more than any other matter, under agenda items that included 
“the situation in the Middle East,” “the question of the exercise by the Palestinian people of its 
inalienable rights,” “The Middle East problem including the Palestinian question,” “the situation 
in the occupied Arab territories,” and the “Request by Libya and Pakistan for consideration of 
the serious situation arising from recent developments in the occupied Arab territories.”295  
Between 1970 (when the US cast its first Security Council veto) and 1990, the United States cast 
vetoes (all sole vetoes) on 29 drafts related to these agenda items.296 
** 





Although the Council’s treatment of several country-specific cases demonstrates the 
assertiveness of elected members from developing world, I have chosen to focus in greater depth 
on three in particular (Southern Rhodesia, Israel/Palestine, and Nicaragua) for three reasons.  
First, the Council’s treatment of these issues collectively demonstrates that voting divergences 
among the P3 were focused on a regionally and substantively diverse set of issues. Second, taken 
together, the focus on these issues spans a wide-time period of the organ’s history, demonstrating 
the longevity of the developing world’s influence on the deliberations and practices of the 
Council. The first veto on these issues was cast by the United Kingdom on 13 September 1963 
on Southern Rhodesia297 in a period when the Non-Aligned Movement was gaining influence in 
the United Nations. The last veto in the Cold War on one of these issues was cast by the United 
States on “the situation in the Occupied Arab Territories” on 31 May 1990,298 which was 
followed by nearly three years without a Council veto.299 Third, and finally, a large percentage of 
P3 vetoes during the Cold War were on these matters; from 1963-1990, roughly 27 percent of the 
vetoes (28 of 105) cast by the P3 were on these three issues.   
 Southern Rhodesia 
The inclusion of Southern Rhodesia on the Security Council’s agenda in September 1963 
followed the adoption of two key General Assembly resolutions on this issue, resolution 1747 of 
28 June 1962 and resolution 1760 of 31 October 1962. Resolution 1747 requested the 
“Administering Authority” (the United Kingdom) to convene “a constitutional 
conference…which would ensure the rights of the majority of the people, on the basis of ‘one 
man, one vote’ in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the 
                                                           
297 UN Security Council document (S/5425/Rev.1), 13 September 1963. 
298 UN Security Council document (S/21326), 31 May 1990. 
299 The next veto occurred on 11 May 1993. It was cast by Russia on Cyprus (UN Security Council document 
S/25693).   
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Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples…”.300 Resolution 
1760 reaffirmed resolution 1747, requesting the United Kingdom to grant to “the whole 
population [of Southern Rhodesia] the full and unconditional exercise of their basic political 
rights.”301 Ghana, Guinea, Morocco and the United Arab Republic requested the first Council 
meeting on the situation in Southern Rhodesia in August 1963, referencing resolution 1760 and 
article 73 of the UN Charter (which focused on the responsibilities of administering powers).302   
Several Security Council resolutions on Southern Rhodesia were adopted in the ensuing 
years. Some of these were groundbreaking in the sense that the Council for the first time ever 
authorized sanctions.   
• In resolution 216 of 12 November 1965, the Council condemned Southern Rhodesia’s 
unilateral declaration of independence (UDI).   
• On 20 November 1965, it authorized the use of sanctions for the first time in its history 
through resolution 217, calling upon all states not to provide the regime “with arms, 
equipment and military material, and to do their utmost in order to break all economic 
relations with Southern Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and petroleum 
products.”303  
•  In resolution 221 of 9 April 1966, it called upon Portugal not to ship oil from Beira (in 
Portuguese Mozambique) to Southern Rhodesia. 
                                                           
300   UN General Assembly document (A/RES/1747), 28 June 1962. 
301 UN General Assembly document (A/RES/1760), 31 October 1962. 
302 Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, Situation in Southern Rhodesia, 217, 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/59-63/Chapter%208/59-63_08-24-
Situation%20in%20Southern%20Rhodesia.pdf. 
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• On 16 December 1966, the Council expanded the embargo through resolution 232, 
deciding that states should prevent the import of various commodities.304   
• Resolution 253, adopted on 29 May 1968, expanded the sanctions to prevent the import 
of all commodities from Southern Rhodesia and created a sanctions committee.   
Security Council sanctions on Southern Rhodesia remained in place until the adoption of 
resolution 460 on 21 December 1979, the same day as the signing of the Lancaster House 
Agreement, which paved the way for the territory’s independence from the United Kingdom as 
the sovereign state of Zimbabwe.   
In spite of these and other decisions taken by the Council on Southern Rhodesia, 
meetings on this agenda item were often contentious. The United Kingdom would not entertain 
draft resolutions calling on it to intervene militarily in Southern Rhodesia305 or demanding a 
political solution regarding the territory’s future while it was in the process of negotiating with 
the white supremacist regime.306 Writing in 1971, Boyd maintained:  
Throughout the later stages of the Rhodesia imbroglio, there were repeatedly clear 
indications that Britain would use its veto if a Council majority tried to carry a resolution 
that went altogether too far for Britain’s liking. This was an important factor in the 
production of a series of Council resolutions which, while usually representing a 
compromise between British and African positions, tended to come out closer to the 
British than to the African.307   
The United Kingdom would table key draft resolutions that imposed and expanded sanctions on 
the territory; however, these at least in part responded to intense pressure from the developing 
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countries that believed that the United Kingdom was not doing enough to bring about majority 
rule in the territory.308 This included pressure from Commonwealth countries. At the 6-15 
September 1965 Commonwealth Conference in London, 16 of the 21 attending members “called 
in varying degrees for more positive action by the British to bring down the Smith regime.”309  
The conference communiqué stated that the UK government would pursue mandatory UN 
sanctions against Southern Rhodesia if efforts failed to convince it “to return to constitutional 
rule before the end of the year.”310 Following the failure of these negotiations, sanctions were 
expanded on Southern Rhodesia the following year at the behest of the United Kingdom.311  
Voting discrepancies among the P3 on Southern Rhodesia occurred over several years.  
In the ten years from 1963 to 1973, the United Kingdom vetoed seven draft resolutions on 
Southern Rhodesia, including five sole vetoes. All of these vetoes responded to drafts put forth 
by developing states, mostly from Africa, which were trying to use the Council as an instrument 
to exert economic and political pressure on the white supremacist regime in Southern Rhodesia 
and compel the United Kingdom to establish democratic rule in the territory.312 France abstained 
                                                           
308 See Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, Situation in Southern Rhodesia, 121-122, 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/66-68/Chapter%208/66-68_08-4-Situation%20is%20Southern%20Rhodesia.pdf. 
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310 Ibid. 
311 Ibid. 
312 UN Security Council document S/5425/Rev. 1, 11 September 1963, was proposed by Ghana, Morocco and the 
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on all seven and the United States abstained on five of them. The United States joined the United 
Kingdom in vetoing two of these draft resolutions (S/9696 of 11 March 1970 and S/10928 of 18 
May 1973); the first of these joint vetoes would have condemned the United Kingdom for not 
overthrowing the Southern Rhodesian government, while the second would have limited the 
shipment of certain commodities to the territory. Interestingly, France not only abstained on 
those drafts vetoed by the United Kingdom on Southern Rhodesia, but also on several other 
resolutions on the issue.   
The US position of Southern Rhodesia was largely aligned with that of the United 
Kingdom, although there were some differences. Like the United Kingdom, Washington opposed 
Southern Rhodesia’s universal declaration of independence and supported progress toward 
majority rule in Salisbury in a phased manner.313 However, it was concerned that the slow pace 
of efforts toward a political settlement “could be exploited by extreme African elements, as well 
as by the Communists…”.314Similarly, Washington did not want to find itself supporting a deal 
struck by London that was perceived by states as being too favorable to Smith.315   
The consistent French abstentions on this issue were rather remarkable: as Joanna 
Warson has written: “France was the…sole country not to oppose UDI in the Security Council in 
the immediate aftermath of Smith’s declaration as well as the only power not to vote in favour of 
a resolution declaring that the situation in Southern Rhodesia was a threat to international peace 
and security and calling upon states to break economic relations with Rhodesia.”316 Warson 
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316  Joanna Warson, “France in Rhodesia: French policy and perceptions throughout the era of decolonisation,” PhD 
diss., University of Portsmouth, 2013, 178. 
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persuasively argues that France firmly adhered to the principle of “non-intervention” at the time, 
believing that the situation in Southern Rhodesia was not a threat to international peace and 
security.317 To support her argument, she notes that “…in cases where Rhodesia was perceived to 
threaten international peace, notably acts of aggression and provocation towards Zambia 
(Resolution 326), Botswana (Resolution 403 and 406) and the People’s Republic of Mozambique 
(Resolution 411), France voted in favour of the relevant Resolution.”318  
The UK vetoes demonstrate that it wanted to manage the decolonization process on its 
own terms, rather than have it imposed by the UN. The United Kingdom had to react to the tide 
of world opinion,319 as reflected by the membership of the General Assembly and the Security 
Council, but it did not want the United Nations to highjack what it maintained was its own 
responsibility—i.e. stewarding Southern Rhodesia toward majority rule.320 In Council debates in 
the 1960s and 1970s, the United Kingdom was pilloried by African, Asian and Eastern bloc 
states for not doing more to precipitate the demise of the white supremacist regime in Salisbury 
and create the conditions for democratic rule based on universal suffrage.   
With the best diplomatic skills they could muster, UK diplomats struggled to withstand 
the barrage coming from the developing and eastern bloc states. The vetoed draft resolution on 
13 September 1963321 invited the United Kingdom not to transfer military forces to Southern 
Rhodesia resulting from the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.322 In 
meetings leading up to the vote, several African member states expressed concern that 
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empowering Southern Rhodesia with additional military strength would pose a threat to 
international peace and security, given the nature of the regime and its capacity to undermine the 
security of its neighbors.323 The United Kingdom countered that Southern Rhodesia was not a 
“non-self-governing territory,” and referred to article 2 (7) of the UN Charter (i.e., that this was a 
matter of domestic jurisdiction).324 In a 13 September 1963 meeting, UK Ambassador Patrick 
Dean opined that the situation in Southern Rhodesia was “tranquil” 325 and that the use of force 
outside of the territory required the approval of the UK government,326 implying that UK 
government would check external mischief by Salisbury.  
Southern Rhodesia’s UDI in November 1965 was particularly disturbing to developing 
countries. In a Council meeting shortly after the UDI, Ghanaian Ambassador Alex Quaison-
Sackey, speaking on behalf of African states, maintained that as a result “of this seizure of 
power, the 4 million Africans in Southern Rhodesia have been rendered impotent and 
powerless…,”327 while accusing the United Kingdom of emboldening the Salisbury regime by 
not using military force against it.328 Similarly outraged, Senegalese Ambassador Ousmane Diop 
called the UDI a “veritable act of international piracy,” and succumbing to hyperbole, added: “If 
this crime goes unpunished, it will be the end of the moral foundations of the British 
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Commonwealth, it will be the end of the authority of the Charter of the United Nations and it 
will be the end of international peace and security in Africa.”329 
On 17 March 1970, Burundi, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Syria and Zambia introduced a draft 
resolution that would have condemned the United Kingdom for not using military force to 
overthrow the regime and that would have decided that states should immediately “sever all 
diplomatic, consular, economic, military and other relations with the illegal racist minority 
regime.”330 A request for the United Kingdom to forcibly overthrow the minority regime had 
already been made by the General Assembly in resolution 2022 of 5 November 1965.331 The 17 
March 1970 draft was vetoed by the United Kingdom and the United States. Abstentions were 
cast by Finland, France, and in this instance, even by Global South states Colombia and 
Nicaragua. Prior to the vote, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, Lord 
Caradon, strongly criticized the draft, citing the unpredictable consequences that could arise from 
military actions against Southern Rhodesia and saying that it could not justify “an economic war 
against all southern African,”332 most likely a reference to the draft resolution’s call for sanctions 
to be imposed on South Africa and Portugal, both violators of the sanctions on Southern 
Rhodesia.333 Regarding UK economic interests, Caradon bluntly noted that his country relied “as 
much as any country in the world…on its foreign trade” and that “to cut off trade with all those 
countries whose policies we dislike or oppose would be economic suicide.”334 At the same 
meeting, US Deputy Ambassador Charles Yost supported the UK position. He concurred that 
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that there was no way to “fully foresee the repercussions and consequences”335 of the use of 
force to overthrow the regime, and that imposing full-fledged sanctions on South Africa and 
Portugal would be very difficult to enforce, requiring a blockade.336  
In November 1971, “proposals for settlement” were agreed between British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Secretary Alec Douglas-Home and Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian 
Smith after negotiations in Salisbury. These were based on “an intricate franchise system which 
was supposed to lead one day to African majority rule.”337 Property ownership still dictated the 
right to vote.338 According to the terms of these settlement proposals, the agreement had to be 
accepted by the Southern Rhodesian population “as a whole” before being implemented.339  
 A UK commission led by Lord Edward Pearce (The Pearce Commission) undertook a 
visiting mission to Southern Rhodesia from 11 January to 11 March 1972 to determine the level 
of support for the agreement.340  After the mission, the Pearce Commission issued a report saying 
that the population as a whole did not support the “proposals for settlement,” in part because the 
African population in the Southern Rhodesia was not allowed to participate in the 
negotiations.341 The UK decision to put the settlement before the people of Southern Rhodesia 
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may have indicated that it was succumbing to international and domestic pressure to forge a fair 
political solution to the long-standing crisis in Southern Rhodesia.342  
On 30 December 1971, less than two weeks before the arrival of the Pearce Commission 
in Southern Rhodesia, the Council met to vote on a draft resolution proposed by Burundi, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia and the Syrian Arab Republic. The draft rejected the “proposals for settlement,” 
emphasized the need for universal adult suffrage in the territory, and called for the United 
Kingdom “to facilitate the participation of a United Nations team of observers during the 
preparation for and actual conduct of” the UK “exercise” to ascertain the wishes of the 
population regarding the proposals.343 It was vetoed by the United Kingdom, while Belgium, 
France, Italy, Japan, and United States abstained.  
The mood of the African members was reflected by Nigerian Ambassador Edwin Ogbu, 
who opined: “The agreement in all its aspects is tantamount to a British Government 
endorsement of the perpetual subjugation of the black people of Southern Rhodesia by the white 
minority.”344 This sentiment was largely echoed by Soviet Ambassador Malik who claimed that 
the UK veto and the abstentions of its NATO allies represent “a major failure of imperialism in 
the United Nations.”345 UK Ambassador Colin Crowe said that the United Kingdom was being 
pragmatic. In trying to strike a deal with the Smith government, its influence was limited. He 
maintained that now was the time to determine whether the settlement proposals were acceptable 
to the population of Southern Rhodesia “as a whole,” rather than to judge the proposals in the 
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UN.346 He questioned whether the failure of the settlement to gain traction could “lead to 
intensification of discrimination and apartheid?”347 The representative of the United States, 
William Bennett, similarly argued against prejudging the agreement, while French Ambassador 
François de La Gorce said that for France “it is simply a matter of following the experiment and 
awaiting its results in the hope that maybe this will mark the end of the status quo 
and…reintroduce momentum into a stagnant situation.”348 
The final two UK vetoes on Southern Rhodesia were cast in February 1972 and in May 
1973, the second of these jointly with the United States. The first of these (S/10606 of 2 
February 1972), proposed by Guinea, Somalia, and Sudan, would have urged the United 
Kingdom to immediately cease implementation of the settlement proposals and expressed the 
belief that an inclusive constitutional conference should be held to determine the political future 
of the country. In addition to the UK veto, abstentions were cast by Belgium, France, Italy, Japan 
and the United States. UK Ambassador Crowe argued that while he understood the Council’s 
concern with the situation in Southern Rhodesia, it could not alter the current political process, 
given that the Pearce Commission had yet to report on its findings.349 The Somali representative, 
Mr. Ghalib, said the veto contributed to the “long list of betrayals”350 committed by the United 
Kingdom, while the Soviet ambassador called the abstentions made by NATO members “equal 
in force to a veto and to solidarity with those who use the veto and prevent the adoption of just 
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resolutions,”351 an accurate if somewhat hypocritical assessment given the Soviet Union’s history 
of breaking unanimity in the Council.   
On 18 May 1973, the United Kingdom and the United States jointly vetoed a draft 
resolution on Southern Rhodesia, introduced by Guinea, Kenya and Sudan, that would have 
significantly ratcheted up the economic pressure not just on southern Rhodesia, but on 
Portuguese colonies in the region and South Africa. The draft resolution, if adopted, would have 
decided that “all states should limit, with immediate effect, any purchase of chrome ores, 
asbestos, tobacco, pig iron, copper, sugar, maize and any products from South Africa, 
Mozambique and Angola to the quantitative levels prevailing in 1965” (i.e., the year of Southern 
Rhodesia’s Universal Declaration of Independence).352 It further would have extended the 
blockade on Beira to cover the port of Lourenço Marques, also in Portuguese Mozambique, 
while urging the United Kingdom to take measures to implement the blockade.353 
 Once again, the familiar divide was exhibited in the discussion on this draft resolution in 
the Council.  Developing countries from Africa and Asia, again supported in their views by the 
Soviet Union, expressed their anger and frustration with the UK and US vetoes. Kenyan 
Ambassador Joseph Odero Jowi charged racism, suggesting that if the rebellion had been carried 
out by the indigenous population, it would have been crushed, while “Rebellion by a minority of 
colonial residents of British or white origin is fine.”354 The draft had crossed a redline for the 
United Kingdom by calling for the  expansion of the sanctions to Portuguese colonies and South 
Africa, something that Caradon had argued in the Council would be detrimental to UK economic 
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interests years earlier, as noted above.355 Meanwhile, US Ambassador John Scali maintained that 
expanding the sanctions would be “unrealistic” and “unenforceable” and that, as a result, 
adopting the draft would harm the credibility of the United Nations.356 US economic interests 
were clearly at stake as well. In a March 1972 policy planning paper on South Africa, the US 
National Security Council noted that the country was “an important source of essential 
minerals—especially chrome, copper, platinum, gold, manganese and vanadium,” while listing 
“continued profitable trade with South Africa and maintenance of U.S investments and access to 
key resources” as an objective in the ensuing five years.357 
The Middle East: Israel/Palestine 
While the United States opposed Israel during the 1956 Suez crisis, strong support of Israel by 
the United States has been a consistent feature of Security Council practice during the past half a 
century, a policy that has varied little in this time period in terms of the level of this support.  . In 
the Cold War, however, the veto was used more frequently by the United States than in the post-
Cold War period on draft resolutions viewed as detrimental to Israeli interests.  This had more to 
do with how the Council functioned than with any major shifts in US policy.  As with a number 
of other agenda items, there was more willingness to table draft resolutions that might be vetoed 
than there has been during the post-Cold War period. From 1970-1990, the US cast 29 vetoes on 
matters related to Israel, whereas it cast 13 vetoes on such issues between 1991 and 2016.  
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At the root of the developing world’s ire toward Israel has been its occupation of the 
territories acquired in the 1967 War, including East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip358 and the West 
Bank. In the Cold War, vetoed resolutions on Israeli policies in the Occupied Territories were 
consistently proposed by developing countries, either Arab states or developing countries 
representing the Non-Aligned Movement more broadly.359   
Indicative of the movement’s opposition to the US use of the veto was its declaration at 
its Conference in Havana, Cuba in September 1979. In a Council debate on 30 April 1980, the 
Soviet representative read from the conference’s declaration, observing that the Conference 
“‘condemned the threat by the United States to use the veto…against any resolution concerning 
the implementation of the Palestinian people’s inalienable national rights.’”360 A rash of US 
vetoes on Israel/Palestine draft resolutions followed in the subsequent years, notwithstanding the 
NAM’s condemnation.      
Drafts resolutions in the Cold War on Israel/Palestine vetoed solely by the United States 
(and which states proposed them) include the following: 
• On 29 June 1976, the United States cast the sole veto, with abstentions by France, Italy, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom, on a draft resolution sponsored by Guyana, Pakistan, 
Panama, and Tanzania, that would have affirmed “the inalienable rights of the Palestinian 
people to self-determination, including the right of return and the right of national 
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independence and sovereignty in Palestine, in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations.”361 
• On 30 April 1980, the United States vetoed a draft resolution proposed by Tunisia that 
would have affirmed the “right [of the Palestinian people] to establish an independent 
state in Palestine,” “[t]he right of Palestinian refugees wishing to return to their 
homes…to do so, and the right of those choosing not to return to receive equitable 
compensation for their property…”.  The draft further reaffirmed that “Israel should 
withdraw from all the Arab territories occupied since June 1967, including 
Jerusalem…”.362   While the US cast the only veto, France, Norway, Portugal and the 
United Kingdom abstained.  
• On 20 January 1982, the United States vetoed a draft resolution proposed by Jordan that 
characterized Israeli measures to administer the Golan Heights as an “act of 
aggression.”363 While the United States registered the only veto, abstentions were cast by 
France, Ireland, Japan, Panama, and the United Kingdom.   
• On 20 April 1982, the United States cast the only veto on a draft resolution sponsored by 
Iraq, Jordan, Morocco and Uganda condemning an attack on worshipers at Holy sites at 
the al-Haram al-Shareef.364 All 14 other members voted in favor of the draft.  
• On 2 August 1983, the United States cast the only veto on a draft resolution deploring 
Israeli settlements in the occupied territories that was sponsored by Algeria, Bahrain, 
Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, 
Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab 
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Emirates and Yemen.365  In addition to the US veto, 13 Council members supported the 
draft resolution, while Zaire abstained.   
• On 13 September 1985, the United States vetoed a draft resolution proposed by Burkina 
Faso, Egypt, India, Madagascar, Peru and Trinidad and Tobago that would have called 
upon Israel “to immediately stop all repressive measures including curfews, 
administrative detentions and forceful deportation and to release forthwith all detainees 
and refrain from further deportations…”.366 Australia, Denmark, France, and United 
Kingdom cast abstentions.   
• On 30 January 1986, the United States vetoed a draft resolution proposed by Congo, 
Ghana, Madagascar, Trinidad and Tobago and the United Arab Emirates that would have 
deplored “provocative acts [by Israelis] which have violated the sanctity of the sanctuary 
of the Haram Al-Sharif in Jerusalem…”.367 Other than Thailand, which abstained, and the 
United States, the 13 remaining Council member voted in favor of the draft.  
• On 1 February 1988, the United States vetoed a draft submitted by Algeria, Argentina, 
Nepal, Senegal, Yugoslavia and Zambia that would have called on Israel “as the 
occupying Power and as a High Contracting Party to the Geneva Convention relative to 
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, to accept the de 
jure applicability of the Convention to the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied 
since 1967…and fully to comply with its obligations under that Convention…”.368 The 
14 remaining members of the Council voted in favor of the draft.   
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• On 15 April 1988, the United States vetoed a draft resolution proposed by Algeria, 
Argentina, Nepal, Senegal, Yugoslavia and Zambia that would have urged Israel to 
“abide immediately and scrupulously with the Geneva Convention relative to the 
Protection of Civilians in Time of War, of 12 August 1949…” and “to rescind the order 
to deport Palestinian civilians and ensure the safe and immediate return to the occupied 
Palestinian territories of those already deported…”.369 The 14 other Council members 
voted in favor of the draft.   
• On 17 February 1989, the United States vetoed a draft resolution proposed by Algeria, 
Colombia, Ethiopia, Malaysia, Nepal, Senegal and Yugoslavia that deplored “Israel’s 
persistent policies and practices against the Palestinian people” in the occupied territories 
that had led to the deaths of Palestinian civilians.370  The 14 other members voted in favor 
of the draft.  
• On 9 June 1989, the United States vetoed a draft resolution submitted by Algeria, 
Colombia, Ethiopia, Malaysia, Nepal, Senegal and Yugoslavia that demanded that Israel 
“desist forthwith from deporting Palestinian civilians from the occupied territory…ensure 
the safe and immediate return of those already deported…and expresse[d] great concern 
about the prolonged closure of schools in part of the occupied territory…”.371 All 14 
additional members voted in favor of the draft.  
• On 7 November 1989, the United States vetoed a draft resolution proposed by Algeria, 
Colombia, Ethiopia, Malaysia, Nepal, Senegal, and Yugoslavia that “strongly deplore[d] 
those policies and practices of Israel, which violate the human rights of the Palestinian 
people in the occupied territory, and in particular the siege of towns, the ransacking of the 
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homes of inhabitants…and the illegal and arbitrary confiscation of their property and 
valuables…,” while requesting the Secretary-General “to conduct on-site monitoring” of 
the Occupied Territories.372 The other 14 members of the Council supported the draft.   
• On 31 May 1990, the United States vetoed a draft resolution that would have 
“establishe[d] a Commission consisting of three members of the Security Council, to be 
dispatched immediately to examine the situation relating to the policies and practices of 
Israel, the occupying Power, in the Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, occupied by 
Israel since 1967…”.  All 14 other members supported the draft.  
Certain clear patterns emerge during the meetings in which these drafts were vetoed. What is 
most striking is the isolation of the US position, especially in the final years of the Cold War, 
when it became even less frequent for Western allies such as France and the United Kingdom to 
abstain on the drafts. Israeli repression during the first Intifada, which began in December 1987 
and ended in the early 1990s, prompted significant discussion in the Council, contributing the six 
US vetoes in which Washington was opposed by all other Council members.    
The US rationales for casting these vetoes were consistent. It often maintained that the 
proposed drafts were not balanced or properly contextualized, condemning Israel for violence 
against Palestinians while not at the same time condemning Palestinians for violence against 
Israelis.373 The United States would also at times argue that the drafts, if adopted, would not 
advance the cause of peace.374 In the last years of the Cold War, a further source of the US 
vetoes very well may have been that it did not believe that the Security Council was the 
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appropriate forum for resolving the Israel-Palestine conflict,375 largely reflecting the negative 
view of the UN held by its Israeli ally. In April 1989, when UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez 
de Cuéllar asked the five permanent members whether there should be informal discussions 
among the five of them and with him on the issue, only the United States said no. France, the 
United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union supported the idea for such discussions, while China did 
not answer Pérez de Cuéllar’s query.376   
Another consistent feature of the discussions on Israel-Palestine was incendiary criticism 
directed toward Israel by Arab and other developing countries in Council meetings. Diplomats 
from the developing world maintained that the policies carried out by Israel were a form of 
racism377 or colonial oppression.378 The United States was at times criticized for its support of 
Israel.379 Sometimes there was a connection made between Israeli actions in the occupied 
territories and the policies of the repressive white minority apartheid regime in South Africa.380 
These views were consistent with the platform of the Non-Aligned Movement at the time.   
Nicaragua 
For most of the 1980s, Council engagement on Nicaragua was fueled by concerns of the left-
wing Sandinista government about US interference in Nicaragua’s domestic affairs. With the 
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Cold War still at its height, the administration of US President Ronald Reagan expressed grave 
reservations about the rise of a left-leaning government in the Americas that was supported by 
Soviet Union and Cuba,381 and consequently, funneled military and financial support to the 
Contras, a rebel group seeking to overthrow the Sandinista regime.   
The United States cast the sole veto on four draft resolutions on the situation in 
Nicaragua in the 1980s. All four were proposed by developing states in the Council. The first, 
proposed by Guyana and Panama and vetoed by the US on 1 April 1982, would have emphasized 
principles related to state sovereignty in the UN Charter—for example, the importance of non-
intervention and territorial integrity—and called on “all Member States to refrain from the direct, 
indirect, overt or covert use of force against any country of Central America or the 
Caribbean…,”382 a thinly veiled reference to US covert operations against the Nicaraguan 
government.  The second, vetoed on 4 April 1984, “condemn[ed] and call[ed] for an immediate 
end to the mining of the main ports of Nicaragua,”383 a reference to US subversive operations in 
Nicaraguan waters. This draft was proposed by Nicaragua, which was a Council member in 
1983-1984. The non-aligned members of the Council—Congo, Ghana, Madagascar, Trinidad 
and Tobago and the United Arab Emirates—proposed the last two vetoed drafts on 31 July384 
and 28 October 1986.385 Both would have called on states to comply with the ruling of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) of 27 June 1986 on “Military and Paramilitary Activities in 
and against Nicaragua,” a ruling that was favorable to Nicaragua and detrimental to US interests.    
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The states that proposed these four drafts must have anticipated a US veto on all of them, 
given that they directly targeted for criticism US policies in its own backyard and called for the 
United States to end military operations against a regime that it perceived as a threat to its 
national interests. The ICJ ruling, which was the subject of the 1986 drafts, must have been an 
especially bitter pill for the Reagan administration to swallow. In its advisory judgement, the 
Court decided by a vote of 12 to 3 that the United States had “acted, against the Republic of 
Nicaragua, in breach of its obligation under customary international law not to intervene in the 
affairs of another State.”386 It further decided, also by a vote of 12 to 3, that the United States 
should “immediately…cease and…refrain from all…acts…as may constitute breaches 
of…[its]…legal obligations.”387 
The week prior to the vote on the April 1982 draft, Ambassador Raúl Roa Kourí of Cuba 
addressed the Security Council in a public session on behalf of the NAM, focusing on its 
apprehensions about external interference in the affairs of Central America and the Caribbean.  
He referred in particular to concerns about the “threats and hostile acts directed against the 
people and government of Nicaragua” and called on the Security Council to “unequivocally state 
its opposition to the threat or use of force against Nicaragua…”.388 This sentiment was at the 
heart of the draft resolution that the US vetoed the following week.  
The April 1982 draft had the support of 12 Council members, with the United Kingdom 
casting one of two abstentions along with Zaire in addition to the US veto. In the 2 April 1982 
meeting in which it cast its veto, US representative Jeanne Kirkpatrick stated her opposition to 
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the NAM position. She said that the United States did not intend to invade Nicaragua, and sought 
to expose inconsistency and selectivity in the NAM’s views on non-intervention. She referred to 
a number of developing states (as well as the Soviet Union) that backed the Nicaraguan position 
but did not support the General Assembly’s call for the Soviet Union to withdraw from 
Afghanistan.389   
In his explanation of vote, UK Ambassador Anthony Parsons was also critical of the text, 
complaining about its reference to General Assembly resolutions that the United Kingdom had 
not supported in the past.390 One of these, General Assembly resolution 2160 on “strict 
observance of the prohibition of the threat or use of force in international relations and of the 
right of people to self-determination,”391 had been called “an exercise in political propaganda” 392 
in November 1965 by Ambassador Caradon of the United Kingdom, which was still in the 
process of unwinding its colonial engagement in Southern Rhodesia at the time.  
France, parting ways with both the United States and the United Kingdom, supported the 
draft.  While it did not make an explanation of vote, Paris had previously espoused a more 
balanced position than its P3 colleagues.  During a 29 March 1982 Council meeting, Ambassador 
Luc de La Barre de Nanteuil said that France understood the concerns of Nicaragua and other 
states in the region about their “national independence and territorial integrity,” further noting 
that France recognized “the anxiety felt by a number of American States, including the United 
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States” regarding the need for “ensuring tranquility and the strengthening of democracy in that 
part of the world.”393      
The P3 were once against divided on the April 1984 draft condemning the mining of 
Nicaragua’s ports. This draft was supported by 13 of the 15 members, with an abstention by the 
United Kingdom and the veto by the United States. The US Representative, Deputy Ambassador 
José Sorzano, argued that the draft lacked balance and did not reflect violations of El Salvador’s 
sovereignty by Nicaragua.394 While deploring mining activities described in the draft,395 UK 
Ambassador John Thompson nonetheless shared the US assessment that it lacked balance,396 
arguing that it should have reflected an emphasis on “free elections, pluralism, democratic 
processes, human rights and economic and social development” in Central America.397 While it 
did not make an explanation of vote, just two days prior to the US veto, France was highly 
critical of the mining of Nicaragua’s waters,398 thus directly objecting to US actions. Its Deputy 
Ambassador, Philippe Louet, maintained that “this type of…action…by interfering with free 
access to the port facilities of a sovereign country, is leading to a kind of blockade in 
disguise…in fundamental violation to…international law.”399 Louet also expressed concern that 
the shipments, including from France, had to be rerouted “with considerable delay and at great 
cost, and only if neighboring countries’ transport systems make it possible,”400 noting that 
humanitarian aid was among these shipments.401    
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In 1986, the positions of the P3 were less divided on the drafts on the ICJ ruling, although 
the US vetoed them while France and the United Kingdom abstained, reflecting some nuanced 
differences of view. In his explanation of vote on the July 1986 draft, US Ambassador Vernon 
Walters maintained that adopting the draft would not contribute to a peaceful and fair resolution 
of the turmoil in Central America, which he said made “no mention of Nicaragua’s own 
responsibility for the situation in Central America….”.402 He questioned the competence of the 
Court, 403 whose compulsory jurisdiction the United States refused to accept following the ICJ’s 
ruling on the particular case under discussion. Walters reiterated these same points prior to 
casting his vote on the October draft resolution. He also pointed to the fact that other states in the 
Council “which do not accept themselves the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court 
of Justice denounce the United States” for not doing so,404 while questioning the commitment of 
the Sandinistas to the pursuit of peace and noting that they were being armed by the Soviet 
Union.405 French Ambassador Claude de Kemoularia said that his country had wanted to support 
a resolution that brought a settlement to the conflicts in Central America;406 however, he noted 
that France, which did not at the time and still does not support the compulsory jurisdiction of 
the Court, questioned the ICJ’s ruling “both on matters of substance and on the Court’s role.”407  
The United Kingdom, the only permanent member that accepted the ICJ’s compulsory 
jurisdiction, nonetheless argued against the draft resolutions on political grounds.408 During the 
UK’s statements on the July and the October drafts, its representative, Ambassador John 
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Thomson, underscored his country’s support for the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction.409 In the 
July meeting, he reiterated London’s condemnation of the mining of Nicaraguan waters, a 
chastisement of it US ally.410  However, Thomson maintained that the drafts failed to account for 
the broader political context in the region, questioning Nicaragua’s commitment to the wider 
Central American peace process (i.e. the Contadora process).411  With regard to the October draft 
resolution, he pointedly stated that Nicaragua was selectively applying the UN Charter for 
“narrow political ends”412 and that the draft “fails to acknowledge that Nicaragua has largely 
brought its troubles upon itself.”413 
The October 1986 veto on the ICJ ruling was the final one the US cast on Nicaragua. By 
the time George H.W. Bush succeeded Ronald Reagan as US President in 1989, the Cold War 
was reaching its denouement, creating conditions for a peaceful settlement to the various 
conflicts in Central America.414 Then UN secretary-general Pérez de Cuéllar has said that the US 
support for resolution 637 in July 1989, which backed the “good offices” role of the Secretary-
General in Central America, represented “a major shift in U.S. policy.”415 Prior to that resolution, 
according to de Cuéllar, it had appeared that the “US Permanent Mission had standing 
instructions to keep the United Nations out of Central America.”416  
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A question of process 
In reading the transcripts of Security Council debates from the Cold War, one is struck by the 
vigorous discussion and spontaneous exchanges that often animated the Council’s proceedings.  
They are now largely relics. Today’s Council debates are generally staid and scripted affairs with 
little interactive discussion. On politically charged issues, such as Syria since 2011, there are 
occasional moments of off-the-cuff interaction, usually unconstructive outbursts of recriminatory 
anger between Russia and Western states, but such spontaneity is the exception that proves the 
rule.   
While Cold War antagonisms and propaganda litter many of the early debates, much of 
the spontaneity and interactivity came from the fact that draft resolutions were often negotiated 
during them. Whereas today draft resolutions are negotiated in private before reaching the open 
chamber for a vote, for much of the Cold War it was common for draft resolutions to be 
negotiated in open sessions, during which amendments were at times proposed and voted on by 
the members.   
Sievers and Daws have written that it was not until the mid-1960s that a working method 
developed whereby drafts would more frequently be discussed in consultations before being 
brought to a vote.417  They note: 
From 1966 onwards, another shift in Security Council decision-making was taking place.  
Increasingly, Council members abandoned the practice of bringing resolutions directly to 
a vote. Rather, they were first negotiating the drafts during consultations of the whole, 
with the hope of reaching consensus. Each time such efforts have been successful, 
potential vetoes have been avoided. In other cases, when it has become apparent in 
informal consultations that a draft resolution will be unacceptable to one or more of the 
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permanent members, the sponsors have often chosen not to bring it to a formal vote, 
thereby also avoiding potential vetoes.418   
The upshot of this analysis is that there may have been fewer vetoes and more unanimous 
resolutions had negotiating processes been more intensive prior to 1966. Along these lines, 
George Ignatieff, Canada’s permanent representative to the UN during its 1967-68 Council 
tenure, observed that informal discussions with other members were “essential if any business is 
to be transacted by the Council” and that “if such consultations fail, the Council becomes merely 
a sounding board for sharply divergent views and a focus for confrontation, rather than for 
negotiation and compromise.”419 
The historical evidence supports this view. Bailey, for example, refers to an early vetoed 
draft resolution that “would merely have called on Greece and her Communist neighbors to cease 
from provocative acts and would have directed them to enter into direct negotiations” and that 
might have been adopted “if more sustained negotiations” had occurred.420 Even after 1966, 
there are cases in which veto-wielding permanent members complained about insufficient 
negotiations. For example, when the United Kingdom vetoed a draft resolution on 10 November 
1970 that would have called for Southern Rhodesia not to be granted independence prior to 
majority rule,421 it complained that “no effort was made beforehand by the sponsors to consult 
with or even inform the United Kingdom delegation of their intention to ask for a debate and to 
submit a draft resolution”, adding that this appeared “a curious procedure if the sponsors really 
                                                           
418 Ibid. 
419 George Ignatieff, “Prompt and Regular Access to Political Government at Home is Essential,” in Paths to Peace: 
The UN Security Council and Its Presidency, ed. Davidson Nicol (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), 138.   
420 Sydney D. Bailey, Voting in the Security Council (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1970), 38-39. This 
was UN Security Council document (S/471), 6 August 1947.   
421 UN Security Council document (S/9976), 6 November 1970. 
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wanted to achieve a constructive result.”422 The UK position was echoed by the United States, 
which abstained on the draft resolution, stating that “little or no effort was made to consult in 
advance all the members of the Council in order to determine whether the draft was in fact non-
controversial.”423 NAM efforts to isolate the UK politically, rather than achieve an immediate 
result, may have been behind the tabling of this draft.   
One of the more divisive episodes in Council history occurred on 30 April 1981, when 
four draft resolutions that collectively would have imposed comprehensive political and 
economic sanctions on South Africa for its occupation of Namibia were jointly vetoed by France, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States.424 The first of these was proposed by Mexico, Niger, 
the Philippines, Tunisia, and Uganda;425 the remaining three were proposed by Niger, Tunisia, 
and Uganda.426 France in particular was disturbed by the way it was forced to repeatedly use its 
veto. French Ambassador Jacques Leprette stated: 
The way in which they [the texts] were prepared, submitted, and…imposed did not make 
their adoption at all likely. In such complicated subjects having such important and 
diverse consequences, rigidity and haste and the absence of negotiations on substance 
could only doom to failure even attempts that seemed to have some aspects that merited 
more detailed study.427   
There have been other occasions in the Cold War when multiple drafts were vetoed on the same 
day, but the four draft vetoes on 30 April 1981 were the highest single day total. As of the end of 
2017, there had never been a case in the post-Cold War period in which more than one veto 
occurred in the same day. Furthermore, although elected members today often complain about 
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the short time allotted for negotiations—and while small groups of influential members 
sometimes negotiate texts among themselves and circulate them to the rest of the Council as 
virtual fait accompli—it is rare in the post-Cold War era for a draft resolution to be put to a vote 
without any prior negotiations.   
This is not to suggest that the preparation and negotiation of Cold War resolutions were 
necessarily hasty affairs. The product of the Council’s efforts would at times be well-considered 
resolutions resulting from protracted and intensive negotiations.428  For example, Bosco writes 
about the weeks in October and November 1967 following the Six Day War  needed to prepare 
and negotiate resolution 242, which created the idea of land-for-peace that has provided the basic 
framework for negotiations between Israeli and Palestinian officials ever since.429  However, it is 
important to underscore that in the Cold War, drafts that had little or no chance of being adopted 
were frequently put to a vote; while this still occurs on occasion, it happens less frequently in the 
post-Cold War era.  Likewise, the Cold War “practice of bringing resolutions directly to a 
vote”430 described by Sievers and Daws is highly unusual in the post-Cold War era.   
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a broad overview of P3 dynamics during the Cold War. It has 
demonstrated that while there were strong policy differences on some issues—the Suez crisis of 
1956 and Israel/Palestine, for example—many of the divergent votes among the P3 had as much 
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to do with the way the Council functioned from the early 1960s onward as with the views of the 
permanent members. The NAM had strong influence on the Council’s agenda, and non-aligned 
states were not shy about tabling drafts that would be vetoed to make an ideological statement. 
The frequent tabling of drafts by non-aligned states exposed differences among the P3, which 
were not always significant but would at times be represented, for example, by one P3 member 
vetoing a draft while the others abstained. The level of disagreement with a draft represented by 
an abstention is difficult to gage, as each case is unique. Even in the Cold War, permanent 
members preferred not to use the veto if they did not have to. However, the veto would be used 
when political concerns were strong enough, and there are numerous examples in which all three 
were strongly opposed to a proposed draft and would cast a veto simultaneously.431 A final point 
made in this chapter is that negotiating processes in the Cold War were in general not as 
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IV: The Council in the post-Cold War era: the ‘Brahmins’432 
consolidate their control 
Simply put, the Security Council is important to its members, permanent and elected 
alike. As Edward Luck has written: “More than any other body in the United Nations system, the 
Council matters. The Council’s mandate—the maintenance of international peace and security—
could not be more central, universal, or enduring.”433 This helps to explain why so much time 
and effort is spent negotiating resolutions and other outcomes on such a vast array of peace and 
security issues. It also helps to explain why elected members often spend several years and 
significant financial resources campaigning for a coveted two-year seat on this organ. While 
elected members can and have exhibited leadership on some issues (e.g., leading the 
humanitarian track in the Council’s engagement on Syria), the permanent members have largely 
dominated the work of the UN’s peace and security organ. More than any other configuration of 
members, the P3 have been the main drivers of the Council’s day-to-day work in the post-Cold 
War era. Of the other permanent members, China generally takes an understated approach, while 
Russia is very active in negotiations but, with the exception of issues on which it has major 
strategic interests, its engagement is largely reactive. One prominent E10 diplomat from the early 
1990s said that the P3 acted like “masters of the universe,”434 while another said that the P3 
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drafted resolutions “in industrial quantities.”435 Today, the P3 draft the majority of resolutions 
and presidential statements, and lead the negotiations on these outcomes.436 In fact, the P3’s 
dominance of drafting has led in recent years to use of the term “penholdership.” This is a 
practice by which members (usually France, the United Kingdom and the United States) draft all 
the outcomes on specific agenda items or issues; it will be discussed in greater detail below.   
The P3 have agreed over the years on the overwhelming majority of issues. However, this tells 
only part of story of why their voting solidarity is so strong. An important part of why they vote 
together so frequently and why the veto is used by them infrequently (in fact, France and the UK 
have not used their veto since 1989) is because they manage so much of the Council’s work, 
enabling them to have considerable control of its outcomes, and because they have by and large 
underscored the value of unanimity.   
In recent years, comity between the P3 and Russia and China has begun to break down on 
a number of issues. China and especially Russia have become increasingly assertive, and at 
times, the P3 have been willing to force through resolutions without unanimous agreement or to 
table drafts that they know will be vetoed, as with the draft resolution that Russia vetoed in April 
2017 condemning the chemical attack in Khan Shaykhun, Syria.437 Nonetheless, the overall 
trajectory of Council decision-making in the post-Cold War period reflects a trend toward 
unanimous decision-making. Notwithstanding the divisions that have arisen in the Council in 
recent years over issues such as Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen, unanimity is still valued by its 
members and is achieved in the large majority of cases.   
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This chapter has four major sections. The first section describes the P3’s role in 
managing the Council’s workload from the late Cold War period onward, which has contributed 
to consensual decision-making. The second section explores why efforts to the achieve 
unanimity are important to members; it offers a typology of the different reasons why consensus 
is valued. The third section describes key areas of disagreement among the P3, exploring why 
efforts to overcome these differences were so difficult and how in some cases intensive 
diplomacy averted vetoes. The fourth section analyzes the tensions between the P3 on the one 
hand and China and Russia, on the other hand, which have become more pronounced in recent 
years, especially as Russia seeks to assert its great power status; some of these sources of 
disagreement are so fundamental, reflecting different worldviews, that they are difficult to 
overcome by negotiation.   
The P3 and the pen 
One of the most striking trends in Security Council voting patterns has been the relative unity 
among the permanent members in the post-Cold War era. This unity was largely borne out of the 
thaw in East-West relations at the end of the Cold War. However, as demonstrated in Chapter II, 
the P3 have also voted together more frequently since the early 1990s than beforehand. This P3 
voting unity is in part a reflection of a broader effort among all the permanent members to work 
together to manage the work of the Council and forge agreement when possible.   
By the late Cold War period, with the Security Council unhampered by superpower 
gridlock, the permanent members began to appreciate that this organ could fulfill its promise as 
envisioned by the UN’s founders. They assiduously worked through the thorniest peace and 
security issues with a renewed sense of purpose in the late 1980s and early 1990s. As former 
Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar wrote: “There were remarkable achievements: the end 
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of the war between Iran and Iraq; independence for Namibia; the withdrawal of the Soviet army 
from Afghanistan; the restoration of an independent Cambodia; the peace process in Central 
America; and…the defeat of Iraqi aggression in Kuwait.”438 At the same time, as discussed in 
Chapter V below, the NAM became less assertive in pushing its agenda in the Council with the 
end of the Cold War, and it lost much of its clout as a movement.439 One deputy ambassador 
representing an elected member in 1993-1994 noted that the “automaticity of NAM opposition to 
the United States was no longer there.”440   
The monumental changes in global politics made the Council a more important foreign 
policy instrument for the permanent members because they perceived its newfound potential. 
Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar said that the permanent members in this period shared “an 
enthusiasm born of the realization of the power they could exert when acting together.”441   
There was a renewed sense of purpose and an enhanced effort to reach agreements on 
pressing issues of peace and security. Thomas Pickering, the US Ambassador to the UN from 
1989-1992, said that the P5 tried “to find ways to reinvigorate the Council, and make it much 
more a centerpiece of cooperation.”442 In an effort to achieve this cooperation, the permanent 
members—and the wider Council—began to meet more frequently to discuss their work in a 
determined effort to reach agreements and to manage the organ’s increasing workload.  
According to David Hannay, UK Ambassador to the UN from 1990-1995, the P5 ambassadors 
convened more than 50 times in the second half of 1990, when the Iraq-Kuwait crisis was a 
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major focus of the Council’s attention.443 Hannay adds that the “emergence of the permanent 
members as a group capable of acting together and of ironing out differences between 
themselves privately and before wider discussion in the Council began was an extremely 
significant development, with positive consequences for the Council’s decision-making 
capacity.”444 
Pickering describes the intense negotiating process on resolution 687 (adopted in April 
1991), which established a weapons inspection regime in Iraq, as well as other resolutions from 
the time period. His description is worth quoting at length because it demonstrates the 
painstaking efforts undertaken to reach agreement, as well as the efforts by the permanent 
members to manage the Council’s work: 
…this resolution was long discussed among the Permanent Five before it was introduced 
to other members of the Council. In that sense, the effort was to try to work out all 
problems before introduction to other members of the Council, and then, as we did with 
the Iraq resolution, receive their proposals and ideas for change; try to incorporate as 
many as we could, and to build consensus. It was critical, in building a consensus for any 
of these resolutions, that we have no opposition among the Permanent Five, either to the 
principle or the text of the resolution. Four of us, at a minimum, always undertook to 
present the resolution to the non-aligned members of the Security Council, so that we 
would either have…the Russians or the Chinese in that group.  It almost invariably was 
the Russians, and it almost invariably helped enormously that the U.S., U.K., France and 
Russia presented this text on behalf of the five. In addition to that, in various times, …we 
would have informal meetings as well, with either the members of the non-aligned or 
groups among the members of the non-aligned to give them a sense of this.  There were 
also, of course, the non-non-aligned members of the Council, who were included.   The 
principle formal way of proposing a resolution text to the other members of the Council 
was to have, in the informal meeting room of the Council, a kind of caucus meeting at 
which the four would present it to all the others.  But in many cases, we had preliminary 
consultations, sometimes at bilateral levels, sometimes with groups among them, so that 
they had an idea of where we were going and what was included. The final…presentation 
involved give and take in the informal Council meeting, and then we would produce the 
                                                           




final draft that would be circulated to them.  That normally opened up the way for formal 
passage.445       
This description demonstrates a thorough effort by the permanent members to shape the work of 
the Council in an effort to reach agreements suitable to their interests in a new era in world 
affairs. Public displays of power, while they still had their place in the open chamber, occurred 
less frequently and gave way to more regular informal consultations,446 which provided 
opportunities to hash out disagreements and strike compromises. The consultations room, 
adjacent to the Council chamber, became a frequently used venue for private and often 
constructive dialogue.  
By the early 1990s, the ability of the permanent members to manage the work of the 
Council and to control the content of its resolutions became greater for two primary reasons. 
First, the permanent members were less divided than they had ever been, approaching their work 
with a renewed sense of purpose. Second, the elected membership had less influence than it had 
before. In the Cold War, the NAM could exert leverage on the Council’s agenda, usually because 
it had the support of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc. These efforts often resulted in one or 
more P3 vetoes, because making an ideological statement outweighed getting a positive result 
(i.e. an adopted text) more often than it did in the post-Cold War era. The NAM became more 
fragmented in the Council in the post-Cold War era in large part because of the pressure that one 
or more of the permanent members could exert on them when they want to get their way.  
Indeed, the elected members as a whole were subjected to the political pressures of the P5.  One 
E10 diplomat, who served on the Council in the mid-1990s, noted that the only time during his 
two year tenure on the Council that the United Kingdom complained to his capital was when his 
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mission convened a meeting of all the elected members.447 This was viewed as an “unfriendly” 
gesture: if the ten elected members could unify around common positions, they could create a 
majority that might necessitate the use of the veto.448   
The enthusiasm for the Council’s potential that marked Pickering’s period as US 
ambassador would soon be tempered by the difficulties of managing the complexities of a new, 
messier international landscape. The mid-1990s were littered with high-profile failures by the 
UN in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, most notably the massacre of 8,000 Bosnian Muslim 
boys and men at the hands of the Bosnia Serb army at the so-called “safe area” of Srebrenica in 
July 1995. Already by 1993 tensions resurfaced among the permanent members, including within 
the P3.449 However, by this point, a pattern had been established by which consistent efforts were 
made by the permanent members (and the elected members as well) to use the Council as a tool 
to resolve differences through often protracted deliberations on complicated issues.   
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, caucusing among the P5, or even the P3, was not done 
regularly, 450 as had been the case in the late Cold War period and the immediate post-Cold War 
era. Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock, the UK’s ambassador to the UN from 1998 to 2003, 
maintains that there were concerns that such meetings would be viewed negatively by UN 
member states, who resented the permanent members for their privilege.451 However, it is clear 
that much of the drafting of resolutions was still being performed by the P3, a consistent trend 
throughout the post-Cold War period. Moreover, on divisive issues of strategic importance to 
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permanent members such as Iraq, the P5 worked assiduously to maintain their control and, at 
least on this issue, held informal meetings among themselves.452   
One key point to be made about at least the first decade of the post-Cold War period is 
that, while the permanent members clearly held a privileged position and would exert their 
authority when they believed it necessary to do so, there was some room for elected members “to 
take the initiative on major substantive items and to strongly contest the policy options on other 
items where a member of the P5 had the lead.”453 In spite of the power asymmetries between the 
P5 and the E10, elected members could and would frequently draft outcomes; furthermore, 
discussions in the consultations room were more collaborative than they are in the current period, 
with genuine dialogue among all members on difficult issues.454 This did not mean that the 
elected members suggestions were necessarily taken on board,455 but they at least had flexibility 
to engage in substantive problem-solving with the permanent members, something that rarely 
happens today.456   
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As Colin Keating has written, “…by the mid-2000s the dynamic had changed.”457 
Caucusing among the P3, and among the P5 more generally, began to occur more frequently by 
the mid-2000s, in particular on matters related to non-proliferation,458 which are of fundamental 
importance to the permanent members. All draft resolutions on these key strategic issues were 
first negotiated among the P5 before being circulated to the elected members: it was typical for 
France to organize the P5 meetings on Iran’s nuclear program; the United States on North 
Korea’s nuclear program; and the United Kingdom on “Weapons of Mass Destruction” 
(resolution 1540 of 28 April 2004 and subsequent resolutions related to this issue).459 There 
could be slight variations in the P5 stranglehold on these meetings; for example, Japan, a key 
regional player, participated in the initial P5 discussions on North Korea when it served on the 
Council in 2005-2006.460 While “experts,” middle-level diplomats, generally negotiate outcomes, 
the negotiations on these matters were conducted at ambassadorial level, with deputy 
ambassadors sometimes standing in.461   
Negotiations among the P3 and the P5 on nuclear issues were often intense and time-
consuming, requiring frequent meetings to reach agreement. For example, following North 
Korea’s test of a nuclear device on 8 October 2006, the permanent members went into high-gear 
to develop a rapid and adequate response. In the six days leading up to the unanimous adoption 
of resolution 1718 on 14 October condemning the test and imposing sanctions on the regime, US 
Ambassador John Bolton notes that his UK colleague, Ambassador Emyr Jones Parry, had 
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“counted twenty-three Perm Three or Perm Five meetings (plus Japan in all cases).”462  Bolton 
claims that the most important meeting he had during this process was a bilateral discussion with 
Chinese Ambassador Wang Guangya, who indicated that China would not veto the draft 
because, in Bolton’s words, “China did not want a public tiff over this resolution.”463   
While the P3 have frequently spearheaded the drafting of resolutions in the post-Cold 
War era, there have been several permutations in how they have managed negotiations on texts 
that one or more of them have prepared. Sometimes, for example, influential states whose 
support is needed to implement the resolution are engaged in early rounds of negotiations, as in 
the case of Japan’s inclusion in the P5 discussions on North Korea’s nuclear program in the mid-
2000s.   
A notable example of regional actors being included early in negotiations occurred with 
respect to the Council’s handling of Côte d’Ivoire in the mid-2000s. While leading the drafting 
and negotiations on resolutions on UN peace operations in Côte d’Ivoire, France would initially 
consult at ambassador-level with African members of the Council, other influential African 
states, and at times, the African Union to ensure that the text was appropriately calibrated before 
enlarging the negotiating group to include the permanent members.464 Based on their interest in 
the issue, some elected members were kept informed about the content of the text, before it was 
ultimately presented to all Council members.465 Burkina Faso, which mediated the Ouagadougou 
Peace Agreement of 2007, was at times consulted about the content of resolutions following the 
signing of this peace agreement.466 African engagement on Côte d’Ivoire resolutions at an early 
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stage was important, especially given the delicate regional politics,467 reflected by divisions on 
the issue between two heavyweights on the continent: Nigeria and South Africa, which had a 
close relationship with Ivoirian President Laurent Gbagbo.468    
In the mid-2000s, in an interesting case of excluding the United Kingdom from their 
early negotiations, France and the United States worked closely on resolutions regarding Syria 
and Lebanon, including in cases when they were not in agreement.469 The difficult negotiations 
on resolution 1701 of 11 August 2006 demonstrate these efforts to cooperate. (Resolution 1701 
increased the troop strength of UN Interim Force in Lebanon [UNIFIL] to 15,000 and called for 
the withdrawal of Israeli forces, which had been fighting Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, once 
UNIFIL troops and Lebanese troops were deployed in the area.)470 US Ambassador Bolton 
maintained that at one point French Ambassador Jean-Marc de La Sablière asked that 
discussions on the text be between just France and the United States, to avoid being perceive as 
an “‘Anglo”’ text that would not be as well received in the Middle East.471  One UN diplomat 
active at the time noted that it was important that the text at least be acceptable to US ally Israel 
and French ally Lebanon, which would in turn help it gain support in the Council.472   
These bilateral negotiations between Bolton and de La Sablière and their staffs enabled 
them to make compromises ultimately leading to the unanimous adoption of resolution 1701.   
Less than two weeks earlier, on 31 July 2006, Bolton asserted that de la Sablière had confided to 
him that “the conceptual gaps between our two positions on Lebanon might be unbridgeable.”473  




470 UN Security Council resolution 1701, 11 August 2006. 
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In the final text, several concessions were made. For example, the resolution called for a “‘full 
cessation of hostilities,’” a distant cry from “‘no cessation of hostilities without a political 
solution,’” which had been advocated by the United States and would have been preferable to 
Israel.474 Moreover, while the United States initially espoused the authorization of a robust 
international force in southern Lebanon, it ultimately consented to the French position, which 
entailed merely enhancing the force structure of UNIFIL to support efforts of the Lebanese force 
to provide security.475  
Later that year, on 29-30 November 2006, during the annual workshop that the Finnish 
Government hosts to prepare the incoming members of the Security Council for their terms, 
there was discussion of the marginalization of the elected members in work of the Council. It 
was observed that: “Three of the five permanent members…are the lead countries on the bulk of 
active items on the Council’s agenda,”476 most likely a reference to the P3, given the fact that 
they, rather than China and Russia, have historically been more active drafters of Council 
outcomes.  Similarly, the viewpoint was expressed that “elected members are brought into the 
resolution drafting process only at a later stage,”477 a common refrain of elected members over 
the past decade that highlights the tension between them and the permanent members. The 
counterargument to this viewpoint, also made at the workshop, is that on particularly difficult 
matters, “it is best to begin with a smaller group and then move towards a larger one,”478 
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particularly relevant when each of the members of that “smaller group” (i.e. the P5) holds the 
veto.  
Concerns about over-concentrating the preparation of drafts in the hands of a small 
minority has been reflected in presidential notes on working methods dating back to 1999. In 
1999, 2006, 2010, 2014, and 2017, notes by the president emphasized the importance of allowing 
all members of the Council to participate in preparing its outcomes, including resolutions or 
presidential statements.479 The most recent of these presidential notes (in 2017) stated that “Any 
member of the Security Council may be a penholder” and that “Members of the Council are 
encouraged to act as the penholder(s) in the drafting of documents.”480 The 2017 presidential 
note further “encourage[d] penholders or co-penholders, as early as possible in the drafting 
exercise, to ensure the exchange of information among all Security Council members and to 
engage in timely consultations with all Council members with openness and flexibility.”481    
The consolidation of the pen in the hands of the P3 over the past decade has led to use of 
the term “penholdership.”482 As noted above, according to this practice, a particular member (or 
members) monopolizes the drafting of outcomes (i.e., resolutions, presidential statements, and 
press statements) on a particular agenda item or issue. The common process by which 
penholdership works among the P3 is that a draft is produced by one of them, which agrees on 
the  text with their P3 colleagues, before then circulating it to other permanent members China 
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and Russia for their input and for further discussions.483 Only then is the draft circulated to the 
elected membership.484 The process enables the permanent members to largely control the 
content of resolutions (as well as presidential statement and press statements), and at times, make 
compromises among themselves at an early stage of negotiations.   
Penholdership is not dissimilar to what had happened in earlier periods. The P3 have 
throughout the post-Cold War period been considered prolific drafters. A process akin to 
penholdership has occurred, especially on issues of high strategic importance to the permanent 
members, in other periods of the late Cold War and post-Cold War period. Pickering’s 
description above of negotiations in the early 1990s attests to this. The P5 deliberations on 
nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea in the mid-2000s—whereby all drafts were negotiated 
on these issues by the permanent members at ambassador-level before being circulated to the 
elected members—were also akin to penholdership.   
However, unlike in prior years, when it had not been uncommon for the elected members 
to initiate drafts on their own, some elected members in recent years have increasingly felt that 
they are being discouraged from drafting, although they do hold the pen on some issues and there 
have been some high-profile drafting initiatives led by elected members, such as the May 2016 
resolution on the protection of health care in armed conflict, discussed in Chapter V.485 
Penholdership is clearly exclusionary. At times, it can also delay the Council’s reaction time to a 
crisis, when the penholder delays in taking action and others do not take the initiative.  Another 
frequent criticism worth reiterating is that drafts produced by the permanent members are often 
                                                           
483 Security Council Report, “In Hindsight: The Security Council Penholders.”  
484 Ibid. 
485 UN Security Council resolution 2286, 3 May 2016. 
132 
 
shared with elected members very late in negotiations when there is little, if any, time for them to 
contribute constructive inputs.    
However, it is possible to muster arguments in favor of penholdership. Given that the 
permanent members have advantages of capacity and institutional knowledge (of the Council and 
of particular issues) and political influence, they are often well-qualified to spearhead drafting 
and negotiating. Furthermore, for the purposes of building consensus on a draft resolution, it is 
helpful to ensure that all of the veto-wielding permanent members support a resolution at an 
early stage before the draft is circulated to the elected members. In this way, differences of 
perspective can frequently be worked out early on among these powerful states, possibly 
avoiding unnecessary vetoes.  
Table 4. Security Council Penholders - 2017486 
 
Issue  Penholder 
  
Afghanistan  Japan 
Bosnia/Herzegovina  Monthly rotation among contact and drafting group 
members (including France, Germany, Italy, 
Russia, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Ukraine and 
the United States) 
Burundi  France 
Central African Region (UN Office for Central 
Africa/Lord’s Resistance Army) 
United Kingdom 
Central African Republic  France 
Central Asia (UN Regional Centre for Preventive 
Diplomacy for Central Asia) 
Russia 
Côte d’Ivoire  France 
Cyprus United Kingdom  
Democratic Republic of the Congo  France 
Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea United States 
Golan Heights (UN Disengagement Observer 
Force) 
Russia and the United States 
Guinea-Bissau  Senegal 
Haiti  United States after negotiation among the Group of 
Friends of Haiti (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, 
                                                           




Colombia, France, Guatemala, Peru, the United 
States, Uruguay and Venezuela) 
Iran (Non-Proliferation) United States; Italy facilitates implementation of 
resolution 2231 which authorized the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (i.e., the Iran 
nuclear deal) 
Iraq  United States  
Iraq/Kuwait United Kingdom 
Lebanon  France 
Liberia  United States  
Libya  United Kingdom 
Mali  France 
Middle East (Israel/Palestine) Various Council members 
Somalia  United Kingdom; United States on piracy issues 
Sudan and South Sudan United States on South Sudan, as well as on 
Sudan/South Sudan and UN Interim Security Force 
for Abyei; United Kingdom on Darfur 
Syria Egypt, Japan and Sweden on the humanitarian 
track; on other matters the United States and Russia 
normally seek agreement on texts before circulating 
to the broader Council; France and the United 
Kingdom also propose texts and request meetings.  
Ukraine The United States and Russia have drafted texts.  
Other members have requested meetings.  
Yemen   United Kingdom 
West Africa, including the Sahel Senegal 
Western Sahara United States drafts; resolution is then negotiated 
among the Group of Friends of Western Sahara 
(France, Russia, Spain, the UK and the US) before 
being circulated to the Council for negotiation.   
Children and Armed Conflict  Sweden 
Counter-terrorism (resolutions 1267/1989/2253)  United States 
Counter-Terrorism (resolution 1373) United States 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia and International Residual Mechanism 
for Criminal Tribunals 
Uruguay 
Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(resolution 1540) 
Bolivia 
Peacekeeping United Kingdom 
Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict  United Kingdom 
Women, Peace and Security  United Kingdom on women’s participation in 
resolving conflict and in peace processes and 
women’s protection issues (resolution 1325); 
United States on sexual violence in armed conflict 
(resolution 1820) 





Why is consensus important? 
Council members frequently emphasize the importance of a unified Council, sometimes 
underscoring the consensus achieved following difficult negotiations. When resolutions are 
adopted without unanimous support, members express their concerns about the broken unity of 
the Council, even though such resolutions have the same legal status as those resolutions that are 
unanimously adopted.   
It is useful to unpack the motivations underpinning efforts to achieve consensus to 
improve our understanding of how the Council works and what role it plays in the foreign 
policies of its members. Four primary reasons can be adduced for why unanimity is so desired by 
members: the legitimacy it accords to decisions;487 the notion that a consensus document is the 
product of the good stewardship of the negotiation process by those leading it; the perceived 
impact of unanimous resolutions on the party or parties who are the object of the resolution; and 
the fear of isolation of those considering breaking the consensus. Analyzing these four reasons 
gives a clearer indication of why consensus is important to members.   
Legitimacy of Unanimity   
Using Hurd’s definition of legitimacy as “an actor’s normative belief that a rule or institution 
ought to be obeyed,”488 it can be assumed that a resolution—if allowed to substitute for a 
“rule”— has greater political clout when it is unanimously adopted. The unanimity of the 
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Council in difficult cases is particularly important because it consists of only 15 members, 
representing a small percentage of the wider membership in UN General Assembly; since the 
Council is the main arbiter of international peace and security, representing all 193 member 
states, a divided Council can be perceived as an indication that the broader international 
community of states is divided and therefore not fully supportive of its action.489   
The relationship between legitimacy and unanimity is especially relevant to why the P3 
strived to secure a unanimous vote on resolution 1441 of 8 November 2002 on Iraq, a last ditch 
effort to forestall a US-UK invasion of the country, one that ultimately failed. UK Ambassador 
Greenstock notes that in the later stages of the negotiations on the resolution, US Ambassador 
John Negroponte “confirmed…that the US was becoming increasingly interested in securing a 
unanimous vote.”490 In the lead up to the vote, once it had settled its differences on the text with 
the United States, France—along with Arab countries and Secretary-General Kofi Annan—
pressured Syria, the one hold-out expected to abstain, to support the resolution.491    
During the explanations of vote, several members alluded to the importance of the 
unanimity that had been achieved. Representing a US administration known primarily for its 
unilateralism, Negroponte commended the “international consensus on how to proceed towards 
Iraq,” an implicit acknowledgement that the Council reflects the will of the global community of 
states on peace and security matters.492 French Ambassador Jean-David Levitte was explicit in 
upholding the centrality of the Council’s responsibility as the main arbiter of international peace 
and security. Levitte said that “the resolution that has just been adopted 
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unanimously…strengthens the role and authority of the Security Council,” referring to France’s 
desire to ensure that violation of the resolution would not automatically lead to the use of force 
without explicit Council approval.493 In spite of the failure of the resolution to prevent the 
ensuing war in Iraq, the major powers valued the legitimacy of a unified Council at this moment.  
Good Stewardship 
There is a certain amount of pride that comes with leading a successful negotiation process. 
When resolutions are adopted unanimously, it can be perceived as an indication that the drafters, 
who lead the negotiations, have done a good job of managing the process, especially when 
differences of perspective have been accommodated or compromises are made.494 They are thus 
viewed as effective stewards of the Council’s work,495 who have demonstrated good judgement 
and diplomatic skill.496  How negotiation processes are led is especially relevant to the British 
and the French, who have consistently been active drafters of resolutions in the post-Cold War 
period and who have over the past decade taken hold of the pen on a high percentage of issues. 
As waning powers whose permanent seats have been called into question, it is important for 
them to demonstrate their competence and skill to the wider UN membership.  It is not 
uncommon for UK diplomats to highlight their proficiency at drafting,497 especially since draft 
resolutions are produced and negotiated in English before being translated into the other five 
languages of the UN (Arabic, Chinese, French, Russia, and Spanish) once they are adopted.  
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The adoption of resolution 2296 on 29 June 2016, which renewed the mandate of the 
UN/AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) for one year, provides an example of members 
emphasizing the importance of achieving unanimity through compromise. The United Kingdom 
drafted the text and led the complex negotiations, accommodating different views regarding how 
to calibrate language on the security situation, on obstacles imposed on the mission by the 
government, and on the efforts of a joint AU, UN and government of Sudan working group 
designed to create an exit strategy for the mission.498 When the text was unanimously adopted, 
UK Ambassador Matthew Rycroft “welcome[d] the constructive spirit in which all 
members…engaged with us during the negotiations” and noted that the “balance” of the text.499  
Likewise, Deputy Ambassador Pyotr Ilyichev of Russia, which has clashed with the United 
Kingdom and other Western countries on Darfur, maintained that “As a result of intensive 
consultations, members of the Council managed to make the text sufficiently balanced.”500    
Obviously, there are times when unanimity cannot be achieved because the differences to 
be bridged are too great; in such cases, no matter how long a negotiation process endures and no 
matter how creatively and constructively the members engage, the text simply does not have the 
requisite support to be adopted unanimously or to be adopted at all. This is especially the case 
when the core national interests of the permanent members are at stake. From the beginning of 
the Syria crisis in 2011, it has been clear that Russia has been inflexible in its unwillingness to 
pressure the Assad regime; the veto has been the most common outcome of drafts attempting to 
do so. Likewise, given the Trump administration’s early policy pronouncements on the Middle 
                                                           
498 Security Council Report, “AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur Mandate Renewal,” What’s In Blue, 28 June 
2016, http://www.whatsinblue.org/2016/06/au-un-hybrid-operation-in-darfur-mandate-renewal.php. 
499 UN Security Council meeting record (S/PV.7728), 29 June 2016, 5. 
500 Ibid., 2. 
138 
 
East, it is hard to imagine that any draft resolution critical of Israel would not be vetoed by the 
United States.    
However, when unanimity is not achieved and when the negotiation process is considered 
to have been poorly managed, the member or members leading the process are subject to 
criticism. Sometimes in their explanations of vote, members complain not only about the 
substance of the text but also about the way the negotiating process has been conducted, arguing 
that their concerns have not been taken into account or that too little time was allowed for 
substantive discussions.   
The negotiations on resolution 2333 of 23 December 2016, which was drafted by the 
United States and which renewed the mandate of UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), illustrate this 
point. The resolution significantly downsized the mission in anticipation that UNMIL will close 
when its mandate expires in March 2018; however, the resolution kept in place some 700 
peacekeepers. The vote represented a rare case of disunity among the P3, with France and the 
United Kingdom joining Russia in abstaining, while all other members supported the draft.  
Ambassador Isobel Coleman of the United States maintained that it was necessary to keep in 
place the peacekeepers “to support the Liberian security services through [elections planned for 
October 2017]…in order to consolidate the hard-earned security gains that Liberia has made.”501   
France, Russia, and the United Kingdom all believed that maintaining the peacekeepers was 
unnecessary, as they could have been better used in other missions in need of personnel.   
While there was considerable criticism of the substance of the text, Council members 
expressed displeasure with the United States for the way in which the negotiations were led and 
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for the failure to make a genuine effort to reach consensus. There was a political price to be paid, 
with the US lambasted in the public chamber for it poor management of the process. French 
Ambassador François Delattre said in his explanation of vote: “…we can only regret the absence 
of genuine negotiations among Council members…our proposals were never taken into serious 
account…We hope…that in the future we are able to strengthen the Council’s unity on this key 
topic.”502 Deputy Ambassador Luis Bermudez of Uruguay, although supportive of the text, 
argued that “The Security Council must show that it is able to adopt resolutions that achieve the 
broadest possible support among its members. The role of the penholder is crucial in such 
negotiating situations, and it is desirable that penholders demonstrate more flexibility and be 
more receptive to proposals from other Council members.”503 And New Zealand’s Deputy 
Ambassador Phillip Taula similarly maintained that “more could have been done to bridge the 
diverging views within the Council in order to achieve consensus and thereby send a united 
message to Liberia.”504 
The perceived impact of a unified Council 
There is a generally held view that a unified Council has greater impact in exerting leverage on 
the actors who are the object of its attention than one that is divided.  Members frequently argue 
that a unified Council sends an important message to the party or the parties on the ground either 
about the strength of the UN’s support for their efforts or about the consequences of a failure to 
comply with its demands. This perception has been evident at the annual Finnish Workshop for 
incoming members of the Council; at the 15 and 16 November 2007 workshop, one of the 
speakers contended that “When members were ‘determined to come together’…the prospects for 
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implementation [of resolutions] rose,”505 while at the 18-19 November 2010 workshop, “several 
participants spoke of the tendency of members of the Security Council to see consensus 
decisions as the most effective ones.”506 A frequent refrain as well is that Council unity is 
essential with regard to effectiveness of UN peace operations in particular. During the 6 April 
2017 debate on peacekeeping, Uruguayan Ambassador Elbio Rosselli captured this sentiment: 
“Experience has shown and continues to show that when there is a lack of unity in the Council 
and the lack of a clear role in support of the peace process, the success of a peacekeeping 
operation can be seriously compromised.”507 
Whether or not these assertions are true merits further study. Nonetheless, the view that 
consensus means that “the full weight of the Council is behind a decision” or that this organ is 
“stronger when it is united” is frequently heard. This perception, true or not, is at least one 
rationale for efforts to achieve unanimity. The caveat that should be observed is that a unanimous 
adoption does not necessarily mean a united Council. The concessions that are made to achieve 
unanimity in voting can lead to ambiguity in language that allows for significant latitude in how 
a resolution is interpreted. Resolution 1441 is an example of this, as the United States and the 
United Kingdom believed that this resolution and prior ones on Iraq provided a legal justification 
for intervention in March 2003,508 while France, Russia and other members did not accept this 
view.      
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Fear of Isolation 
In addition to vetoes, there are numerous cases when one or more abstentions are cast on 
resolutions that have the support of most members. However, as Bolton has written, the 
compulsion to seek unanimity “could also increase the pressure on some members to go along 
with the majority.”509 At times, hold-outs from smaller states find it difficult to resist the pressure 
placed on them by more powerful states to vote a certain way, especially if those powerful states 
have political or economic leverage over them. Even powerful states at times vote along with a 
resolution not entirely to their liking, so as not to appear divisive. Bolton, for example, describes 
the unanimous adoption of the resolution 1679 of 16 May 2006, which paved the way for the 
transition from an African Union to a UN peacekeeping operation in Darfur, as an instance in 
which China and Russia succumbed and supported the resolution “because they feared being 
exposed and isolated on a subject as sensitive as Sudan.”510  
Differences among the P3 
In spite of being united on most issues, there have nonetheless been several points of friction 
among the P3 in the post-Cold War period on peace and security issues that have featured to a 
greater or lesser extent in the Council’s deliberations. This section is not intended to be 
exhaustive in describing the differences among the P3, but rather to highlight some of the key 
ones. Significant areas of differences included the Bosnian conflict in the early to mid-1990s, 
Iraq beginning in the 1990s and culminating with the US-led invasion in March 2003, and 
Israel/Palestine over several decades. Disagreements on Israel/Palestine extended beyond the 
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Cold War and have continued until the present day; all but one US veto in the post-Cold War era 
has pertained to Israel/Palestine.   
Descriptions of these issues demonstrate why agreement could not be reached on them.  
In some cases, the divisions among the P3 (and the P5 more broadly) were simply too vast, 
leading to diverging votes or even the bypassing of the Council altogether (e.g., the US decision 
to invade Iraq in 2003 without Council approval). However, when there are opportunities to 
bridge the divide on difficult issues, considerable efforts are frequently made to hammer out 
differences and make agreements. While it is not always possible to achieve unanimity, in some 
cases vetoes have been avoided as a result of these discussions. With regard to resolutions 
critical of Israel, a major US client benefiting from a powerful US lobby, the domestic costs of 
not vetoing resolutions can be significant, as reflected by the US abstention on resolution 2334 in 
December 2016.    
Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Bosnia was a particular strong point of contention between the United States, on the one hand, 
and France and the United Kingdom, on the other hand. John Weston, UK Ambassador to NATO 
from 1992 to 1995 and to the UN from 1995 to 1998, has said that the NATO alliance was 
almost broken over Bosnia.511 The crux of the disagreement was that the United States endorsed 
a muscular approach against the Bosnian Serbs—including by advocating robust NATO-led air 
strikes—but the British and the French were more circumspect, particularly since both countries, 
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unlike the United States, had peacekeepers on the ground and were worried about potential 
retaliation against their personnel by the Bosnian Serbs.512   
The so-called “dual key” approach—a cumbersome process by which all bombing 
decisions had to be approved by both NATO and the UN—reflected the divergent views among 
the allies.513 As Hannay notes: “There was a permanent tension between NATO, dominated by 
the USA, where substantial strategic deployment of air power was favoured, and the UN 
hierarchy, which listened more to the concerns of the main troop contributors (France and 
Britain) and which favoured limited tactical use of air power in narrowly defined 
circumstances.”514 The result of this tension was to promote further intransigence of the Bosnian 
Serbs, with the support of Slobodan Milosevic.515 The controversial dual key policy was 
discarded by NATO in 1995, amidst ongoing Serb bombing of Sarajevo516 and “the 
unwillingness of the United States and NATO to accept the halfhearted Bosnian Serb efforts at 
appeasement and to accept UN authority over NATO’s actions.”517 
A further frustration of the United States during the Bosnia War—and a source of tension 
with all the other permanent members of the Council—was the inability to adopt a resolution 
endorsing the lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia, with the goal of enabling the Bosnian 
Muslims to defend themselves from the Bosnian Serbs who were supplied with weapons by 
Belgrade. This issue came to a head on 29 June 1993 when the Council voted on a draft 
resolution that would have lifted the arms embargo. Reminiscent of what happened frequently in 
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the Cold War days but less frequently since then, the draft resolution was proposed by the non-
aligned caucus in the Council, and was consistent with the 24 May 1993 declaration of the 
Organisation of Islamic Conference calling for a lifting of the embargo.518 The draft received 
only six affirmative votes—including all the NAM members (Cape Verde, Djibouti, Morocco, 
Pakistan, and Venezuela) and the United States.  Abstentions were cast by Brazil, China, France, 
Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, Spain, and the United Kingdom.  
This was one issue that no amount of discussion or dialogue could overcome. The 
Council was too divided.  During the meeting in which the vote occurred, those states supporting 
the lifting of the embargo maintained that the Bosnian Muslims needed to be able to defend 
themselves.519 Those states against lifting the embargo argued that lifting the embargo would 
lead to increased fighting, with the Bosnian Serbs and Croats redoubling their military actions, 
while undermining the political process.520 For France and the United Kingdom, perhaps the 
most important consideration for their decision to oppose the lifting of the embargo was that they 
(unlike the United States) had troops on the ground, whose safety was a major concern. Along 
these lines, French Ambassador Jean-Bernard Mérimée reacted against impassioned pleas for the 
lifting of the embargo by saying that France “will not accept lessons in morality from anyone,”521 
noting that 11 French personnel had already died in the conflict.522   
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While many people recall P3 divisions in the lead up to the March 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, 
less frequently discussed is that the divergence of views between France, on the one hand, and 
the United States and the United Kingdom, on the other hand, on Iraq policy began years earlier.  
Hannay writes that as early as 1993, elections in France had brought in a government that was 
“instinctively more friendly towards Saddam Hussein’s Iraq than its predecessor.”523    
In the aftermath of the brief US-UK bombing campaign against Baghdad in December 
1998—which was precipitated by Saddam Hussein’s lack of cooperation with weapons 
inspectors and the withdrawal of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) in August 2008524—
the Council established a new weapons inspection regime through UN Monitoring, Verification 
and Inspection Commission with the adoption of resolution 1284 in December 1999. France— 
along with China, Malaysia, and Russia—was one of four countries that abstained on the draft.  
In its explanation of vote, while noting the humanitarian impact of sanctions on Iraq, France said 
that the draft left open for interpretation the “criteria for the suspension and then lifting of 
sanctions,”525 an indication of its trepidation that the sanctions on Iraq might be unfairly 
maintained even if it improved its compliance.526   
In spite of the four abstentions on this resolution, significant efforts were made to strike 
agreement. Greenstock observed that the negotiations on resolution 1284 lasted eight months, 
from April to December 1999, surmising that this was “one of the longest negotiations of any 
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[Security Council] resolution.”527 Some of the negotiations were held at ministerial level.528 The 
resolution was negotiated only after the Council considered the recommendations proposed by 
three panels it established in January 1999 to “discuss options which would lead to the full 
implementation of all relevant Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.”529 These panels—
consisting of UN and International Atomic Energy Agency experts—focused on disarmament 
and monitoring and verification issues; humanitarian matters; and Kuwaiti prisoners and 
property seized by Iraq.530 Greenstock concludes that while the negotiations on resolution 1284 
“failed to unite the Security Council around a single position,”531 they at least avoided vetoes 
from the three permanent members that abstained.532  
The negotiations on resolution 1441 of 8 November 2002, which gave Iraq “a final 
opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations” or “face serious consequences” were 
also highly divisive.533 The language had to be calibrated to allay French and Russian concerns 
that violation of the resolution’s terms would not lead automatically to the use of force without 
further Council discussion—concerns which would have led to vetoes by both countries if left 
unaddressed.534  Ultimately, after several weeks of negotiations that included engagement among 
P5 foreign ministers, a compromise was struck, 535 not only avoiding French and Russian vetoes 
but resulting in a unanimous adoption. The unanimity achieved was not strong enough to survive 
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the profound divisions among the major powers, with Washington and London determined to 
pursue a military option.  
However, this only happened after the United States and the United Kingdom attempted 
to secure a second resolution in late February/March 2003 to authorize the decision to use force.  
The effort met stiff resistance from several Council members, including permanent members 
China, France, and Russia, which believed that the weapons inspectors needed more time to 
complete their work.536 On 11 March, French President Jacques Chirac publicly stated that his 
country would veto a resolution resulting in military intervention.537 In spite of US/UK lobbying 
of permanent and elected members alike,538 it became clear that not only would the draft be 
vetoed but that it would not even receive nine votes, the required number to adopt a resolution 
absent a veto. The draft was never put to a vote.   
Israel/Palestine 
The Israel/Palestine conflict has been a persistent problem on the Council’s agenda. Since 
August 2002, the Council has met every month on this issue539—and sometimes more than once 
per month—and yet, no progress has been made in addressing the conflict’s underlying issues; in 
fact, relations between Israel and Palestine are far worse now than they were in the early post-
Cold War era when the Oslo process provided at least a modicum of hope for a better future for 
Israelis and Palestinians. Blame heaped on the Security Council for its failings on this issue can 
be widely dispersed onto other actors; its gridlock is a reflection of the great power divides that 
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exist outside the organ as well. The parties themselves have missed several opportunities to make 
peace, bilateral efforts to exert leverage on them have not been particularly effective, and the 
issues involved have always been complex and intractable. While the UN has often been accused 
of an anti-Israel bias (both during and after the Cold War) and it could be argued that this bias 
applies to the General Assembly, the Human Rights Council, and the UN Educational, Scientific, 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), it is much harder to make this case with regard to the 
outcomes of the Security Council, where Israel is often protected by the US veto and threat of 
veto and where resolutions on Israel/Palestine are moderate and balanced. Thirteen of the 14 US 
vetoes in the post-Cold War era through the end of 2016 have been on this Israel/Palestine, and 
they have all been sole vetoes.  
 In recent years, draft resolutions on Israel/Palestine are usually initially drafted by the 
Palestinians and presented by the Arab group member of the Council. Thus, the P3 does not 
exercise control of the pen, as they do on so many other issues. For obvious reasons, the United 
States prefers to keep the focus off of Israel in the Council. France and the United Kingdom as 
close allies of the US are inclined to exercise caution in proposing drafts on Israel/Palestine; one 
notable exception to this, discussed below, was the draft resolution vetoed by the United States 
in March 1997, which would have condemned settlements, that was proposed by Council 
members belonging to the European Union.    
On Israel/Palestine in the post-Cold War era, three vetoes were cast during President Bill 
Clinton’s administration; nine during President George W. Bush’s administration; and one 
during President Barack Obama’s administration. The United States was particularly isolated 
with regard to the three vetoes cast under President Clinton in the 1990s. The first of these texts, 
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voted on 17 May 1995,540 would have condemned Israel’s annexation of 53 hectares of land in 
East Jerusalem, while the second (7 March 1997)541 and third (21 March 1997)542 would have 
condemned Israeli settlement building in East Jerusalem. The first two received fourteen 
affirmative votes, meaning that no other member even abstained, while the third one received 
thirteen affirmative votes with only one abstention, cast by Costa Rica. The 7 March 1997 draft 
was sponsored by the European members of the Council—including France, Portugal, Sweden, 
and the United Kingdom—demonstrating the depth of division between the United States and its 
Western allies. What is particularly striking about the US explanations of vote in all of their 
vetoes in the Clinton years is that it did not directly criticize the substance of the draft 
resolutions; rather, it argued that the Council was not the appropriate venue to address the issue, 
maintaining that the parties themselves should resolve their differences through negotiations.543  
This is a case of the United States marginalizing the Council to protect one of its closest allies, 
instead of using it as a pressure point to exert leverage on it.   
The nine vetoes cast on Israel/Palestine under the Bush administration came during years 
of heightened tension and violence between Israel and Palestinians, marked by the Second 
Intifada (2000-2005) and the fighting between Israel and Hamas in 2006, following Hamas’ 
seizure of the Gaza strip. A common thread running through these drafts was their call for an end 
to the violence between the parties. The 26 March 2001 draft called for the establishment of a 
UN observer force to protect Palestinian civilians,544 while the 10 November 2006 draft called 
for the “possible establishment of international mechanism for protection of the civilian 
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populations.”545 A frequent US refrain in explaining their vetoes in the 2000s was that the texts 
lacked balance, maintaining that they  failed to distinguish between Israel’s right to self-defense 
and Palestinian terrorism or that their condemnation of Palestinian terrorist acts was 
insufficient.546   
There has been an interesting dynamic among the P3 on Israel/Palestine in the post-Cold 
War era in the Council. While France and the United Kingdom have disagreed with US policy on 
Israel/Palestine and have voted in favour of resolutions condemning settlement-building, there 
has been some difference between them on this issue, with the United Kingdom less inclined 
than France to criticize Israel.  It is particularly telling, for example, that the UK abstained, rather 
than voting affirmatively, on eight of the nine draft resolutions on this issue vetoed by the United 
States during the Bush administration; France abstained on only one of these drafts, voting with 
the majority on the eight other texts and thus willing to exert more pressure on Israel than its P3 
colleagues. UK Ambassador Greenstock captures the dilemma facing the United Kingdom in 
voting on Israel/Palestine resolutions in the Security Council or the General Assembly: “…these 
were always agonizing occasions, torn as we were between firm support for Israel’s security and 
insistence on justice for the Palestinians…we drove our EU colleagues to distraction as we 
looked for one or more element of balance to set beside the mild but noticeable European bias in 
favour of the Palestinians.”547 
The explanations of vote on the vetoed draft resolution on 24 March 2004 demonstrate 
the differences in the P3 perspectives. This draft condemned extrajudicial killings by Israel, 
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particularly of Hamas leader Sheik Ahmed Yassin, a targeted assassination that led to six 
additional Palestinian deaths.548 In explaining its veto, US Ambassador John Negroponte gave a 
common US refrain by saying that the draft would “not further the goals of peace and security in 
the region.”549 He further argued that the draft was “silent about the terrorist atrocities committed 
by Hamas,” maintaining that while it condemned the assassination of Yassin, it did not mention a 
recent suicide bombing that killed 10 Israelis in Ashdod, Israel.550 Ambassador Emyr Jones Parry 
of the United Kingdom, which abstained, argued that his country would have voted for the text, 
if there had been stronger language on terrorism.551 The text did indeed say that the Council 
“condemns…all terrorist acts against civilians;”552 however, whereas this reference was 
sufficient to satisfy France, which supported the text, it was not detailed enough for the United 
Kingdom, and certainly not for the United States.  
The Council was very active on Israel/Palestine in the Bush years. Between 2002 and 
2004, for example, it convened 68 meetings regarding the “Middle East situation, including the 
Palestine question.”553 In spite of the high number of vetoes under Bush, the United States also 
allowed a number of resolutions to be adopted on Israel/Palestine.554 It sponsored resolution 
1397, adopted in March 2002, calling for the two parties to “live side by side within secure and 
recognized borders”555 and “to cooperate… with the aim of resuming negotiations on a political 
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settlement.”556 UK Ambassador Greenstock maintains that headway on the Middle East (i.e., 
Israel/Palestine) peace process was one of the conditions attached to the United Kingdom’s 
support for the military option in Iraq—which provides a possible explanation for the increased 
US engagement on Israel/Palestine at the time.557 The level of activity in the Council is also 
understandable considering that it occurred amidst the violence of the Second Intifada.  
However, as Marcus Bouillon has argued, the increased engagement was indicative of 
“deterioration, rather than progress” as the “Council became essentially a venting 
mechanism.”558 The Middle East Quartet—formed in 2002 and comprising the European Union, 
the United Nations, the United States, and Russia—guided international decision-making on 
Israel-Palestine, and the Council was largely left to rubberstamp its decisions.559  
During the Obama administration, the United States cast one veto on Israel/Palestine 
issues, on yet another draft resolution condemning the building of settlements in February 
2011.560 Given the resonance of this issue among UN member states, the draft—which received 
the votes of all other 14 members—garnered co-sponsorship from 79 UN member states. All 
indications are that the United States was reluctant to cast this veto and worked hard to find a 
way out of its diplomatic isolation. Rather than a resolution, it proposed that the Council pursue a 
presidential statement, an outcome with less political clout, but one that needs unanimous 
support to be adopted.561 The United States further demonstrated willingness to consider a 
Council visiting mission to Israel/Palestine and other parts of the Middle East, based on a 
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Russian proposal, 562 and to “publicly declare its support for a peace deal based upon the 1967 
lines with mutually agreed land swaps.”563 However, these concessions were not enough to 
prevent the draft from being put to a vote, in spite of a call from President Obama to Mahmoud 
Abbas, the head of the Palestinian Authority, the day before the vote, in an unsuccessful effort to 
have the draft resolution pulled.564  US Ambassador Susan Rice, who reportedly would have 
preferred the US not to veto the draft,565 gave the US response, condemning settlements but 
maintaining, if adopted, the draft would not further the peace process.566  
Another resolution condemning settlements came before the Council in December 
2016.567 Egypt—which initially co-sponsored the draft along with elected members Malaysia, 
New Zealand, Senegal, and Venezuela—was expected to present it for a vote on 22 December.568 
However, after a phone call from US President-elect Donald Trump to Egyptian President Abdel 
Fatah al-Sisi, Egypt succumbed to the diplomatic pressure and delayed tabling the draft.569  The 
other four cosponsors, however, decided to table the text for a vote anyway, which occurred on 
23 December. A lame duck with less than a month left in office, President Obama let the 
resolution go through, with the United States abstaining.  
The Obama administration’s abstention generated considerable domestic repercussions 
that put the administration on the defensive in its waning days. Following the vote, President-
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elect Trump tweeted that things would “be different at the UN” 570 when he assumed office.571  
On 5 January 2017, the US House of Representatives adopted a resolution that had bipartisan 
support condemning the decision by a vote of 342-80.572 In January 2017, US Senators Ted Cruz 
(Republican) of Texas and Lyndsey Graham (South Carolina) proposed a bill (known as the 
Safeguard Israel Act of 2017) calling for an end to all US financial support for the UN pending 
the rescinding of the resolution; while it is unlikely that such a bill could pass, its introduction is 
an indication of the ire aroused by resolution 2334.573 And during her confirmation hearing 
before the US Senate, UN Ambassador Nikki Haley called the adoption of resolution 2334 “a 
terrible mistake, making a peace agreement between the Israelis and Palestinians harder to 
achieve.”574    
Israel/Palestine is one issue on which the United States will consistently defend Israeli 
interests in the Security Council, at least for the foreseeable future, and notwithstanding the US 
abstention on resolution 2334. The Trump administration has demonstrated that its policies will 
be largely in line with the positions of the current right-wing Israeli government, as has been 
abundantly clear from statements and actions by President Trump and his UN Ambassador Nikki 
Haley.  
There are long-standing historical roots to the relationship between Israel and the United 
States, where there is a strong pro-Israel lobby and where any US administration that attempts to 
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criticize or exert strong diplomatic pressure on Israel through the UN Security Council does so at 
its own peril. The domestic reaction to the Obama administration’s abstention on resolution 2334 
is an indication of the immense pressures imposed on any US administration considering a 
position more in keeping with the international mainstream.   
The below charts demonstrate differences in voting among the P3 in the post-Cold War 
era.  




Agenda Item Vote Tally  
   
S/RES/946 of 30 
September 1994 
The situation in Somalia 14-0-1 (US abstention) 
S/RES/1073 of 28 
September 1996 
The situation in the occupied 
Arab territories  
14-0-1 (US abstention) 
S/RES/1280 of 3 
December 1999 
The situation between Iraq and 
Kuwait  
11-0-3 (China, Malaysia and 
Russia abstained, while France did 
not participate in the vote) 
S/RES/1284 of 17 
December 1999  
The situation between Iraq and 
Kuwait 
11-0-4 (China, France, Malaysia 
and Russia abstained) 
S/RES/1322 of 7 
October 2000  
The situation in the Middle East, 
including the Palestine question 
14-0-1 (US abstention) 
S/RES/1372 of 28 
September 2001 
Security Council Resolution 1054 
of 26 April 1996 [Sudan] 
14-0-1 (US abstention) 
S/RES/1435 of 24 
September 2002  
The situation in the Middle East, 
including the Palestine question 
14-0-1 (US abstention) 
S/RES/1487 of 12 
June 2003  
United Nations peacekeeping  12-0-3 (France, Germany and 
Syria abstained) 
S/RES/1497 of 1 
August 2003 
The situation in Liberia 12-0-3 (France, Germany, and 
Mexico abstained) 
S/RES/1506 of 12 
September 2003 
Libya 13-0-2 (France and the United 
States abstained) 
S/RES/1544 of 19 
May 2004 
The situation in the Middle East, 
including that Palestinian question 
14-0-1 (US abstention) 
S/RES/1593 of 31 
March 2005 
Reports of the Secretary-General 
on the Sudan 
11-0-4 (Algeria, Brazil, China, and 
the United States abstained) 
S/RES/1828 of 31 July 
2008 
Reports of the Secretary-General 
on the Sudan 
14-0-1 (US abstention) 
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S/RES/1860 of 8 
January 2009 
The situation in the Middle East, 
including that Palestinian question 
14-0-1 (US abstention) 
S/RES/1958 of 15 
December 2010 
The situation concerning Iraq 14-0-1 (French abstention) 
S/RES/2334 of 23 
December 2016 
The situation in the Middle East, 
including the Palestinian question 
14-0-1 (US abstention) 
S/RES/2333 of 23 
December 2016 
The situation in Liberia  12-0-3 (France, Russia and the 
United Kingdom abstained) 
 
Table 6. P3 Voting Divergences on Drafts that did not Receive the Required Number of 
Votes for Adoption 
 
Document Symbol and Date  Agenda Item Vote Tally  
S/25997 of 29 June 1993 The situation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  
6-0-9 (Cape Verde, Djibouti, 
Morocco, Pakistan, United 
States, and Venezuela in 
favour; abstentions by Brazil, 
China, France, Hungary, 
Japan, New Zealand, Russia, 
Spain, and the United 
Kingdom) 
S/2014/916 of 30 December 
2014 
The situation in the Middle 
East, including the Palestinian 
question  
8-2-5 (Argentina, Chad, Chile, 
China, France, Jordan, 
Luxembourg and Russia in 
favor; Australia and the 
United States opposed; 
abstentions by Lithuania, 
Nigeria, the Republic of 
Korea, Rwanda, and the 
United Kingdom 
 
Table 7. US Vetoes (1992-2016) 575 
Document Symbol and Date 
of Vote 
Agenda Item Vote Tally  
S/1995/394 of 17 May 1995 The situation in the Occupied 
Arab Territories  
14-1-0 (14 in favor; the US 
veto) 
S/1997/199 of 7 March 1997 The situation in the Occupied 
Arab Territories  
14-1-0 (14 in favor; US veto)  
S/1997/241 of 21 March 1997 The situation in the Occupied 
Arab Territories 
13-1-1(14 in favor; US veto; 
abstention by Costa Rica) 
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US vetoes since France and the United Kingdom have not used the veto since the Cold War.  Also, all US vetoes 
since the end of the Cold War have been sole vetoes.  
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S/2001/270 of 27 March 2001 The situation in the Middle 
East, including the Palestinian 
question 
10-1-4 (10 in favor; US veto; 
abstentions by France, Ireland, 
Norway, and the United 
Kingdom) 
S/2001/1199 of 15 December 
2001 
The situation in the Middle 
East, including the Palestinian 
question 
12-1-2 (12 in favor; US veto; 
abstentions by Norway and the 
United Kingdom) 
S/2002/712 of 30 June 2002 The situation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  
13-1-1 (14 in favor; US veto; 
abstention by Bulgaria) 
S/2002/1385 of 20 December 
2002 
The situation in the Middle 
East, including the Palestinian 
question 
12-1-2 (12 in favor; US veto; 
abstentions by Bulgaria and 
Cameroon) 
S/2003/891 of 16 September 
2003 
The situation in the Middle 
East, including the Palestinian 
question 
11-1-3 (11 in favor; US veto; 
abstentions by Bulgaria, 
Germany and the United 
Kingdom) 
S/2003/980 of 14 October 
2003 
The situation in the Middle 
East, including the Palestinian 
question 
10-1-4 (10 in favor; US veto; 
abstentions by Bulgaria, 
Cameroon, Germany and the 
United Kingdom) 
S/2004/240  of 25 March 2004  The situation in the Middle 
East, including the Palestinian 
question 
11-1-3 (11 in favor, US veto, 
abstentions by Germany, 
Romania and the United 
Kingdom) 
S/2004/783 of 5 October 2004  The situation in the Middle 
East, including the Palestinian 
question 
11-1-3 (11 in favor; US veto; 
abstentions by Germany, 
Romania and the United 
Kingdom) 
S/2006/508 of 13 July 2006 The situation in the Middle 
East, including the Palestinian 
question 
10-1-4 (10 in favor; US veto; 
abstentions by Denmark, Peru, 
Slovakia and the United 
Kingdom) 
S/2006/878 of 11 November 
2006 
The situation in the Middle 
East, including the Palestinian 
question 
10-1-4 (10 in favor; US veto; 
Denmark, Japan, Slovakia, 
and the United Kingdom) 
S/2011/24 of 18 February 
2011 
The situation in the Middle 
East, including the Palestinian 
question 
14-1-0 (14 in favor; US veto) 
 
The permanent members and the breakdown of consensus: toward a new 
Cold War?   
The Council has gone through a particularly contentious period in recent years, marked by 
sometimes bitter divisions among the permanent members (and at times, even among the elected 
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members) on Syria, Ukraine, South Sudan, and Yemen, among other issues. While unanimous 
adoptions are still the norm, a higher number of non-unanimous adoptions (nine) occurred in 
2016 than in any other year in the post-Cold War period576  to go along with two vetoed draft 
resolutions, both on Syria-related matters: the first577 vetoed solely by Russia, the second578 by 
both China and Russia. What is happening and does this reflect changes in the geo-political 
landscape?  
One point to be noted is that the high number of non-unanimous votes is in part a 
reflection of the Council’s hyper-activity, including on a number of complicated issues. The nine 
non-unanimous adoptions in 2016 occurred on a total of 77 resolutions, the most adopted by the 
Council in any calendar year since 1993.579 This means that in 2016 members still managed to 
achieve unanimity roughly 86 percent of the time (i.e. on 68 of 79 drafts put to a vote, including 
the 77 adopted and the two vetoed drafts). Despite clear divisions among the members, this is 
still a high-level of unanimity, especially if compared to the Cold War years.  
However, there has been a definite cooling in relations between Russia and the Western 
powers during the Putin years, so much so that people question whether a new Cold War is upon 
us. Following years of humiliation in the 1990s—and an inability to act more assertively to 
prevent the US invasion of Iraq in 2003580—Russia has demonstrated an incessant desire to be 
                                                           
576 Security Council Report, “The Security Council in 2016,” February 2017 Monthly Forecast, 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-02/the_security_council_in_2016.php. 
577 UN Security Council document (S/2016/846), 8 October 2016. 
578 UN Security Council document (S/2016/1026), 5 December 2016. 
579 Security Council Report, “The Security Council in 2016,” February 2017 Monthly Forecast, 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-02/the_security_council_in_2016.php. 




respected as a great power in more recent years,581 and it has been willing to use hard power to 
achieve that end.  In the past decade, it has used military force to assert its authority in South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia, Georgia, in 2008, and to annex Crimea from Ukraine in 2014, both 
formerly part of the Soviet empire.  Furthermore, from the outset of the Syrian civil war in 2011, 
Russia has staunchly defended the legitimacy of the Assad government, and it continues to use 
its air force to attack the anti-government opposition in a conflict that has now claimed some 
400,000 lives and displaced over half the country’s population.582   
All of these issues—Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria—have been a focus of Council 
deliberations, and all of them have resulted in Russian vetoes.  In June 2009, Russia vetoed a 
draft that would have extended the mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia.583 It has 
vetoed two drafts resolutions on Ukraine: one on 15 March 2014 that would have delegitimized 
the referendum that Russia was organizing on the status of Crimea, which it had recently seized, 
for the following day;584 and a second on 29 July 2015 that would have established an 
international tribunal to try those responsible for the downing of a civilian aircraft over Ukraine 
(flight MH17).585 There have furthermore been eleven Russian vetoes between February 2011 
and the end of 2017 on drafts designed to put pressure on or hold accountable the Assad 
government for its actions in Syria.  
                                                           
581 Kimberly Marten. Interview by Charlie Rose. Charlie Rose: The Week, PBS, 14 April 2017. Marten, a Columbia 
University professor specializing in US-Russia relations, states: “…more than anything else [Putin] wants to be 
treated as an equal with the United States.”  
582 Anne Barnard and Hwaida Saad, “It’s Hard to Believe, but Syria’s War Is Getting Even Worse,” The New York 
Times, 8 February 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/08/world/middleeast/syria-war-
idlib.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fmiddleeast&action=click&contentCollection=middleeast&regio
n=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=10&pgtype=sectionfront. 
583 UN Security Council document (S/2009/310), 15 June 2009. 
584 UN Security Council document (S/2014/189), 15 March 2015. 
585 UN Security Council document (S/2015/562), 29 July 2015. 
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Russia’s opportunistic aggression in former Soviet Republics is understandable.  
Notwithstanding Putin’s desire to project an image of power, the country harbors a strong sense 
of insecurity, given its extensive borders and its history of suffering invasions from European 
neighbors.586 Kimberly Marten, for example, has noted that: “The Russian military genuinely 
fears a surprise Western attack along the country’s long borders, including possible U.S. or 
NATO intervention in one of Russia’s ongoing military conflicts.”587  
While Russia does not share a border with Syria, there are several reasons for its support 
of the Assad government. Salman Shaikh and Amanda Roberts maintain that these include such 
factors as “preserving its security and arms-trading agreements and keeping its largely symbolic 
naval base in Tartous on the eastern Mediterranean coast…,”588 as well as “maintaining its last 
significant sphere of influence in the region, containing Islamic extremism…, and ensuring the 
safety of Syria’s Christian community.”589       
If, as Stephen Kotkin argues, “Russian governments have generally oscillated between 
seeking closer ties with the West and recoiling in fury at perceived slights,”590 then the current 
period falls into the latter category. This insecurity is at times reflected in Council deliberations.  
For example, following the Khan Shaykhun chemical weapons attack in Syria on 4 April 2017, 
when Russia was pilloried by Western countries in the Council chamber on 7 April for defending 
the Assad regime, including through the use of the veto, Russian Deputy Ambassador Vladimir 
Safronkov took the floor a second time at the end of the proceedings, requesting “the 
                                                           
586 Kimberly Marten, “Reducing Tensions between Russia and NATO,” Council on Foreign Relations, Special 
Report No. 79 (2017): 13. 
587 Ibid. 
588 Salman Shaikh and Amanda Roberts, “Syria,” in The UN Security Council in the 21st Century, ed. David M. 
Malone, Bruno Stagno Ugarte, and Sebastian von Einsiedel (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2016), 731.  
589 Ibid. 
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representatives of the United States and other countries not to insult my country” and adding that 
“they have no moral right to do so.”591 A week later, in response to criticism of Russia’s action 
on Syria from UK Ambassador Matthew Rycroft, Safronkov made the point again in the open 
chamber, retorting that Rycroft “should not dare to insult Russia again.”592   
However, Russia’s behavior in the Security Council can be explained by much more than 
merely defending strategic interests or demanding respect as a great power. Russia, like China, 
has a fundamentally different worldview from the P3, one that strongly underscores the 
importance of state sovereignty and respect for non-intervention, a perspective shared with many 
developing countries that maintain that sovereignty is their main source of protection from 
Western interventionism.  In addition, China and Russia have a more narrow perspective than the 
other permanent members of the mandate of the Council (i.e. what constitutes a threat to 
international peace and security.)  Both are less amenable to discussing matters related to human 
rights, among other issues, in the Council than their P3 colleagues. Russia, for example, 
maintains that discussion of such matters encroaches on the work of other UN organs and 
questions the connection between human rights violations and violent conflict.593    
Over the past decade, as Russia has reasserted itself as a major power, and as China has 
grown in strength and confidence, both countries have not been shy about throwing their weight 
around in the Council. Russia has done so through its statements and its vetoes. Although 
                                                           
591 UN Security Council meeting record (S/PV.7919), 7 April 2017, 20. 
592 UN Security Council meeting record (S/PV.7921), 12 April 2017, 12. 
593 UN Security Council meeting record (S/PV.7561), 17 November 2015, 19. During a debate on “Security, 
development and the root causes of conflict,” Russian ambassador Vitaly Churkin said “…questions of international 
law, human rights and development — in other words, essentially peacebuilding — is a role that should fall to the 
General Assembly…”. He went on to assert: “We have repeatedly heard the argument that human rights violations 
are one of the root causes of crises. However, everyone is well aware of countries that have extremely harsh laws in 
that regard, but on whose territories there are no conflicts. Indeed, in a number of cases, no one even complains 
about them.”   
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China’s approach is generally more muted—with its consistent calls for negotiation and 
cooperation—it at times forcefully expresses its views in public, especially on issues of key 
strategic importance such as North Korea or Myanmar594 and when it upholds the notion that a 
country’s domestic affairs are its own business.595 Moreover, it has in the past ten years 
demonstrated less reluctance to use its veto, a course of action that was extraordinarily rare for 
China prior to 2007.   
In several cases in which these countries have either abstained or used their vetoes, 
sovereignty concerns have been a major consideration. This is often reflected through a 
reluctance to support sanctions, international legal prosecution, or military action as means to 
address threats to international peace and security, frequently maintaining that such tools are 
counterproductive.  Public statements, including explanations of vote on several draft resolutions 
resulting in Chinese and Russian vetoes or even abstentions, highlight their view that sovereignty 
is sacrosanct and that coercive measures should be pursued cautiously, if at all.   
• When vetoing a 12 January 2007 draft calling on Myanmar to stop its violence against 
ethnic minorities and to initiate “substantive political dialogue, which would lead to a 
genuine democratic transition,”596 Chinese Ambassador Wang Guangya said “the 
Myanmar issue is mainly the internal affair of a sovereign State. The current domestic 
situation does not constitute a threat to international peace and security.”597 Russian 
                                                           
594 Shaikh and Roberts, “Syria,” 732. 
595 For example, see UN Security Council meeting record (S/PV.7621), 15 February 2016, focusing on the UN 
Charter.  During this open debate, Chinese Ambassador Liu Jieyi stated: “Important principles enshrined in the 
Charter—including respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity, peace settlement of disputes and non-
interference in the internal affairs of States—are the cornerstone of modern international law and international 
relations. Our only option is to reinforce them, not weaken them.”, 25. 
596 UN Security Council document (S/2007/14), 12 January 2007. 
597 UN Security Council meeting record (S/PV.5619), 12 January 2007, 3. 
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ambassador Vitaly Churkin likewise stated that the issue “does not pose any threat to 
international or regional peace.”598  
• When vetoing a July 2008 draft resolution that the P3 and other states sponsored that 
sought to impose an arms embargo on Zimbabwe and targeted sanctions (i.e. travel bans 
and assets freezes) on key government and military officials in the midst of government 
repression during a fraudulent electoral process, Chinese Ambassador Wang Guangya 
said that “lightly using or threatening to use sanctions is not conducive to solving 
problems,”599 while Russian Ambassador Churkin asserted that “the draft resolution 
represents nothing but an attempt by the Council to interfere in the internal affairs of 
States, contrary to the [UN] Charter.”600  
•  Following the 11 March 2011 adoption of resolution 1973—which authorized a no fly 
zone in Libya to protect civilians and which resulted in 10 affirmative votes and 
abstentions by five members (including China, Russia, and elected members Brazil, 
Germany, and India)—Chinese Ambassador Li Baodong underscored that “the Security 
Council should follow the United Nations Charter and the norms governing international 
law, respect for sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Libya and 
resolve the current crisis…through peaceful means,”601 while Russian Ambassador 
Churkin expressed concerns that the resolution “could potentially open the door to large-
scale military intervention,”602 which approximates what occurred when NATO 
undertook an air campaign that contributed to the downfall of President Muamar Gaddafi.    
                                                           
598 Ibid., 6. 
599 UN Security Council meeting record (S/PV.5933), 11 July 2008, 13. 
600 Ibid., 9. 
601 UN Security Council meeting record (S/PV.6498), 17 March 2011, 10. 
602 Ibid., 8. 
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• In the early phases of the Syria conflict, China and Russia both maintained that the 
fighting was an internal matter and upheld the principles of sovereignty and non-
intervention.603  As the conflict took on clear cross-border implications—with large-scale 
refugee flows out of Syria and several foreign states and terrorist groups playing a role in 
the fighting—arguments that the Syria crisis did not impact on international peace and 
security no longer had weight.604 While China has continued to emphasize the importance 
of negotiations to find a solution to the conflict,605 Russia has, according to Shaikh and 
Roberts, “shifted to a threefold argument in the Security Council: rejecting regime 
change by external force, denying any legitimacy to the opposition, and amplifying the 
threat of terrorism.”606 
In recent years, while China and especially Russia have become more assertive, the United States 
has demonstrated an increased propensity to force controversial drafts to a vote. Depending on 
one’s view, this could be interpreted as the United States demonstrating less patience with 
careful diplomacy or, more charitably, as a greater unwillingness to compromise on principles 
and values. Why this change in approach has occurred is not clear, but there are some plausible 
explanations. First, geopolitical tensions have polluted the Council’s engagement on a wide-
range of agenda items, even when core national interests are not at stake. Second, the issues 
addressed have been intractable and reaching agreement on them is difficult, given the 
philosophical differences among members on how to approach peace and security matters. Most 
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likely, a combination of both of these factors is at play.607 Whatever the case may be, there have 
been since 2015 a number of non-consensual resolutions on issues on which the United States is 
penholder; in fact, the United States was the penholder on 5 of the 9 non-consensual resolutions 
adopted in 2016. These five  were on a wide-range of issues, including S/RES/2272 (11 March 
2016) on UN peacekeeping; S/RES/2285 (29 April 2016) on the UN Mission for the Referendum 
in Western Sahara (MINURSO);608 S/RES/2304 (12 August 2016) on South Sudan; S/RES/2310 
(23 September 2016) on nuclear non-proliferation; and S/RES/2333 (23 December 2016) on the 
UN Mission in Liberia. 
The limited US willingness to compromise has been particularly noticeable on South 
Sudan, an issue on which it holds the pen. Since October 2015, three resolutions on the mandate 
of UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) have been adopted without unanimous support,609 and 
one draft resolution in December 2016 seeking to impose an arms embargo and further targeted 
sanctions on South Sudanese spoilers did not receive the requisite number of votes to be 
adopted.610 In general, these resolutions have faced criticism because they call for measures that 
some members—including China and Russia, among others—view as intruding too heavily on 
South Sudan’s sovereignty.   
                                                           
607 I thank my colleague, Dahlia Morched, Policy Analyst at Security Council Report, for this insight that both of 
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608 While the MINURSO draft resolution is produced by the Group of Friends of Western Sahara before circulation 
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 One consistent element of recent UNMISS resolutions has been the threat of targeted 
sanctions against spoilers to the faltering efforts to promote peace in the country. While several 
Council members supported these threats, some maintained that they risked undermining chances 
for peace by hardening the positions of the parties; the inclusion of these threats contributed to 
the decision by Russia and Venezuela to abstain on the 9 October and 15 December 2015 
UNMISS resolutions.611 Resolution 2304 of 12 August 2016, which authorized a Regional 
Protection Force (RPF) to serve under the umbrella of the UNMISS, indicated that the Council 
would consider an arms embargo if the deployment of the RPF were obstructed or the operations 
of UNMISS in general continued to be impeded. Several members were concerned that the 
government was not properly consulted about the establishment of the force and were opposed to 
possible implementation of an arms embargo on South Sudan.612 In large part for these reasons, 
China, Egypt, Russia, and Venezuela abstained on the resolution.  
Perhaps the most controversial effort in 2016 on South Sudan in the Council was the US 
decision in December to force to a vote a draft resolution imposing an arms embargo on South 
Sudan and targeted sanctions on high-level figures in the country. The vote was doomed to 
failure, as it was clear that the United States did not have the nine votes needed for adoption. It 
pushed the resolution to a vote anyhow, perhaps from a sense of moral obligation, the need to 
show that at least it tried to do “something” in the face of the ongoing commission of atrocities, 
even if the proposed “something” was rejected by the Council. As US Ambassador Samantha 
Power said in her explanation of vote: “At a certain point, drifting along and internalizing the 
constraints imposed by those Council members who do not want to take action in the face of the 
                                                           
611 See UN Security Council meeting record (S/PV.7532), 9 October 2015; and UN Security Council meeting record 
(S/PV.7581), 15 December 2015, for explanations of vote on these two resolutions, which demonstrate concern by 
Russia and Venezuela about the threat of sanctions. 
612 Security Council Report, “Vote on Resolution Strengthening UN Mission in South Sudan Mandate,” What’s In 
Blue, 12 August 2016. 
167 
 
violence, that is not option. We learned that from Rwanda, Srebrenica and chapters past.”613 The 
supreme irony was that the United States—unlike France, the United Kingdom, and others—had 
been opposed to an arms embargo until the latter half of 2016, and that in Rwanda especially, the 
United States in 1994 had joined all the other permanent members, who did “not want to take 
action in the face of the violence.”614  
There were a number of other elements of South Sudan resolutions in late 2015 and in 
2016 that were controversial and that were incorporated into drafts produced by United States in 
spite of the opposition of some Council members.  Russia and Venezuela, in particular, objected 
to references in the resolutions to unarmed aerial vehicles (UAVs).615 The Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations advocated for this technology to be used by the mission to enhance its 
situational awareness and early warning capabilities—a view supported by the P3 and some 
other members—but Russia and Venezuela maintained that their deployment would violate the 
sovereignty of South Sudan, considering that the government disapproved on their potential 
use.616 Furthermore, although language on accountability was diluted in the October 2015 
resolution to accommodate Angola, Russia, and Venezuela, references to the Council’s role in 
assessing efforts to set up the Hybrid Court for South Sudan, envisioned in the August 2015 
South Sudan peace agreement, remained problematic to them.617 In its explanations of vote on 
both resolutions 2241(October 2015) and 2252 (December 2015) Russia argued that under the 
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peace agreement, the court was under the auspices of the African Union, implying that the UN 
should not encroach on its efforts.618    
Thus, on South Sudan—as on other issues in recent years—the United States has decided 
to forfeit the unity of the Council in exchange for pursuing what it believes are stronger 
resolutions or resolutions more in keeping with its interests. Such principled efforts are 
understandable, and sometimes it is impossible to achieve unity when there are strongly 
contrasting views on complex issues. However, an argument could be made that political 
leverage is limited without a unified Council. For a penholder, trying to ensure that a resolution 
is meaningful (and not weakened by unwise concessions) while also securing the unity of the 
Council can be a difficult balancing act.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored Council decision-making and dynamics in the post-Cold War era.  It 
maintained that the drafting and negotiating of resolutions (as well as other outcomes) has been 
dominated by the permanent members, particularly the P3, given the importance of the Council 
to their foreign policies. It argued that they have often made considerable efforts to promote 
consensus, a goal that is shared by all members. It posited that there are four primary reasons 
why a high percentage of unanimous resolutions are adopted: the legitimacy of unanimity; the 
importance of good stewardship for penholders; the perceived impact of a unified Council; and 
the fear of isolation. The chapter further described key instances in which the P3 have disagreed 
and the efforts that were made to avoid vetoes.  Finally, it described the current deterioration of 
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relations among the permanent members (particularly between the P3 and China and Russia), 
what underlies these differences, and how they have impacted voting patterns. 
Although normative factors play a significant part in the Council’s work, it is important 
to note that rational calculations and power politics ultimately determine how this body 
functions. While penholders seek the enhanced legitimacy of a unanimously adopted resolution, 
the legitimacy afforded to such resolutions is often undergirded by instrumental concerns, most 
notably the view that a unanimous resolution is more likely to have the support of the wider 
membership and to be adhered to by the subject party or parties.  Even the notion that penholders 
like to be viewed as good stewards of the Council’s work has an instrumental value for members 
such as France and the United Kingdom, if not for the United States, because they need to 
demonstrate that they warrant a permanent seat at the horseshoe table; since their political and 
military heft is not the same as the other P5, they try to compensate with their competence and 
effectiveness. Although the unity of the Council is perceived as important, that unity will fracture 
once big power tensions become too strong, no matter how much effort is made to compromise. 
While not using the veto is preferable, it will inevitably be used, especially by China, Russia and 
the United States, when core strategic interests are at stake. Furthermore, the penholder system, 
which is the product of P3 efforts, is symptomatic of the permanent members’ efforts to 
consolidate their control of the Council. As the next chapter attempts to demonstrate, the elected 
members are not always passive in accepting the domination of the permanent members, and 
they often play an important role in the Council’s work. Nonetheless, the permanent members 




V: The elected members and efforts to build consensus 
At the conclusion of the workshop that the government of Finland hosts every November for 
incoming elected members of the Security Council, there is a session in which the outgoing 
elected members share reflections of their time on the Council and impart their knowledge to the 
incoming members about to embark on two years of intense diplomatic engagement on the world 
body’s peace and security organ. One theme emphasized over the years has been the role that 
elected members can play in building bridges among their fellow members, especially the 
permanent ones, whose support, or at the very least acquiescence, is needed to for them to 
contribute effectively to the Council’s work. Such thinking is captured by observations made by 
departing members such as: “When the permanent members are divided, there may be 
opportunities to claim some middle ground. Look for them.”619 Or “Do not undermine any of the 
15 members. At one point or another, you will need each of them. The Council works best when 
everyone tries to work together. Consensus is the preferred option.”620    
The point of highlighting these observations is to demonstrate that one of the key reasons 
why the Council has been able to achieve greater voting unity in the post-Cold War period, in 
spite of persistent differences among its members on specific issues, is because the mindset of 
the elected members about the function of this organ has changed in addition to that of the 
permanent members. The role of the elected members has frequently been downplayed because 
of the institutional obstacles that they encounter and the power disparities between them and the 
permanent members, but many elected members strive to compensate for their status as “less 
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than equal citizens” by making the most of their two year terms. In many instances, genuine 
efforts have been made by elected members, either acting alone or in unison with others, to unify 
the organ’s membership around initiatives they believe will promote international peace and 
security. The E10 often divided the Council in the Cold War era, as reflected by the agenda 
forcefully pushed by Non-aligned Movement (NAM); in more recent years, although there are 
cases in which elected members have challenged the unity of the Council out of principle or to 
pursue national interests, the elected members have frequently tried to use their limited influence 
to unify the Council, notwithstanding their varied policy perspectives.   
This chapter has two key sections, before some brief concluding observations. The first 
section is on the waning influence of the NAM in the post-Cold War era, which has led to a less 
divided Council. It maintains that in recent decades there has been no cohesive, ideologically-
driven bloc of elected members in the Council that will push the agenda in ways that consistently 
lead to vetoes and more generally fracture the voting unity of the organ, as had been the case 
with the NAM in the Cold War era.  In fact, as the second, longer section argues, despite the 
significant variation in priorities and world views among the elected members, they   frequently 
strive to strike agreements with all members, but most notably with the veto-wielding permanent 
ones, in order to help produce constructive outcomes in accordance with Council’s mandate to 
promote international peace and security. Three small cases studies are presented in an effort to 
demonstrate this point with respect to how particular elected members have addressed issues 
including: 1.) humanitarian access in Syria; 2.) the protection of health care workers and 




Divided we stand: the elected membership in the post-Cold War era  
In the Cold War, the Non-aligned Movement represented a cohesive and influential political 
force in the Council, its members confidently asserting their positions and tabling controversial 
draft resolutions, often out of a sense of principle, even if the result was a veto. As demonstrated 
in Chapter III, a large number of the vetoes cast in the Cold War period were on draft resolutions 
proposed by NAM members.      
This dynamic had changed by the early post-Cold War period. The ideological zeal that 
fueled the non-aligned movement had weakened.  Many of the issues that drove its anti-colonial, 
anti-apartheid agenda—and which had occupied the Security Council’s attention—had largely 
been sorted out. Southern Rhodesia became the independent state of Zimbabwe in 1980; 
Namibia gained its independence in 1990; and the death of apartheid in South Africa led to the 
election in 1994 of Nelson Mandela, who had once been the country’s most famous political 
prisoner. Furthermore, while the movement had leaned considerably more closely to the Soviet 
Union than the United States, the question of “non-alignment” lost its meaning with the fall of 
one of the two superpowers. In the bi-polar international system of the Cold War, “Third World 
nations generally benefited by playing…[the United States and the Soviets] off against the 
other.”621  This was no longer the case.  
In the early 1990s, the permanent members sometimes referred to the elected members as 
the non-aligned and the non-non-aligned members.622 This categorization, in and of itself, 
                                                           
621 Daniel Patrick Moynihan with Suzanne Weaver, A Dangerous Place (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 
1978), 118.  In this quote, Moynihan was referring to the views of Zbigniew Brzezinski. He adds that, according to 
Brzezinski, the playing of the two superpowers “off against the other” by the Third World had been replaced by a 
situation in which “the dominant struggle in the world was between the West and the Third World, with the Soviets 
the principle beneficiaries.”   
622 UN diplomat, interviewed by the author, New York, 1 November 2016. 
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suggests that the NAM were still considered an important grouping in the Council, and at times, 
they would (and still do) ban together to advocate common positions. Their effort, albeit a failed 
one, to push through a resolution removing the arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina in June 
1993 was an example of this.623 Among the elected members in the Council at the time, the 
NAM members included Cade Verde, Djibouti, Morocco, Pakistan, and Venezuela, while the 
“non-non-aligned” members consisted of Brazil, Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, and Spain. A 
more recent example is the broader NAM caucuses’ response to the public briefing in the 
Council specifically on human rights on 18 April 2017; on the same day as the briefing, the 
Coordinating Bureau of the NAM released a communiqué that “reject[ed] the on-going practice 
of the Security Council of dealing with human rights issues in pursuit of certain states’ political 
objectives,”624 a pronouncement perhaps most directly aimed at the United States, which initiated 
the briefing as a highlight of its April 2017 presidency of the Council.   
However, notwithstanding such examples, the NAM does not have the same political 
influence or cohesion in the Council as it had in the Cold War. While the NAM tries to 
coordinate its positions, its 120 members are essentially an aggregation of developing countries 
whose members have different views on a number of issues.625  For example, Council members 
such as Guatemala (2013-2014) and Chile (2014-2015) were less inclined to support the 
traditional, ultra-sovereignty views of their NAM counterparts Angola (2015-2016), Venezuela 
(2015-2016), and Bolivia (2017-present), on peace and security issues during their Council 
tenures. In recent years, one issue of considerable division among NAM Council members has 
been Western Sahara; in 2016, for example, there were two NAM elected members that were 
                                                           
623 UN Security Council document (S/25997), 29 June 1993.  
624 Communiqué of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement, NAM 2017/CoB/128 (18 April 2017). 
625 Venezuelan diplomat, interviewed by the author, New York, 18 January 2017. 
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generally supportive of Morocco’s position (Egypt and Senegal) and three that were more 
sympathetic of the Polisario Front (Angola, Malaysia, and Venezuela).    
The propensity of the NAM caucus in the Council—or for that matter, any elected 
member or bloc of elected members—to propose draft resolutions out of principle that have a 
high-risk of failure is by and large a distant memory. The pattern since the mid-2000s of the 
Palestinian Authority producing drafts regarding the Israeli occupation, getting buy in from the 
Arab Group for the draft, and then having the Arab member of the Council table the draft even 
though failure is a distinct possibility (either through a veto or insufficient votes) is arguably the 
closest example. However, even this pattern is a departure from what the NAM often did during 
the Cold War. Such drafts are voted upon infrequently in comparison with the Cold War, 
extended periods of intense negotiations are the norm, and there is at times the hope, if not 
always the expectation, of an adoption. The veto forced on the United States in December 2017 
for its decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel was quite rare by current standards, 
but something that would have been more common in the Cold War.   
 The fragmentation of the NAM is representative of the broader fragmentation among the 
elected membership as a whole. In a multi-polar world, the variation of views of the E10 is only 
natural since the elected membership is drawn from an even large grouping of states than the 
NAM.  Although some UN member states have not served on the Council and some have served 
multiple times, the E10 is drawn from the entire membership of the world body with the 
exception of the five permanent members—that is, 188 member states. Therefore, these member 
states come from all the regional groupings—Africa, Asia-Pacific, Eastern Europe, Latin 
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American and Caribbean, and Western Europe and Others Group (WEOG)626—and include 
countries that vary greatly in terms of military power, economic strength, political influence and 
population size.   
One must be careful about making broad generalizations about the behavior of the elected 
membership as a whole, or even about the policy positions of members within distinct regional 
groupings.  The WEOG members are perhaps the most consistent in their policy views of all the 
regional groups, its members often promoting the integration of human rights issues into the 
Council’s work and frequently willing to espouse measures such as sanctions or international 
legal prosecution. However, even among WEOG members, there are some variations in policy. 
For example, during its 2009-2010 Council tenure, WEOG member Turkey627 parted ways with 
its WEOG colleagues on several votes. In June 2009, when the Council voted to strengthen 
sanctions on Iran because of its continuing pursuit of nuclear weapons, Turkey voted against the 
resolution along with fellow Council member Brazil.628 Both of these members believed that a 
fuel exchange agreement they were negotiating with Iran needed more time to produce results 
before the Council pursued additional sanctions.629 While a sui generis issue, Turkey also 
differed from the rest of the Council by voting against four resolutions630 renewing the UN 
                                                           
626 See UN website, Department for General Assembly and Conference Management, “United Nations Regional 
Groups of Member States,” available at http://www.un.org/depts/DGACM/RegionalGroups.shtml. The “Others” 
include the CANZ countries (Canada, Australia and New Zealand) as well as Israel. The United States is a WEOG 
observer and participates in WOEG in elections, but it is not a member of the Group.  
627 See UN website, Department for General Assembly and Conference Management, “United Nations Regional 
Groups of Member States,” available at http://www.un.org/depts/DGACM/RegionalGroups.shtml. According the 
UN website, Turkey is a special case in that it “participates fully in both WEOG and Asian Group [sic], but for 
electoral purposes is considered a member of WEOG only.” 
628 See UN Security Council resolution 1929, 9 June 2010, adopted with 12 affirmative votes, 2 negative votes 
(Brazil and Turkey), and one abstention (Lebanon). 
629 UN Security Council meeting record (S/PV.6335), 9 June 2010, statements by Brazil and Turkey, 2-4. 
630 These were UN Security Council resolution 1874, 29 May 2009; UN Security Council resolution 1898, 14 
December 2009; UN Security Council resolution 1930, 15 June 2010; and UN Security Council resolution 1953, 14 
December 2010.  
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Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) because of its view that the Council failed to account 
for the lack of Turkish Cypriot participation in the government of Cyprus.631  
Indeed, in recent years, on political charged issues such as Burundi, South Sudan and 
Western Sahara, the divisions among the elected members have been as stark as they have been 
among the permanent members. Alignments with and political pressure from different members 
of the P5 tend to further fragment the elected members.632 With the exception of Israel/Palestine, 
even when one or more of the elected members are able to unite most of the Council in support 
of a controversial draft resolution, they are generally unwilling to put such a draft to a vote if it 
were to force a veto, just to make a political point.   
Indeed, it is striking that elected members vote together so frequently—and even at times, 
attempt to unify the Council—when they themselves are divided on so many issues. The reasons 
why all members strive for a united Council was highlighted in Chapter IV, but as the next 
section attempts to demonstrate, there are times when the elected members in particular are 
uniquely positioned to unite the Council around mutually acceptable outcomes.  On occasion, 
they have demonstrated the ability in recent years to be the responsible adults in the room when 
the permanent members are compromised by their strategic interests and resort to political 
grandstanding rather than engaging in constructive problem-solving. 
 
 
                                                           
631 See UN Security Council meeting records: S/PV.6132 (29 May 2009), S/PV.6239 (14 December 2009), 
S/PV.6339 (15 June 2010), and S/PV.6445 (14 December 2010) for Turkey’s explanations of votes on resolutions 
renewing the mandate of UNFICYP. See also Security Council Report, “Update Report No. 2: Cyprus,” 19 May 
2009, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Update%20Report%2019%20May_Cyprus.pdf. 
632 E10 diplomat, interviewed by the author, New York, 17 July 2017. 
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The elected members: making their mark? 
The opportunity to spend two years on the Council as an elected member is desired for several 
reasons. Often cited is the prestige value of serving with major powers on the organ responsible 
for the maintenance of international peace and security.633 Just being in the arena of big power 
politics is a perceived benefit to some members. Furthermore, states that have a particular 
national interest in one or more country issues on the agenda are motivated to serve in order to 
have a role in decisions affecting such issues.634 Finally, a number of elected members believe 
that multilateralism is the cornerstone of a peaceful international order and that all member states 
have a responsibility to strive for a principled, “rules-based” international system.635 This is a 
point that is often downplayed because of the circumscribed power they have to influence the 
organ’s deliberations, as they do not have the veto privilege and as they generally have difficulty 
matching the institutional memory and staffing capacity of the permanent members. But elected 
members coming onto the Council frequently express a desire to make a positive impact on the 
international peace and security environment. Of course, any combination of these different 
factors may motivate countries to pursue Council membership.  
Unfortunately, several member states have strategic or political interests on certain issues 
that prevent them from playing a constructive role, or that make them less than objective arbiters, 
when they get on the Council. Big power interests are frequently accused of polluting the organ’s 
work, but elected members also have strong political interests that can undermine the Council’s 
work. Rwanda’s participation as an elected member in 1994 while it was committing genocide 
                                                           
633 Former E10 diplomat, interviewed by the author, New York, 9 June 2017; and Ian Hurd, After Anarchy: 
Legitimacy and Power in the United States Security Council (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 121-123. 
634 Former E10 diplomat, interviewed by the author, New York, 9 June 2017. 
635 Former E10 diplomat, interviewed by the author, New York, 16 June 2017. 
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against its own people, erecting “significant obstacles to Council action during the time of 
crisis,”636 is perhaps the most egregious example of the deleterious impact that a member can 
have, especially when it is a party to a dispute. 
However, elected members by and large do not have the same large variety and depth of 
strategic and political interests as the permanent members. One E10 diplomat has said that 
positions of the elected members are usually “milder;”637 while this observation may not be true 
of elected members with specific “intimacy issues”638—e.g. Turkey on Cyprus in 2009-2010 or 
Morocco on Western Sahara in 2013-2014—it is a fair generalization of the elected membership 
as a whole with regard to the broad panoply of issues with which the Council deals. In many 
instances, this can give the E10 the flexibility needed to compromise in a negotiation. 
Furthermore, in spite of the policy differences among the elected members, they are generally 
unified on the need to improve the working methods of the Council, as they frequently chafe at 
the permanent members’ domination of the Council’s work. Especially on issues in which the 
permanent members are at loggerheads or are politically compromised, the elected members can 
be viewed as more neutral parties and play a bridging role among the permanent members. 
Indeed, “modest sized delegation can serve as inconspicuous brokers on issues in which they do 
not have a strong national interest and can often facilitate progress by providing important 
ideas.”639 Since the permanent members so jealously guard their privileges as penholders on so 
many issues, when the elected members do take the initiative, they often work hard to make their 
mark by building widespread support for resolutions they pursue. The permanent members work 
                                                           
636 Colin Keating, “Rwanda: An Insider’s Account,” in The Security Council: From Cold War to the 21st Century ed. 
David M. Malone (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 503. 
637 E10 diplomat, interviewed by the author, New York, 10 November 2017. 
638 This is a term used by a UN insider to describe the relationship of elected members with key issues of national 
interest that are reflected by their behavior on the Council.   
639 Paul Romita, Naureen Chowdhury Fink, and Till Papenfuss, “What Impact? The E10 and the 2011 Security 
Council,” International Peace Institute (March 2011), 3. 
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at times to circumscribe the initiative of the elected members. Nonetheless, in spite of the fact 
that the P3 dominate the drafting on most issues, there are several examples of elected members 
taking the pen and working hard over long periods of time, sometimes lasting several months, in 
an effort to garner the support of their fellow members, especially the veto-wielding permanent 
members, and to achieve unanimous adoptions on the resolutions they steward.   
Below are three notable examples from recent years: the Syrian humanitarian initiative 
led by Australia, Luxembourg and Jordan in 2013-2014; the protection of health care in armed 
conflict resolution640 led by Egypt, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and Uruguay in 2016; and the 
Australian effort in 2014, albeit an ultimately an unsuccessful one, to adopt a resolution focused 
broadly on sanctions. I have chosen to focus on these more recent examples because it has 
enabled me to garner granular detail on negotiations from diplomats and other sources with close 
proximity to the recent events. With the passage of time, memories fade and it is difficult to 
capture in intimate detail the various aspects of negotiations. Additionally, I have relied heavily 
in this chapter on the analysis of the not-for-profit organization Security Council Report, which 
is the one organization that consistently provides in-depth coverage of negotiations on Council 
outcomes through its What’s in Blue site. This service was not available prior to 2011, making it 
harder to access the specific details of behind the scenes deliberations on draft resolutions and 
presidential statements before that year.  
Syria Humanitarian Initiative (2013-2014) 
One of the more notable initiatives spearheaded by the elected members has been the Security 
Council’s engagement on the humanitarian crisis in Syria. Over the years, the Council’s 
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treatment of Syria has been divided into three separate areas: political matters, chemical 
weapons, and humanitarian issues. Permanent members have taken the lead on the political and 
chemical weapons tracks. In 2013-2014, three elected members (Australia and Luxembourg, 
joined by Jordan in 2014) made a determined effort to rally the Council around several outcomes 
addressing the humanitarian crisis in Syria, in the face of significant resistance from China and 
Russia. Referring to Australia and Luxembourg in particular, one UN official has noted that they 
were “not naïve about the difficulties” they would face, which buoyed them and gave them the 
“staying power” they would need to achieve constructive outcomes.641 
The origin of the elected members’ leadership of the humanitarian track can be traced to 
18 April 2013.642 On that day, several high-level UN officials briefed the Council on the 
humanitarian and human rights situation in the country: Under Secretary-General for 
Humanitarian Affairs Valerie Amos, High Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres, 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict Zainab Hawa 
Bangura, and Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict 
Leila Zerrougui.643 The Council retreated to closed consultations after the briefings, which one 
E10 diplomat described as particularly disturbing and graphic in terms of the abuses detailed.644  
Following the meeting, Ambassador Eugène-Richard Gasana of Rwanda, Council president that 
month, came out to the stakeout outside the consultations room and read press elements (or 
“elements to the press,” as they are often called). Australia was a key force behind the decision 
to produce the elements to the press.645   
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643 UN Security Council meeting record (S/PV.6949), 18 April 2013. 
644 Former E10 diplomat, interviewed by the author, New York, 21 August 2017. 
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Press elements are the weakest pronouncement Council members can make; unlike 
resolutions and presidential statements, they are not even considered formal documents of the 
Security Council. However, since they have limited clout and no legal standing, members 
generally do not have to consult with their capitals on the substance of these documents, so it is 
frequently possible to agree on them quickly, and since all members must agree them, they are at 
least in theory a reflection of the will of all members. Nonetheless, even negotiations on these 
elements were not easy, demonstrating the depth of the division.646 One former E10 diplomat has 
noted that while this was a very small step, at least the members were not mute, as the Council 
had not produced an outcome on Syria in several months.647  
Some of the language in the press elements foreshadowed language that would ultimately 
find its way into Council outcomes on Syria humanitarian issues. Members “urged all parties to 
ensure safe and unimpeded access for aid organisations to those in need in all areas of Syria.”648  
They “deplored the obstacles to the provision of humanitarian assistance and underlined the 
urgent need to remove such obstacles…”649 And they “underlined the need to facilitate the 
provision of humanitarian assistance through the most effective ways, including where 
appropriate across borders in accordance with guiding principles of humanitarian 
assistance…”.650  
By June 2013, Australia and Luxembourg had started working on a draft resolution 
focused on ways to improve humanitarian access in Syria.651 They were hopeful that as elected 
members taking the lead on this initiative, they could reduce some of the tensions on Syria 
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generated by divisions among the permanent members.652 Over the ensuing weeks, they held in 
depth negotiations on the substance of the text with the permanent members, and they were 
making progress in these negotiations.653 However, this momentum was delayed following the 
21 August 2013 chemical weapons attacks in Ghouta, Syria, which “killed hundreds of civilians, 
including large numbers of children.”654 On 20 August 2012, US President Barack Obama had 
issued his famous warning that the use of chemical weapons in Syria would be “a red-line,” 
which “would change my calculations significantly.”655 The magnitude of the these attacks and 
the fact that Obama had a year earlier issued this ultimatum heightened international tensions 
over Syria, including between the United States and Russia, and generated expectations that 
United States, as well as France, might respond with military force against the Assad regime.656    
The Council’s bandwidth on Syria was taken up by the immediate crisis at hand—namely 
addressing the Ghouta attack and calming political tensions—and the space to continue 
discussions on Syria humanitarian matters was not readily available. The humanitarian initiative 
spearheaded by Australia and Luxembourg would temporarily be put on hold, and the focus 
shifted to the use of chemical weapons in Syria. A UK effort in late August 2013 to introduce a 
draft resolution that would have “condemn[ed] the alleged chemical weapons attack on rebel-
held areas in Syria…and [sought] Council authorisation for ‘all necessary means’ under Chapter 
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VII…to protect Syrian civilians from chemical weapons”657 stalled and failed to gain momentum 
amidst Chinese and Russian objections.658    
In the following weeks, the Council became largely a spectator to the real action on the 
chemical weapons issue, with Russia-US bilateral diplomacy taking center stage. On 9 
September 2013, Russia proposed that Syria do away with its chemical weapons under 
international supervision, a clever diplomatic maneuver that contributed to an easing of tensions 
with the United States. This proposal became the basis of resolution 2118 of 27 September 2013, 
through which the Council decided that Syria would terminate its chemical weapons program 
with the UN with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons playing a key role 
in the process and endorsed the (ultimately unsuccessful) 30 June 2012 Geneva Communiqué, 
which “called for the establishment of a transitional governing body”659 in Syria. The resolution 
was negotiated in Geneva and New York by the United States and Russia, including involvement 
from Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and US Secretary of State John Kerry.660 The other 
members were left to endorse the agreement that had been struck by these two big powers.661  
After the adoption of resolution 2118, the focus shifted back to the humanitarian situation 
in Syria.  However, Australia and Luxembourg decided to pursue a presidential statement rather 
than a resolution. While still a formal outcome of the Council, a presidential statement has less 
political weight than a resolution, although it needs the support of all 15 members to be adopted.  
Some of the permanent members encouraged Australia and Luxembourg to pursue “a more 
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gradual approach.”662 The strategy to forgo the pursuit of a resolution was based on apparent P3 
concerns, already expressed to Australia and Luxembourg in August 2013, that a draft resolution 
risked being vetoed,663 and could have polluted the political process being pursued in Geneva.664     
The negotiations on the draft presidential statement were not difficult. This text was 
perceived by members as being measured.665  Australia and Luxembourg had already conducted 
negotiations in July and August with the permanent members,666 hammering out some of the 
more difficult elements of the text, which was at the time envisioned as a possible resolution but 
which ultimately came to birth as a presidential statement. Adopted on 2 October 2013, the 
presidential statement was the first formal Council outcome on the humanitarian track.667 In the 
statement, the Council urged that the government of Syria to remove bureaucratic obstacles and 
other impediments to humanitarian operations and urged all parties to “take all appropriate steps 
to ensure the safety and security of United Nations personnel…and all other personnel engaged 
in humanitarian relief activities.”668  
By January 2014, Australia and Luxembourg—joined by new Council member Jordan—
had reengaged with the P3 in a renewed effort to negotiate a resolution addressing the 
humanitarian crisis in Syria.  Jordan’s inclusion as a third penholder made sense as a neighboring 
country directly impacted by the fighting in Syria.669 Apparently eager to play more of a 
leadership role, the United Kingdom suggested that it assume the role of co-penholder with 
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Jordan, which would have meant wresting the pen away from Australia and Luxembourg.670 
Australia and Luxembourg tactfully rebuffed the effort.671 How serious the United Kingdom was 
about seizing the pen is not entirely clear. Although the United Kingdom has traditionally taken 
pride in drafting outcomes, it was not a penholder on Syrian issues.672 One diplomat close to the 
negotiations has suggested that United Kingdom may have restrained its more assertive instincts 
because it had confidence that the penholders would manage the process effectively.673 The fact 
that the penholders worked closely with the United Kingdom—as well as the other permanent 
members—throughout the negotiations likely encouraged this perspective.674 
A key challenge was producing a text that could secure the support of all the permanent 
members, particularly China and Russia, but that still maintained strong language critical of the 
government and contained meaningful references to measures of accountability for the 
violence.675 Finding the right balance proved to be a difficult endeavor. After the three 
penholders negotiated the text with the P3, they circulated it on 6 February 2014 to China and 
Russia,676 whose initial reactions were not favorable.677 China expressed concern that pursuing 
the initiative could disrupt the Geneva negotiations, while Russia maintained that the members 
should instead be pursuing a counter-terrorism resolution with regard to Syria.678 The draft had 
gone some way in trying to anticipate and address such potential concerns: for example, 
terrorism was referenced in operational paragraphs; violence by all parties, not just by the 
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government, was denounced; and there was language backing the political process in Geneva.679   
However, the draft did not go far enough to get Chinese and especially Russian support, and 
further concessions would need to be made.  
Two weeks of vigorous negotiations of the full Council ensued before the unanimous 
adoption of resolution 2139 on 22 February 2014.680 It is not by coincidence that the adoption 
was scheduled during the Sochi Olympics,681 which closed on 23 February. This was a way of 
raising the stakes on Russia, which was less likely to risk international opprobrium by casting a 
veto on a Syria humanitarian resolution while it was basking in the glow of hosting the Winter 
Olympics.682    
The final text resulting from the negotiations demanded that “all parties immediately 
cease all attack attacks against civilians”683 and that “all parties, in particular the Syrian 
authorities, fully implement the provisions of the 2 October Statement by the President of the 
Security Council…”.684  It further demanded that “all parties, in particular the Syrian authorities, 
promptly allow rapid, safe and unhindered humanitarian access for United Nations humanitarian 
agencies and their implementing partners, including across conflict lines and across borders, in 
order to ensure that humanitarian assistance reaches people in need through the most direct 
routes.”685 One of the more notable features of the resolution was that it established a monthly 
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reporting requirement regarding the resolution’s implementation, 686  which was still in effect as 
of December 2017.  
This final product was significantly different from the initial draft proposed by the 
penholders.687 A number of revisions had to be made to get all the permanent members, 
especially Russia, on board.  Resolution 2139 “stresse[d] the need to end impunity for violations 
of international humanitarian law and violations of abuses of human rights” and “reaffirme[d] 
that those who have committed or are otherwise responsible for such violations and abuses in 
Syria must be brought to justice.”688 However, a clear reference to the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), which had been included in an earlier draft of the resolution, was omitted as it had 
discomforted Russia, Rwanda, and the United States in particular689—none of which are state 
parties to the ICC’s Rome Statute.  
Furthermore, the Council merely “expresse[d] its intent to take further steps in the case of 
non-compliance with the resolution,”690 rather than threatening to impose article 41 measures 
(usually a reference to sanctions) in case of non-compliance, language that had been in the draft 
initially forwarded to China and Russia.691 The weakened accountability language was a 
concession to Russia, which had “said publicly and during negotiations that the threat of 
sanctions was a non-starter.”692   
Another difficult matter was how to refer to cross-border humanitarian access. Resolution 
2139 demands cross-border access, but only does so in cursory fashion. An early draft had 
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specifically called for all restrictions on such access, particularly from neighboring countries Iraq 
and Turkey, to be lifted.693 However, this more specific language proved to be controversial and 
was removed from the text ultimately adopted.694 Syria continued to restrict humanitarian access, 
including cross-border access, in the months following the adoption of resolution 2139. This 
would set the stage for the intense negotiations on resolution 2165, which focused on means of 
achieving cross-border access.   
With the humanitarian situation in Syria continuing to deteriorate, Australia, Jordan, and 
Luxembourg had produced a draft resolution in late May 2014 that, according to Shaikh and 
Roberts, “under Chapter VII, permitted the UN to carry out cross-border and cross-line 
humanitarian aid operations in the absence of state consent, and included the threat to impose 
sanctions.”695 The negotiation process followed the same pattern as had been the case on 
resolution 2139. Australia, Jordan, and Luxembourg first discussed the draft among the P3, then 
among the P5 as a group, and finally with the whole membership of the Council. The 
negotiations lasted for six weeks, five of which were with the permanent members.696   
There was some guilt among the penholders that they were excluding the other elected 
members from the initial negotiations.697 By excluding their fellow elected members, they could 
be perceived of the same exclusionary tactics for which the permanent members were often 
criticized. However, the penholders realized that this approach was the most effective way to 
ensure a successful outcome, as the permanent members, notably China and Russia, had to be on 
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board for the draft to be adopted.698 Moreover, a concerted effort was made by the penholders to 
consult with their fellow elected members on their negotiations with the permanent members so 
they would be able to engage fully once the draft was circulated to the whole Council.699 This 
effort at transparency appeared to be appreciated by the other members.700      
A number of significant concessions were made to get China and Russia on board.  
Calibrating the language was a tug of war. China and Russia wanted to soften the language so 
that the resolution could not be perceived as containing legally binding obligations on Syria 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The penholders wanted stronger language that would 
impose such obligations.  Reference to Chapter VII was struck at an early stage.701 The threat of 
article 41,702 usually a reference to sanctions, in case of failure to comply with the resolution, 
was replaced with a much weaker formulation affirming that the Council “will take further 
measures in the event of non-compliance with this resolution or resolution 2139 (2014) by any 
Syrian party.”703  However, in spite of these concessions, the penholders did get some language 
in the final draft that could be interpreted as binding, informally consulting legal experts for their 
input.704  The final draft, for example, underscores the obligation of member states to comply 
with Article 25 of the UN Charter, which says that “Members of the United Nations agree to 
accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council...”.705 In addition, there are several 
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operative paragraphs that begin with the verb “decides” with regard to the Council’s decisions, 
one of the  stronger formulations used by the Council.706     
One of the key impasses in the negotiations related to the modalities for cross-border aid 
deliveries.707 While Syria agreed to permit aid to be delivered at four UN-specified border 
crossings not under its control, it wanted to exercise oversight of the distribution of the aid once 
inside Syria.708 This constituted a red-line for the penholders and the P3,709 given evidence that 
the Syrian government “had used the distribution of humanitarian aid as a tactic of war.”710 The 
impasse was ultimately resolved during negotiations on 2 July 2014 between the penholders and 
the permanent members, when Australia, Luxembourg, and Jordan proposed that the “UN would 
notify the Syrian authorities of the contents of the humanitarian convoys, creating a notification 
system that would offer transparency with no corresponding requirement for the regime’s 
approval.”711 Russia appeared to accept this proposal,712 which in retrospect represented a tipping 
point in the negotiations.   
Nonetheless, in spite of the many concessions made and the fact that Russia seemed to 
consent to proposal offered by the penholders, a positive outcome was not taken for granted. On 
the day of the vote, it was not entirely clear if China and Russia would support the draft, 
although members were “cautiously optimistic.”713 One advantage that the penholders had was 
that China and Russia were “clearly uncomfortable with the prospect of casting a fifth veto on 
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Syria,”714 having already jointly vetoed four draft resolutions on the issue in less than three 
years, including one as recently as 22 May 2014 that was drafted by France and that would have 
referred the situation in Syria to the ICC. It was most likely the case that the penholders 
coordinated with France, the penholder on the ICC draft, regarding the timing of the vote on the 
humanitarian draft resolution.715 Tabling this draft shortly after the vetoes in May increased the 
political pressure on China and Russia not to veto another Syria resolution less than two months 
later.716  
Resolution 2165 was adopted on 14 July 2014 with the support of all Council members.  
One diplomat involved in the negotiations maintained that it was important to get a unanimous 
vote, because it “sends a message to the Syrian government.”717 The resolution authorized aid 
delivery “across conflict lines and the border crossings of Bab al-Salam, Bab al-Hawa, Al 
Yarubiyah and Al-Ramtha, in addition to those already in use, in order to ensure that 
humanitarian assistance…reaches people in need throughout Syria through the most direct 
routes, with notification to the Syrian authorities…”.718 It further established a monitoring 
mechanism, under the UN Secretary-General’s authority, to “monitor, with the consent of the 
relevant neighboring countries of Syria…the loading of all humanitarian relief 
consignments…and any subsequent opening of the consignments by the customs authorities of 
the relevant neighboring countries…in order to confirm the humanitarian nature” of the relief 
items shipped.719 Other key elements of the resolution decided that all parties to the conflict 
“enable the immediate and unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance directly to people 
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throughout Syria” and that they “take all appropriate steps to ensure the safety and security of 
United Nations and associated  personnel…”.720 
In their explanations of vote on the resolution, several members emphasized the 
unanimity achieved. Jordanian Ambassador Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein said that Australia, Jordan, 
and Luxembourg tried their “best to come up with the highest degree of consensus,” while 
adding their appreciation for “the unified position taken by the Council.”721 Australian 
Ambassador Gary Quinlan thanked his co-penholders for their efforts to bring about a 
unanimous adoption, positing that: “Decisively, the Council has been united today in recognizing 
that the humanitarian situation…has become even more desperate, and that immediate action is 
necessary…”.722 And US Ambassador Samantha Power closed her remarks with the following: 
“The Council must now take the cooperation and unity we have shown today and bring it to bear 
in ensuring the end of the horrors being perpetrated against the Syrian people.”723 
Unfortunately, as of late 2017, the horrors have not ended, and these resolutions, and 
subsequent ones reauthorizing cross-line and cross-border humanitarian access (resolution 2165 
was authorized for 180 days), have not been as impactful as had been hoped. It would be 
foolhardy, even blindly insensitive and divorced from reality, to talk about success on the 
humanitarian front in Syria, given large-scale displacements, the restrictions of humanitarian 
access, and the siege and starvation tactics of the regime which have continued unabated. The 
lack of meaningful consequences for non-compliance with the resolutions, necessary concessions 
to avoid vetoes by China and Russia, provided a greenlight for continued obstructionism by 
Syrian authorities. However, resolution 2165 has had a positive impact, allowing humanitarian 
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assistance to reach people in need who otherwise would not have received it.724 For example, in 
November 2017 alone, the United Nations noted that “902,000 people were reached through 
cross-border convoys” in Syria.725 Furthermore, the monthly reporting requirement to the 
Council on the humanitarian situation in Syria, initiated through resolution 2139, has in the very 
least helped to maintain a constant high-level focus on the crisis. In a Council that has been 
largely feckless in recent years, the passage of these resolutions may be the closest to a bright 
spot that the Council has been able to achieve on Syria, as the conflict continues to rage and a 
political solution remains elusive.   
Negotiations on resolution 2286: protection of health care in armed conflict (2016) 
On 3 May 2016, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2286 on the protection of 
healthcare workers and facilities in armed conflict. This was the first time it had adopted a 
resolution specifically on this issue, although it had adopted one condemning “violence and 
intimidation” against humanitarian workers.726 Resolution 2286 condemned attacks against 
healthcare workers, facilities, and “their means of transport and equipment,” while “deplor[ing] 
the long-term consequences of such attacks for the civilian population and the health-care 
systems of the countries concerned.”727 It demanded that parties to conflict respect and protect 
humanitarian and medical workers engaged exclusively in medical activities, in accordance with 
their obligations under international law.728 It further strongly urged states to develop “domestic 
legal frameworks,” to collect data, and to share “challenges and good practice” with regard to 
attacks on medical and humanitarian workers engaged solely in medical activities and “their 
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means of transport and medical facilities.”729 The resolution requested the Secretary-General to 
provide recommendations to prevent such attacks, to strengthen the protections afforded to the 
wounded and sick and those exclusively involved in medical duties, and to enhance 
accountability for those responsible for attacks on health care.730  Finally, to ensure continuity of 
focus on this issue, it requested that the Secretary-General brief the Council annually on the 
resolution’s implementation.731  
The drafting and negotiations were spearheaded by five elected members.  Coordination 
among them to produce the desired outcome was a difficult task.732 The resolution was the result 
of painstaking negotiations that took place over several months, with numerous concessions 
made, including to all of the permanent members, in order to secure a unanimously adopted text.  
This intensive legwork was necessary, given the political sensitivities involved with such a 
resolution.  These sensitivities were highlighted by Joanne Liu, the International President of 
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), when she briefed the Council moments after the resolution’s 
adoption. Ms. Liu stated, “The Council is charged with protecting peace and security. Yet four of 
the five permanent members…have, in varying degrees, been associated with coalitions 
responsible for attacks on health care structures during the past year.  Those include the NATO-
led coalition in Afghanistan, the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen and the Russian-backed, Syrian-
led coalition.”733   
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Indeed, the resolution had its genesis in these attacks and the toll they had taken on health 
care workers and facilities.734 In MSF’s 2015 US Annual Report—referring to attacks on MSF 
facilities in towns in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Syria, and 
Yemen—the President of the organization’s US Board of Directors (Deane Marchbein) and its 
US Executive Director (Jason Cone) warned of “an existential threat to the practice of 
humanitarian action.”735 In his 18 June 2015 report to the Security Council on the protection of 
civilians in armed conflict, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon expressed his concern about 
“continuing attacks against humanitarian and health-care workers and facilities,”736 referring to 
such attacks on such workers or facilities in several country cases, including South Sudan, Syria 
and Yemen.737  Similarly, when addressing the Council during its 19 January 2016 debate on the 
protection of civilians, Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson stated: “Hospitals must be treated 
as sanctuaries in wartime. But recently we have seen a surge in attacks on hospitals and health 
centres.”738 
Those initiating the drafting and negotiations on resolution 2286 represented a regionally 
diverse group of elected members with varying political interests (Egypt, Japan, New Zealand, 
Spain and Uruguay), who shared a clear strategy to garner maximum support for the initiative.  
(Malaysia, which had initially shown interest in a leadership role in the initiative, remained 
supportive of the effort throughout but withdrew as one of the penholders; it was replaced by 
Japan, which became the fifth and final penholder.) The diverse composition of the group was by 
design. The logic was that the wide-range of political views and the regional diversity of the five 
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members were a microcosm of the broader Council, thus making it less difficult to get other 
members on board with the initiative.739 The five were also careful to depoliticize the initiative as 
much as possible from the outset.740 The permanent members were excluded from the drafting.741  
Furthermore, the penholders pursued a thematic resolution, rather than a country-specific one, 742 
apparently to make it clear that attacks on health care had become a serious problem in several 
different contexts and to avoid charges of bias. If, for example, the resolution had focused on 
attacks on health care in Syria alone, Russia would most likely have been less inclined to support 
the text, and probably would have pointed to cases in which health care workers and facilities 
had been bombed by the P3 or its allies in Afghanistan or Yemen. Likewise, if the resolution had 
focused on attacks on health care specifically in Yemen, for example, the P3 might have argued 
that it was more appropriate to have a resolution on attacks on health facilities and workers in 
Syria.  
By January 2016, the groundwork for the resolution was already being prepared. At the 
Council’s open debate on the protection of civilians on 19 January 2016, the New Zealand and 
Spanish representatives noted that they were working on an initiative to protect health care in 
armed conflict, along with colleagues from Egypt and Uruguay.743 A roundtable discussion was 
convened at the New Zealand mission during January with a variety of stakeholders to 
brainstorm about a possible resolution, including which elements would be most useful to 
practitioners in the field, which would be most workable for the UN system, and which were not 
plausible to include.744 In addition to the penholders, the discussion included humanitarian actors 
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both inside the UN system (such as the UN Children’s Fund, the Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the World Health 
Organization) and outside of the system (including the International Committee of the Red Cross 
[ICRC] and non-governmental organizations such as MSF and the Physicians for Human 
Rights).745  Advice from ICRC and MSF in particular played a key role in shaping the text.746   
While it was not until late March that the group had a draft ready to distribute to the 
wider Council, the penholders made extensive efforts to be transparent about their own internal 
deliberations. On 3 March, they held an informal discussion on their initiative during the 
“another other business” part of consultations and “shared the objectives of the draft…”.747 In 
addition, each of the five was assigned to reach out to one to three other members in order “to 
answer their questions and ascertain what their red-lines might be.”748    
The negotiations among all 15 members began in earnest in early April, with a total of 
three rounds with the full Council held prior to the resolution’s adoption.749 Two of the five 
penholders had the responsibility of co-chairing each of these three rounds.750 Several 
compromises were struck and adjustments made to the text before it was satisfactory to all 
members—both during the preliminary negotiations among the five penholders and during the 
later negotiations among all members.    
One key issue that was divisive was the language on accountability for attacks on health 
care. When the draft was initially being discussed by the five penholders, Egypt objected to the 
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potential inclusion of a reference to the International Criminal Court (ICC). This was to be 
expected, as it was the only one of the five penholders not a state party to the Rome Statute. As a 
compromise, the penholders decided not to specifically reference the ICC, but incorporated in 
the text language from article 8 of the Rome Statute on war crimes.751 During the negotiations 
among the 15 members, the language on accountability had to be further calibrated to satisfy the 
preferences of France and the United Kingdom, who wanted stronger language on this matter, 
and Angola, China, and Russia, who preferred less robust accountability language.752 Consistent 
with article 8 of the Rome Statute, resolution 2286 recalled that “under international law, attacks 
intentionally directed against hospitals and places where sick and wounded are collected, 
provided that they are not military objectives, as well as attacks intentionally directed against 
buildings, material, medical units and transport and personnel using the distinctive emblems of 
the Geneva Conventions in conformity with international law are war crimes…”.753 
Another sensitive issue that had to be addressed was how to address the issue of “non-
punishment” of those engaged in medical duties. Both Article 16 (2) of the First Additional 
Protocol and Article 10 (2) of the Second Additional Protocol of the Geneva Conventions make 
an identical point: “Under no circumstances shall any person be punished for carrying out 
medical activities compatible with medical ethics, regardless of the person benefiting 
therefrom.”754 However, the United States is not a state party to either of the first two additional 
protocols, and it had difficulty with the language on non-punishment in the draft resolution.755 To 
address this concern, the penholders substituted “applicable rules” for “rules” when referring to 
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international law regarding “non-punishment.”756 Apparently the penholders were willing to 
make this compromise because they believed that “non-punishment” of medical personnel was 
already recognized in customary law; its mere mention in the resolution was perceived as a step 
forward, which could be used to promote ethical medical practice.757 
A further contentious matter was the inclusion in an early version of the draft resolution 
of language calling on medical personnel to adhere to the domestic laws of the country in which 
they were working. Some members maintained that this would necessitate foreign militaries, 
including their medical staffs, to abide by the national legislation of the states where they served.   
This language was removed, with the resolution ultimately underscoring the need for 
humanitarian and medical personnel to demonstrate medical ethics in their activities.758  
During the briefing at which resolution 2286 was adopted, amidst concerns expressed 
about the high incidence of attacks on health care workers and facilities, was an 
acknowledgement of the intensive labor that went into preparing the resolution, which was 
adopted with sponsorship from 85 UN member states. Peter Maurer, the President of the ICRC 
and the former ambassador of Switzerland to the UN, stated: “I know from my own experience 
at the Organization that every comma actually has carefully been considered and negotiated, and 
the result is strong.”759 Ambassador Gerard van Bohemen of New Zealand, one of the five 
penholders, said that “Close consultation with all Council members and openness to negotiation 
enabled its unanimous adoption,”760 while Spanish Ambassador Román Oyarzun Marchesi 
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expressed thanks to “the five permanent members of the Council, which participated actively in 
the negotiations and will play an essential role in implementing the resolution.”761 
As of mid-2017, a year after its adoption, resolution 2286 had not had a noticeable 
impact, with health care facilities and personnel continuing to be under assault at a high rate. 
This was the assessment of several of the briefers and member states participating in the 
Council’s open debate on the protection of civilians on 25 May 2017, which was chaired by the 
Foreign Minister Affairs Rodolfo Nin Novoa of Uruguay, one of the co-penholders on resolution 
2286, and which included a discussion of the protection of health care in armed conflict.762 As 
Secretary-General António Guterres noted during the meeting, “…on the ground, little has 
changed.  Attacks against medical workers and facilities continue and no is spared.”763 However, 
at the very least, the resolution reinforced a normative and legal standard regarding the 
unacceptability of attacking medical and humanitarian workers and facilities that can be used as 
a springboard for advocacy to promote the protection of health care. Furthermore, by requiring 
the Secretary-General to brief the Council annually on the resolution’s implementation, the 
penholders ensured an ongoing focus on this issue.   
Australia’s pursuit of a sanctions resolution (2014)  
Australia took a keen interest in how to improve the implementation UN sanctions during its 
2013-2014 tenure on the Council.  Starting in November 2012, before it even began its term, it 
engaged in a systematic way with a variety of UN entities—the Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations, the Office of Disarmament Affairs, and the Subsidiary Organs Branch in the 
Department of Political Affairs, among others—to enhance its own understanding of UN 
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sanctions and to advocate improved implementation measures.764 While on the Council, it was 
one of five member state sponsors—along with Finland, Germany, Greece and Sweden—of the 
High-Level Review of UN Sanctions, an initiative of the Watson Institute and Compliance and 
Capacity International conducted in 2014, intended to improve UN sanctions implementation.765  
A compendium of the results of the review was produced in 2015.766 Australia spearheaded one 
of the review’s three working groups (Working Group I), the one that focused on bringing the 
different parts of the UN system together to better implement sanctions.767   
In preparing for its November 2014 presidency of the Council, Australia planned to hold 
a briefing on sanctions late in the month at which in hoped to table a resolution on sanctions 
implementation. A key objective of the draft resolution was to bring various parts of the UN 
system together more effectively in implementing sanctions in order to make this area of the 
world body’s work more professional and, as much as possible, less politicized.768 Australia 
sought to cast sanctions as a collaborative tool, “whereby the Council, sanctions committees, 
regional organizations and the UN system would work with the subject state.”769 One of the more 
innovative proposals in the draft was its request to establish a “Policy and Coordination Unit” 
within the UN Secretariat’s Security Council Affairs Division (SCAD) that would discern best 
practices, marshal expertise within the UN system on how to make sanctions more effective, and 
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support the Council in helping to guide member states in implementing sanctions.770 The draft 
charged SCAD with helping member states to obtain capacity building and technical assistance 
regarding sanctions implementation.771 It further encouraged Special Representatives of the 
Secretary-General, the senior UN representative in countries with UN peace operations, to make 
sure that all UN entities understand their part in carrying out sanctions imposed by the 
Council.772 And it called for enhanced cooperation on sanctions-related issues between the UN 
and intergovernmental, sub-regional, regional and international organizations, such as the 
International Civil Aviation Organization, INTERPOL, and World Customs Organization, 
among others.773  
Before it began its November 2014 presidency, Australia had already consulted with the 
all Council members about its intention to propose a draft resolution on sanctions and had even 
circulated a first version of the text.774 China and Russia were uncomfortable with the draft from 
the start; there were two major sticking points for them. The first one was the draft resolution’s 
call for the special unit in the Secretariat to discern best practices, among other tasks. Russia 
perceived such a unit as infringing on the decision-making authority of the Security Council.775 It 
further thought that such a unit could be manipulated by influential member states to serve their 
political purposes.776 The second major concern for both China and Russia was that the 
penholder would not include language in the draft indicating that the only legitimate sanctions 
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are those imposed by the UN Security Council.777 This was most likely an especially sensitive 
matter for Russia, which was the target of bilateral sanctions because of its military involvement 
in Ukraine and had seized the Crimea only some months earlier in March 2014. As John 
Langmore and Jeremy Farrall have noted, a sanctions resolution “was a risky initiative to pursue 
particularly in light of the non-UN sanctions that were in place against…Russia at that time by 
the United States, the European Union, and even Australia itself following the Crimea and 
eastern Ukrainian crises.”778 Beyond the particular elements of the draft resolution, a more 
fundamental challenge in getting support for the initiative was the caution with which China and 
Russia approach sanctions in general. One E10 diplomat serving on the Council at the time 
noted: “Russia and China…persisted in the belief that sanctions were a punitive, coercive 
measure to be applied against the most egregious states as a last resort.”779 This view was in 
sharp contrast with that of Australia, which tended to see sanctions in most cases as an 
instrument to help countries get out of crisis, rather than as a form of punishment.780  
 The Russian and Chinese views were clearly on display during the 25 November 2014 
briefing on sanctions that Australia chaired.781 Russian Ambassador Churkin appeared to roundly 
criticize the potential establishment of a new Secretariat sanctions mechanism. He stated: “…we 
believe that it would be unwise and harmful to periodically toss around ideas…regarding the 
creation of additional bureaucratic barriers, whether inter-state or at the level of the Secretariat. 
Moreover, what we detect in such initiatives is not simply the danger of creating excessive red-
tape but an attempt to consolidate the approaches of a narrow group of States with regard to the 
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issue of sanctions, as well as to infringe on the exclusive prerogatives of the Security Council 
itself with regard to sanctions.”782 Churkin added that: “The Secretariat has nothing to do with 
issues relating to the implementation and development of relevant recommendations.”783 With 
equal clarity and verve, he took aim at unilateral or non-UN sanctions. He stated that “we should 
not overlook…the illegitimacy of unilateral sanctions,”784 while lamenting that “there has been a 
number of attempts via unilateral restrictions to circumvent the Security Council.”785 Churkin 
further posited “that such actions only undermine the system of international relations and 
torpedo political and diplomatic efforts in the quest to resolve situations.”786 This position was 
consistent with Russia’s call during the negotiations for the addition of language in the draft 
resolution stating that sanctions by national and regional actors (i.e. outside of the UN context) 
violate international law, a proposal that Australia turned down.787 During the briefing, Chinese 
Deputy Ambassador Wang Min, like his Russian counterpart, maintained that “…a small number 
of countries act at will according to their domestic laws and impose or threaten to impose 
unilateral sanctions against other States, which is not only in violation of the principle of 
sovereign equality among Member States but also undermines the authority of Council 
sanctions.”788 Wang further maintained that: “Sanctions should not be a tool for one country to 
use in pursuit of power politics.”789  
Australia was unable to table the draft resolution at the briefing, as it had hoped. It had 
held several negotiating rounds at expert level and produced numerous revised drafts.790 Bilateral 
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negotiations between Australian Ambassador Gary Quinlan and Ambassador Churkin were held 
both the weekend before the (Tuesday) debate and ensued in the days after the debate.791 
According to one E10 diplomat at the time, “China recognized that Russia had the greater 
political concerns and would have only supported the resolution if Russia had acquiesced on the 
text.”792 However, the impasse with Russia could not be broken. As reflected by Churkin’s 
intervention in the briefing, Russia would not relent on its unwillingness to cede greater 
administrative power to the Secretariat.793 The sanctions imposed on Russia by Australia as a 
result of its actions in Ukraine may have been an additional factor fueling Russia’s 
intransigence.794   
Australia ultimately decided not to bring the draft to a vote, avoiding what would have 
been a Russian veto and possibly a Chinese one. Some modest advances had recently been made 
in the Council’s sanctions work, mostly related to transparency.795 Australia, which chaired three 
sanctions committees,796 and other elected members had begun to brief on the work of their 
committees in open sessions, whereas the norm had previously been closed briefings.797 
Furthermore, the UN Secretariat at the time had recently begun to publish on the Security 
Council’s website a monthly program listing the meetings of the various sanctions 
committees,798 while these committees were interacting with increased frequency with states that 
were targeted by sanctions and other regional states.799 As one Security Council diplomat at the 
time has maintained, a vetoed draft “would have a chilling effect on the changing practice that 
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was …occurring without the resolution.”800 Australia did not want to risk undermining the 
progress that had been made.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has maintained that a major reason for fewer vetoes (and greater voting unanimity) 
in the Council in the post-Cold War era as compared to the Cold War era is because of the 
evolving role of the elected members. Although the elected members from the NAM would 
frequently propose drafts in the Cold War with a high probability of being vetoed, the elected 
members in more recent years have been more circumspect about tabling resolutions that might 
fail to be adopted. They have often worked hard to build bridges among the permanent members, 
making painstaking efforts to achieve successful outcomes and leading negotiations that have at 
times lasted several months as part of these efforts. Recent examples of such initiatives by the 
elected members have been highlighted in this chapter.  
A few general conclusions can be drawn from the analysis. First, by and large, the elected 
members take their role on the Council seriously. Elected members often serve for reasons other 
than mere prestige, trying to make a positive contribution during their two year tenures. Second, 
as the Syria and the protection of health care case studies demonstrate, they at times ban together 
to pursue initiatives, ostensibly because proposals will have greater appeal if they are pursued by 
a range of elected members. Third, and perhaps most depressingly for the E10, their room for 
maneuver is highly limited. Because of the veto (and the threat of the veto), any proposal for a 
draft resolution on all but procedural matters requires the acquiescence, if not the support, of all 




the permanent members, as evidenced by the negotiations on the Australian sanctions draft 

























VI: Whither the Council? 
This project started with the puzzle of why the P3 voted together in the Security Council a higher 
percentage of the time in the post-Cold War era than during the Cold War, when one might have 
expected greater voting unity among them as a result of the common threat from the Soviet 
Union. Given the high level of voting unity in general in the Council in the post-Cold War era, it 
also led to broader consideration of why Council members place so much emphasis on the 
importance of unanimity. In other words, if the rapprochement between the United States and the 
Soviet Union was not the only reason for greater unity in the Council, what were the other 
reasons?  
A number of conclusions emerge from the Cold War and the post-Cold War eras in 
searching for answers to these questions. First, a strong Non-aligned Movement (NAM) exerted 
considerable influence on the Council’s agenda from the early 1960s onward, often proposing 
draft resolutions with little chance of being adopted. Drafts that NAM members proposed on 
Israel/Palestine, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and other issues frequently resulted 
in vetoes or abstentions by one or more of the P3. Second, France and the United Kingdom 
viewed the Council as a danger to their colonial interests in the early part of the Cold War, rather 
than an instrument crucial to promoting their foreign policies, as they have in recent decades.801 
Charles de Gaulle, French President from 1959-1969, was particularly critical of the United 
Nations, even encouraging the French mission in New York to abstain on draft resolutions rather 
than seek agreement.802 Third, negotiation processes were not as developed as they have been 
since the late Cold War period, when the East-West thaw led to a greater appreciation of the 
                                                           
801 Thierry Tardy and Dominik Zaum, “France and the United Kingdom in the Security Council,” in The UN 
Security Council in the 21st Century ed. David M. Malone, Bruno Stagno Ugarte, Sebastian von Einsiedel (Boulder, 
Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2016), 136. 




potential for a more effective Council and greater attention was focused on hashing out 
differences and making compromises so as to promote more unanimous decision-making.    
The post-Cold War era has been marked by greater voting unity as reflected by the high 
percentage of resolutions adopted with the support of all members and the decrease in the 
number of vetoes. With the end of the gridlock that plagued the Council until the late Cold War 
period, this organ become a more central tool of the foreign policies of its members, both the 
permanent and elected members alike. The Council was, is and likely always will be a forum for 
political grandstanding, but this has been more muted in recent decades than during the Cold 
War, notwithstanding the deterioration of Russia-US relations in recent years. The pursuit of 
unanimity has been a reflection of how important the Council is to its members and can be 
attributed to several factors:   
• the perceived legitimacy that a unanimous decision accords a resolution, with the 
expectation that the wider membership will be more likely to respect and abide by the 
resolution;803  
• the notion that a unanimous decision exerts more leverage on the subject parties, who at 
least in theory will not be able to exploit divisions among Council members;  
• the view among those drafting resolutions and leading negotiations (nowadays 
disproportionately the P3) that a unanimously adopted resolution is a sign of good 
stewardship of the Council’s work; and  
• the stigma of being isolated attached to those members who might abstain or vote against 
a resolution that has broad support.    
                                                           
803 On the Council’s legitimating role, see, for example, Mats Berdal, “The UN Security Council: Ineffective but 
Indispensable,” Survival 45, no. 2 (2003): 9; Inis L. Claude, Jr., “Collective Legitimation as a Political Function of 
the United Nations,” International Organization 20, no. 3 (1996): 367-379; and Ian Hurd, After Anarchy: 





Trying to answer the questions posed in this dissertation has generated a number of 
additional questions and observations that provide fertile ground for additional research. First, 
while members frequently emphasize the importance of unanimity, there are legitimate questions 
about how much of an impact a unanimously adopted resolution has in comparison to one that 
does not have unanimous support. Second, while the P3 does most of the drafting of resolutions 
and managing of negotiations, one can question whether and for how long this will continue, 
given questions about the Council’s ineffectiveness in recent years and about the right of France 
and the United Kingdom to serve as permanent members given their waning geo-politics 
influence. Third, since China is the least engaged in drafting and leading negotiations of all the 
permanent members, it would be interesting to investigate whether it will play a more assertive 
role in the Council’s work in the years to come, especially considering its growing role on global 
security matters, or whether it will maintain its more measured approach. Fourth, while the 
Trump administration has been highly critical of the United Nations and has cut funding for UN 
entities, there is evidence that in some respects it has found the Council useful in achieving its 
foreign policy goals and that, at least to this point, its engagement with the Council has not 
represented as significant a departure from prior US administrations as might have been 
anticipated. These issues are briefly discussed before the chapter concludes with some final 







What is the value of unanimity? 
It is often presumed that a unanimously adopted text has more impact than one not garnering 15 
votes, with members regularly equating more unified decision-making with enhanced 
effectiveness. But is this assumption correct? The answer is not clear.  
There are numerous cases in which the implementation of non-unanimous resolutions has 
been problematic, particularly when there are abstentions from permanent members or 
abstentions and negative votes from other influential members. Resolution 1593, which referred 
the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in March 2005, was adopted 
with abstentions from Algeria, Brazil, China and the United States.  In the years since, the ICC’s 
investigations in Darfur have been controversial, and Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, who 
has been indicted by the court for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, has 
travelled abroad with impunity.  Even state parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC have not 
apprehended him, as is their obligation under the Statute, when he has been on their respective 
territories. Resolution 2303, adopted in July 2016 with abstentions from Angola, China, Egypt, 
and Venezuela, authorized the deployment of up to 228 UN police in Burundi for one year “to 
monitor the security situation and to support OHCHR [Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights] in monitoring human rights violations and abuses.” As a result of the resistance 
of the government of Burundi, no doubt observing and exploiting the divisions in the Council, 
the police were never deployed. Resolution 2304, adopted in August 2016, with abstentions from 
China, Egypt, Russia, and Venezuela, authorized the deployment of a Regional Protection Force 
(RPF) in South Sudan to enhance the mission’s ability to protect civilians and the airport in the 
capital city of Juba. As of October 2017, South Sudan has persisted in its refusal to allow the 
force to protect the airport and repeatedly delayed in providing visas to some of the peacekeepers 
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in the force. These examples demonstrate that divisions in the UN’s peace and security organ can 
complicate the implementation of the resolutions it adopts. They give credence to the view that a 
divided Council is a less effective one, especially when powerful members are not clearly 
supportive of the resolutions adopted.   
However, the notion that unanimity is the gold standard should be accompanied by three 
key caveats. First, sometimes the sought-after unanimity is not possible, and a resolution that is 
not unanimously adopted is better than no resolution at all, or a resolution that is significantly 
diluted to achieve the support of all members. Second, non-unanimous resolutions can be 
faithfully implemented if the permanent member(s) abstaining, or the elected member(s) 
abstaining or voting against the resolution, have little inclination or ability to block its 
implementation. For example, resolution 678 of 29 November 1990, which authorized “all 
necessary means” to compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, was adopted with 12 affirmative 
votes, two negative votes (Cuba and Yemen) and one abstention (China). The lack of unanimity 
on the vote was of little importance; the resolution provided political and legal backing for the 
US-led campaign to oust Saddam Hussein’s forces from Kuwait, and the Council’s response to 
Iraq’s aggression strengthened its credibility.804 Third, it is frequently the case that a unanimous 
resolution is not faithfully implemented—both by those Council members whose affirmative 
votes are merely a sign of acquiescence rather than full-throated support or by other influential 
states that have the capacity and influence to affect the behavior of the subject parties.  
Regardless of whether a resolution is adopted unanimously or not, the will to implement it must 
be forthcoming—especially from the permanent members of the Council and other influential 
                                                           
804 Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, Pilgrimage for Peace: A Secretary-General’s Memoir (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
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states (whether on the Council or not). For example, it makes little difference that all the 
permanent members agree to support a resolution on the protection of health care in armed 
conflict (i.e., resolution 2286 of 3 May 2016) if they are unwilling to adhere to the resolution or 
to exert sufficient leverage on the parties that are violating it to change their behavior.  
Indeed, the view that unanimous resolutions will be more readily adhered to or 
implemented by those members adopting them (or by the wider UN membership) and that such 
resolutions will increase the likelihood of compliance by the subject parties needs to be carefully 
scrutinized and raises several interesting questions for further research. Are Council members 
(and other UN member states) more likely to implement unanimously adopted resolutions than 
ones adopted without the support of all 15 members because they perceive them as having more 
legitimacy?  Are the subjects of unanimously adopted resolutions more likely to comply with 
them than with resolutions that do not receive the support of all members? In other words, do 
subject parties perceive that “the full weight of the Council” is being brought to bear on them, as 
members sometimes profess with regard to unanimously adopted resolutions? Even if all 15 
members vote in support of a resolution, how well do the subject parties recognize the difference 
between acquiescence and committed support for the resolution by permanent and other key 
members? If they do pick up on these differences of perspective, how effectively do the exploit 
them? These questions merit further study, as the answers to them are not entirely clear.   
 
Breaking the P3 penholder stranglehold?  
It is frequently observed that the composition and the privileges of the permanent members of 
the Security Council no longer reflect the realities of geo-politics. In large part, this is a criticism 
of the fact that France and the United Kingdom are still part of this elite club, even though their 
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great power status is questionable.  However, structural reform of the Security Council, which 
could weaken their influence at the horseshoe table—and that of the other P5—is not on the 
horizon for a variety of reasons, including the unwillingness of the permanent members to forfeit 
their privileged positions and the inability of the rest of the world to decide on a mutually 
acceptable reform proposal that they can rally around to exert pressure on the permanent 
members. It is further unlikely that a larger Council would be more effective or responsive in 
preventing, managing, or resolving conflicts.  The 15 members already have enough difficulties 
managing their differences, and adding more members would only complicate the political 
tensions among them. Nor is it apparent that the potential candidates for permanent membership 
would necessarily have a significant impact on the work of the world body’s peace and security 
organ if they were to be given permanent seats, especially if those seats were not to come with 
the institutional benefit of the right of veto.  As Colin Keating has written: “From 2010 to 2013, 
the elected members….included Germany, Japan, India, Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria, Turkey, 
and Mexico. But it is fair to say that this…concentration of ‘heavyweights’ had only minimal if 
any impact on the power relationships between the P5 and the elected members, and on the 
overall quality of the Council’s output relative to other recent periods.”805 
 Reform efforts will remain mired in the General Assembly, precluding the possibility 
that powerful elected members such as those that Keating refers to will become permanent 
members any time soon. At the same time, France and the United Kingdom will continue to cling 
to their outsized role in drafting outcomes, and consequently, managing negotiations, amidst 
persisting questions about whether they deserve that right.806 Influence in the multilateral system, 
                                                           
805 Colin Keating, “Power Dynamics Between Permanent and Elected Members,” in The UN Security Council in the 
Twenty First Century, ed. Sebastian von Einsiedel, David M. Malone, and Bruno Stagno Ugarte (Boulder, Co: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2016), 149. 
806 UN diplomat, interview with the author, New York, 1 November 2016. 
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as embodied by the UN, remains critical to them. As French Ambassador François Delattre 
observed in a statement soon after France assumed the monthly presidency of the Council in 
October 2017: “Our presidency doesn’t come out of the blue. It is very much anchored…in favor 
of a [sic] efficient multilateralism and a strong UN. This is at the core of French diplomacy.”807 
The United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union will likely increase the role it places on its 
engagement with the UN.  
Both France and the United Kingdom have highly competent diplomatic corps, and can 
legitimately claim they have strong historical and cultural ties to many of the countries on the 
Council’s agenda by virtue of their colonial past, including several cases on which they hold the 
pen. But is this enough to justify the extent of their influence in stewarding the Council’s work? 
And do they play a constructive or negative role in stewarding the Council’s engagement on 
those issues on which they have strategic interests or cultural and historical attachments? With 
respect to the United Kingdom, how much will its exit from the European Union (i.e., Brexit) 
magnify the importance that London places on its role in the Security Council and in other 
international fora? Answers to these questions are worthy of further exploration.   
One plausible scenario is that the role of France and the United Kingdom as penholders 
will be increasingly challenged by elected members, who question the legitimacy of their 
influence and who want to make their own mark on the Council’s work. Complaints against the 
United States as a penholder will probably be more muted, because it remains the most powerful 
country in the world and therefore can justify its influence. These complaints will focus more on 
a perceived lack of consultations with the E10 when preparing resolutions and presidential 
statements, rather than on whether the United States merits the right to draft a high percentage of 
                                                           
807  François Delattre, Briefing on France’s Presidency of the UN Security Council, organized by the World 
Federation of United Nations Association of the United Nations, 2 October 2017.  
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outcomes. In general, the elected members will continue to chafe at all of the P3’s domination of 
the pen if they believe that they are not adequately consulted; if they believe that they have good 
ideas that the Council can pursue, but are discouraged from taking initiative; or more broadly, if 
they do not believe that the penholder is doing a good job of managing the issue under 
consideration.  
    It is extremely difficult for the elected members to break the penholder stranglehold of 
the permanent members on country cases of considerable strategic importance to the P5. With 
some exceptions, the elected members have traditionally been afforded more latitude by the 
permanent members in taking the initiative on thematic resolutions, such as those on health care 
in armed conflict, mine action, and small arms and light weapons, among other issues (i.e., not 
on country cases).808 However, there are indications that that the exasperation of the elected 
members, both with the outsized role of France and the United Kingdom and with the inability of 
the P5 collectively to resolve some of the more difficult issues of our time—such as South 
Sudan, Syria and Yemen, among others—may be reaching a breaking point. One important issue 
to consider is how assertive the elected members will become as their ire with their 
marginalization by the permanent members rises and as their concern with Council’s 
shortcomings in addressing the difficult international peace and security environment compels 
them to fill the perceived void in responsible action left by the permanent members.       
There is evidence that they are trying to push back and are not passively accepting their 
second class status. During its February 2016 presidency of the Council, Venezuela proposed a 
presidential note on improving the transparency and practices of subsidiary bodies of the organ. 
                                                           
808 Notable exceptions include the Syria humanitarian initiative and Afghanistan; the Council’s work on Afghanistan   
is focused on overseeing the UN’s political mission in the country: UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
(UNAMA).  It should be noted, however, that the elected member that holds the pen on Afghanistan is invariably a 
close US ally over whom the United States exerts strong influence. In 2017, for example, the penholder was Japan.  
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In a reversal of normal procedure, it negotiated the text first among the elected members before 
sharing it with the permanent members, the apparent rational being that elected members are the 
ones who generally chair subsidiary bodies.809 The note was adopted on 22 February 2016.810 In 
April 2017, when the permanent members were gridlocked over how to respond to the Khan 
Shaykhun chemical weapons attack in Syria, with the P3 proposing a draft resolution that Russia 
found unacceptable and countered with its own draft to which the P3 objected, the ten elected 
members tried to break the impasse by crafting their own draft resolution. This was ultimately 
rejected by the P3, with US Ambassador Nikki Haley complaining that “compromising with 
Russia for a watered-down draft resolution would have only strengthened [Bashar] Al-Assad.”811 
Elected members disagreed with Haley’s view.  When a revised P3 draft was vetoed by 
Russia,812 Ethiopian Ambassador Tekeda Alemu posited that:  
what the resolution was supposed do was to call for a thorough investigation [of the 
chemical weapons attack] to ensure accountability based on the results of an independent, 
professional and impartial process…What could have easily resolved the issue was to 
turn to already agreed language from previous resolutions. That language is strong 
enough to convey the message and ensure that the objective is achieved, namely, to hold 
those responsible to account. We tried, as the 10 elected members of the Council, to work 
towards that end.813   
 
Of course, while elected members at times demonstrate resistance to the permanent members’ 
dominance of the Council, this example demonstrates how futile their efforts often are. The 
institutional and political realities are simply too significant for the elected members to play a 
sustained leadership role. As Ambassador Elbio Rosselli of Uruguay said at the same meeting in 
which Alemu lamented the unwillingness of the P3 to consider an E10 compromise draft on the 
                                                           
809 Security Council Report, “Working Methods Debate,” What’s In Blue, 9 February 2016, 
http://www.whatsinblue.org/2016/02/working-methods-debate-2.php. 
810 Note by the President of the Security Council: work of the subsidiary organs of the Security Council (UN 
Security Council document S/2016/170), 22 February 2016. 
811 UN Security Council meeting record (S/PV.7919), 7 April 2017. 
812 UN Security Council document (S/2017/315), 12 April 2017. 
813 UN Security Council meeting record (S/PV.7922), 12 April 2017. 
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Khan Shaykhun attack: “The privileges that distinguish the various Council members calls to 
mind an expression from the novel of George Orwell, ‘Animal Farm’, namely, that some animals 
are more equal than others. That legal, but dishonest, imbalance means that many members are in 
a situation where they have to choose the lesser of two evils in terms of the options before 
them.”814    
The E10 have several options available to them to challenge the P5. Any elected member 
can break the coveted unanimity by abstaining or voting against a resolution if it believes the 
negotiations are poorly handled by the permanent members or if its views are not adequately 
taken into account.815 Furthermore, since much of the Council’s work is done by consensus 
(sanctions committees operate by consensus and presidential and press statements require the 
support of all 15 members), any elected member can kill a presidential statement or press 
statement or block the work of sanctions committees by mere non-acquiescence. However, the 
key question for an elected member is whether and when taking such measures is worth it, both 
for the sake of the Council’s work and for one’s own well-being. Standing up to the permanent 
members is a risky proposition, particularly when political or economic retribution from a 
permanent member may ensue and the desired outcome of greater input in decision-making and 
respectful treatment may not follow.   
 
                                                           
814  UN Security Council meeting record (S/PV.7922), 12 April 2017, 10. 
815  See, for example, Security Council Report, “Western Sahara: Mission Mandate Extended for 12 Months,” 
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Morocco’s “occupation” of Western Sahara during a March 2016 visit to MINURSO. Language critical of Morocco 
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the substance of the text but also to the limited time and scope the elected members had for input on the draft.   
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What about China?  
It is unclear why China is the least directly engaged of the permanent members in the 
management of the Council’s work in terms of drafting and negotiating, especially considering 
its significant geo-political influence. As Zhu Wenqi and Leng Xinyu have argued, “Since the 
mid-1990s…the United Nations has played a growing role in Chinese foreign policy 
thinking.”816 It has demonstrated increased willingness to use its veto over the past decade for 
several reasons, including those related to state sovereignty and non-interference, as 
demonstrated with respect to Myanmar, Zimbabwe, and Syria.817 As of 30 June 2017, it was by 
far the leading contributor among the permanent members of UN peacekeeping personnel and 
the 12th overall contributor among UN members states more broadly, with 2,515 personnel 
deployed.818 China contributes 10.25 percent to the UN peacekeeping budget; 819 this is well 
behind the United States, which provides 28.47 percent of the budget, but still second among all 
UN member states.820  
And yet, as Wenqi and Xinyu note, it is “disinclined to take the lead on either 
contemporary security crises or the thematic discussions among member states…”821 and its 
                                                           
816 Zhu Wenqi and Leng Xinyu, “China in the Security Council,” in The UN Security Council in the 21st Century, ed. 
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819 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Financing Peacekeeping,” 
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“overall profile in the Council remains deliberately understated relative to its global heft.”822  
Why is this so? Is it because China prefers conducting its diplomacy bilaterally?823 Are there 
cultural reasons for China’s preference for low-key diplomatic engagement in the Council?  
Given that there has been an evolution in China’s engagement with the UN, marked by greater 
involvement in peacekeeping operations and an increased willingness to use the veto, and given 
China’s important role in world affairs, might its approach to the Council become less low-key 
over time? In other words, will it become more involved in proposing initiatives and drafting 
outcomes? Such questions merit investigation.   
The Trump administration’s engagement with the Security Council 
While only one year has transpired since US President Trump assumed office, it is already 
abundantly clear that his administration views the UN as bloated and inefficient and that it chafes 
at what it perceives as the world body’s unfair treatment of close US ally Israel. Along these 
lines, US Ambassador Nikki Haley has said: “You can be sure we’ll continue to look at ways to 
increase the U.N.’s efficiency while protecting our interests.”824   
The Trump administration’s reservations about the Security Council are consistent with 
this view. It is frustrated by the monthly public meetings in the Council on the Middle East, 
because they generally focus on Israel/Palestine, rather than the misdeeds of the Iranian or Syrian 
governments. Trump and Haley were infuriated when the United States was forced to cast a veto 
in December 2017 on a draft resolution isolating it for recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of 
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Israel. It has also consistently looked for ways to cut the peacekeeping budget; while the Council 
does not manage this budget, it does mandate and oversee peacekeeping operations.  
However, it would be wrong to assume that the United States under Trump does not see 
value in the work of the Security Council. It found the Council useful in unanimously adopting a 
series of resolutions that significantly strengthened sanctions on the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (North Korea) in 2017.  As Mark Leon Goldberg has written, “when it comes 
to confronting some of the toughest global challenges, like non-proliferation and terrorism, the 
United States still believes it is in its best interests to work with the Security Council, and not 
around it.”825 Furthermore, while legitimate concerns have been raised about the cuts to UN 
peacekeeping operations that the administration has demanded and continues to demand,826 these 
seem to reflect a desire for more efficient and cost-effective operations as much as the 
administration’s “America-first” mentality. The verdict is still out regarding how detrimental 
current and future cuts will be to the effectiveness of the peacekeeping missions the Council 
mandates. However, it should be noted that the United States showed willingness in 2017 to 
compromise with other members in reductions in the numbers of peacekeepers in operations in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Abyei.827 In the Central African Republic, where the 
security situation is highly unstable, it agreed to an increase in the number of peacekeepers.828   
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As of early 2018, Trump himself has already hosted Security Council members twice in 
the White House, after little more than a year in office.829  While one admittedly must be careful 
not to read too much into Trump’s words, as he is not known for his honesty and has shifting 
opinions, it is striking that during the Council’s second visit to the White House on 29 January 
2018, he told members: “We’ve already done…tremendous…coalition building, and the United 
Nations Security Council, in particular, is very important to us.  The power and respect it has all 
over the world is…excellent.”830 These words are not what one would expect from a president 
dismissive of multilateralism.    
There was considerable division in the Council in 2017. There were six vetoes, which 
was the most since 1988. While this level of discord is troubling, it should nonetheless not be 
exaggerated. The Council was already divided before Trump came into office. Furthermore, five 
of these vetoes were on a single issue, chemical weapons in Syria,831 and the Council managed to 
achieve a considerable degree of unity on several other issues.  Only two of the 61 resolutions in 
2017 were not adopted unanimously. This compares favorably to 2016 in which 10 of the 77 
resolutions were not adopted unanimously and one draft failed to garner the requisite 9 votes to 
be adopted, although admittedly there were only two vetoes during 2016.   
The bottom line is that while changes in US policy have been reflected in the Council—
for example, support for Israel is more pronounced, there is stronger emphasis on cost-saving in 
peacekeeping operations, and efforts to address climate change as a security issue are not being 
supported—there is yet to be an indication that the overall US view of the Security Council has 
represented as significant a departure from the past as would seem at first site. By and large, the 
                                                           
829 Goldberg, “One Year In, The Trump Administration Seems to Have Learned to Like the UN.” 
830 Quote taken from Goldberg, “One Year In, The Trump Administration Seems to Have Learned to Like the UN.”  
831 These include one draft jointly vetoed by Russia and China and four registered solely by Russia. The other veto 
in 2017 was the US veto in late December regarding Jerusalem. 
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administration has not subjected the UN Security Council to the same level of scorn as, for 
example, the UN Human Rights Council; the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) (from which the United States withdrew in 2017);832 the UN 
Population Fund (UNFPA) (which the United States announced it would stop funding in April 
2017);833 and the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (which 
is expected to suffer from the Trump administration’s decision to slash US financial support). 
From a cynical perspective, it does seems that Ambassador Haley enjoys the spotlight offered by 
the Council, which is enabling her to burnish her domestic reputation among certain conservative 
elements of the electorate and serves as a springboard for possible future political ambitions.834 
Nonetheless, while it is unclear how US engagement with the Security Council will unfold 
during the remainder of the Trump administration, it values the UN’s peace and security organ as 
a useful instrument of US foreign policy, despite its criticism of the United Nations and its cuts 
in funding for UN peacekeeping and other UN entities.   
Conclusion   
The Security Council is going through a difficult period. The Council remains engaged in 
longstanding crises in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Israel/Palestine, and 
Western Sahara, with little to show for its efforts, and it has had limited success at best in 
supporting political solutions to the more recent conflicts that have come onto its agenda since 
2011 in the Central African Republic, Libya, Mali, South Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen. 
                                                           
832 Zack Beauchamp, “Here’s what UNESCO is—and why the Trump administration just quit it,” Vox, 12 October 
2017, https://www.vox.com/world/2017/10/12/16464778/unesco-us-withdrawal-trump. 
833 See UN Population Fund, “Statement by UNFPA on U.S. Decision to Withhold Funding,” 4 April 2017, 
https://www.unfpa.org/press/statement-unfpa-us-decision-withhold-funding. 
834 This is my impression from interactions with knowledgeable UN observers.  
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Tensions between Russia and the United States have affected dynamics in the Council for the 
worse.   
While this negative depiction of the Council does not leave much room for optimism, one 
could argue that expectations of what this organ can do need to be tempered. The permanent 
members were accorded the veto to ensure their participation in the new world body at the end of 
World War II and to ensure that the Council would not be used as an instrument against their 
core interests; the UN would likely not exist if the P5 were not given the right of veto in the 
peace and security organ.835 The gridlock in the Council with regard to conflicts in Syria, 
Ukraine, and Yemen is to be expected because the strategic interests of the great powers clash in 
these cases; a continuation of this gridlock in the Council will continue until and unless the 
permanent members come up with a political arrangement among themselves that is also 
acceptable to the respective host countries and key regional states. 
Another major challenge in the Council’s work, also described in Chapter IV of this 
dissertation, is the fundamental disagreements over the nature of state sovereignty, especially 
among the permanent members, but also among the elected members. How and when this organ 
uses instruments at its disposal under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, such as sanctions, 
international legal prosecution, or the use of force—and more broadly, how it chooses to engage 
with states that are the subject to its resolutions—is very often a decision about how much the 
sovereignty of the target state should be temporarily forfeited. As noted earlier, China and Russia 
generally have more traditional views of state sovereignty than the P3, who tend to be more 
amenable to pursuing Chapter VII measures. Even in cases in which members agree with the 
                                                           
835  David L. Bosco, Five to Rule Them All: The UN Security Council and the Making of the Modern World (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), 36. 
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basic diagnosis of the problem, they have sometimes had difficulty developing a common 
approach because of their different views on state sovereignty (for example, South Sudan). As 
the Council continues to manage a heavy agenda of crises, its members will frequently be 
divided on appropriate responses, if and until there is a shared understanding of when and how it 
is permissible to pursue Chapter VII measures, or threaten their imposition as a way to exert 
political leverage.      
        However, for all of its shortcomings, the Council plays a critical role in the foreign 
policies of its members. The quest for reaching consensual arrangements is very often a 
reflection of this fact. While I have attempted to demonstrate that unanimity in and of itself is not 
necessarily a good thing, there is much to be said for the Council’s impact on issues on which its 
members, especially the permanent ones, agree. The Council may never do enough to satisfy its 
detractors, but when its most powerful members are united—and are willing to back their 
decisions with political will and resources—it can make a positive difference on international 











Appendix: List of Interviews 
 
Arria, Diego, former Venezuelan ambassador to the UN, New York, NY, 19 September 2016.  
 
van Bohemen, Gerard, former New Zealand ambassador to the UN, New York, NY, 1 November 
2016. 
 
Greenstock, Jeremy, former UK ambassador to the UN, interviewed by phone by the author, 
New York, NY, 3 March 2017. 
 
Mendez, Wilmer, current political coordinator of the Venezuelan mission to the UN, 1 January 
2017. 
 
Yañez-Barnuevo, Juan A., former Spanish ambassador to the UN, New York, NY, 12 December 
2016.  
 
Various former and current diplomats and UN Secretariat officials with knowledge of the UN 

















Adebajo, Adekeye, UN Peacekeeping in Africa: From the Suez Crisis to the Sudan Conflicts  
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2011).  
 




Alvarez, José, International Organizations as Law-makers (Oxford: Oxford University Press,  
2005). 
 
Asmus, Ronald D.; Richard L. Kugler, and Stephen F. Larrabee, “Building a New NATO,”  
Foreign Affairs 72, no. 4 (1993): 28-40. 
 
Axelrod, Robert and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and  
Institutions,” World Politics 38, no. 1 (1985): 226-254. 
 
Bailey, Sydney D., “New Light on Abstentions in the UN Security Council,” International  
Affairs 50, no. 4 (1974): 554-573. 
 
Bailey, Sydney D., Voting in the Security Council (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,  
1970).  
 
Barnard, Anne and Hwaida Saad, “It’s Hard to Believe, but Syria’s War Is Getting Even Worse,”  






Beauchamp, Zack, “Here’s what UNESCO is—and why the Trump administration just quit it,”  
Vox, 12 October 2017, https://www.vox.com/world/2017/10/12/16464778/unesco-us-
withdrawal-trump 
 
Beinart, Peter, The Crisis of Zionism (New York: Times Books, 2012). 
 
Berdal, Mats, “The UN Security Council: Ineffective but Indispensable,” Survival 45, no. 2  
(2003): 7-30. 
 
Bolton, John, Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations and Abroad  
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007). 
 
Bosco, David, Five to Rule Them All: The UN Security Council and the Making of the Modern  




---------“Assessing the UN Security Council: A Concert Perspective,” Global Governance 20  
(2014): 545-561. 
 
Bouillon, Markus E., “The Arab-Israeli Conflict,” in The UN Security Council: From the Cold  
War to the 21st Century, 2nd edition, eds. von Einsiedel, Sebastian, David M. Malone, and  
Bruno Stagno Ugarte (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2016), 529-549.  
 
Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, Unvanquished: A U.S.-U.N. Saga (New York: Random House, 1999). 
 
Boyd, Andrew, Fifteen Men on a Powder Keg: A History of the U.N. Security Council (New  
York: Stein and Day, 1971).  
 
Chan, Steve, “Power, Satisfaction and Popularity: A Poisson Analysis of UN Security Council  
Vetoes,” Cooperation and Conflict 38, no. 4 (2003): 339-359. 
 
Chowdhury Fink, Naureen, Paul Romita and Till Papenfuss, “What Impact? The E10 and the  
2011 Security Council,” International Peace Institute (March 2011). 
 




Cronin, Bruce, “International consensus and the changing legal authority of the UN Security  
Council,” in The UN Security Council and the Politics of International Governance, eds. 
Bruce Cronin and Ian Hurd (New York: Routledge, 2008), 57-79. 
 
De Gaulle, Charles, Major Addresses, Statements and Press Conferences of General Charles de  
Gaulle, May 19, 1958-January 31, 1964, New York: French Embassy, Press and  
Information Division.  
 
von Einsiedel, Sebastian, David M. Malone, and Bruno Stagno Ugarte, eds., The UN Security  
Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century, 2nd edition (Boulder: Lynne Rienner  
Publishers, 2016). 
 
von Einsiedel, Sebastian, David M. Malone, and Bruno Stagno Ugarte, “Conclusion: The  
Security Council in a World in Crisis,” in The UN Security Council: From the Cold War  
to the 21st Century, 2nd edition, eds., von Einsiedel, Sebastian, David M. Malone, and  
Bruno Stagno Ugarte (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2016), 827-876.  
 
Evans, Gareth, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocities Once and For All  
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008).  
 
Gaiduk, Ilya V., Divided Together: The United States and the Soviet Union in the United  
Nations, 1945-1965 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2012).  
 
Gladstone, Rick, “Taking Credit for U.N. Budget Cut, Trump’s Envoy Hints at More to Come,”  
229 
 
The New York Times, 25 December 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/25/world/americas/trump-united-nations-budget.html 
 
Glennon, Michael J., “Why the Security Council Failed,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 3 (2003): 16- 
35. 
 
Goldberg, Mark Leon, “One Year In, The Trump Administration Seems to Have Learned to Like  
the UN,” UN Dispatch, 30 January 2018, https://www.undispatch.com/one-year-trump-
administration-seems-learned-like-un/. 
 
Gorbachev, Mikhail, Realities and Guarantees for a Secure World (Moscow: Novosti Press  
Agency Publishing House, 1987). 
 
Greenstock, Jeremy, Iraq: The Cost of War (London: Arrow, 2017). 
 
Gross, Leo, “Voting in the Security Council: Abstention from Voting and Absence from  
Meetings,” The Yale Law Journal 60, no. 2 (1951): 209-257. 
 
Hannay, David, New World Disorder: The UN after the Cold War-An Insider’s View (London:  
I.B. Tauris, 2008). 
 
Hannay, David, interview by Malcolm McBain, British Diplomatic Oral History Project, 22 July  
1999, https://www.chu.cam.ac.uk/media/uploads/files/Hannay.pdf. 
 
Haas, Richard, A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order  
(New York: Penguin Press, 2017).  
 
Human Rights Watch, “Attacks on Ghouta: Analysis of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in  
Syria,” 10 September 2013, https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/09/10/attacks-
ghouta/analysis-alleged-use-chemical-weapons-syria. 
 
Hurd, Ian, After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council  
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).  
 
Ignatieff, George, “Prompt and Regular Access to Political Government at Home is Essential,” in  
Paths to Peace: The UN Security Council and Its Presidency, ed. Nicol, Davidson, (New 
York: Pergamon Press, 1981), 130-139. 
 
Ikenberry, G. John, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of World  
Order after Major Wars (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibility to  
Protect (Ottawa: ICISS, 2001).   
 
Johnstone, Ian, “Legislation and Adjudication in the UN Security Council: Bringing Down the  





Kaplan, Lawrence S., NATO and the UN: A Peculiar Relationship (Columbia: University of  
Missouri Press, 2010).  
 
Kaplan, Lawrence S., NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance (Westport:  
Praegar Publishers, 2004).  
 
Keating, Colin, “Power Dynamics Between Permanent and Elected Members,” in The UN  
Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century, 2nd edition, eds. von Einsiedel,  
Sebastian, David M. Malone, and Bruno Stagno Ugarte (Boulder: Lynne Rienner  
Publishers, 2016), 139-155.  
 
---------“Rwanda: An Insider’s Account,” in The Security Council: From Cold War to the 21st  
Century, Malone, David M., ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 500-511. 
Kotkin, Stephen, “Russia’s Perpetual Geopolitics: Putin Returns to the Historical 
Pattern,” Foreign Affairs 95, no. 3 (2016): 2-9. 
 
Langmore, John and Jeremy Farrall, “Can Elected Members Make a Difference in the UN  
Security Council? Australia’s Experience in 2013-2014,” Global Governance 22 (2016): 
59-77. 
 
Lefever, Ernest W., Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the U.N. Congo Operation (Baltimore: The  
John Hopkins Press, 1967).  
 
Louis, William Roger, “American Anti-Colonialism and the Dissolution of the British Empire,”  
International Affairs 61, no. 3 (1985): 395-420. 
 
Luck, Edward C., “The Security Council at 70: Ever Changing or Never Changing?,” in The UN  
Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century, 2nd edition, eds. von Einsiedel, 
Sebastian, David M. Malone, and Bruno Stagno Ugarte (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2016), 195-214.  
 
---------UN Security Council: Practice and Promise (New York: Routledge, 2006).  
Mahbubani, Kishore, “The Permanent and the Elected Members,” in The UN Security 
Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century, ed. Malone, David M. (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2004), 253-266.  
 
Malik, Yakov. “Veto as a Protective Act of Policy,” in Davidson Nicol, ed., Paths to Peace: The  
UN Security Council and Its Presidency, ed. Nicol, Davidson (New York: Pergamon 
Press, 1981), 173-177.  
 
Malone, David M., ed., The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century  










Marten, Kimberly, “Reducing Tensions between Russia and NATO,” Council on Foreign  
Relations, Special Report No. 79 (March 2017). 
 
--------- Interview by Charlie Rose. Charlie Rose: The Week, PBS, 14 April 2017. 
Martin, Lisa, “Neoliberalism,” in International Relations Theories: Discipline and 
Diversity, eds. Dunne, Tim, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 109-126. 
Mearsheimer, John J., “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security  
82, no. 3 (1994-95): 5-49. 
 
---------The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001).  
 
---------“Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War,” The Atlantic 266, no. 2 (1990): 35-50. 
 
Médecins Sans Frontières, 2015 US Annual Report, New York, 2015. 
 
Meyer, Steven E., “Carcass of Dead Policies: The Irrelevance of NATO,” Parameters 33, no. 4  
(2003): 83-97.  
 
Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (United States  
of America: McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1993). 
 
Moynihan, Daniel Patrick with Suzanne Weaver, A Dangerous Place (Boston: Little, Brown and  
Company, 1978).  
 
Muñoz, Heraldo, A Solitary War: A Diplomat’s Chronicle of the Iraq War and Its Lessons  
(Golden, Colorado: Fulcrum Publishing, 2008). 
 
Neidig, Harper, “Trump Warns UN after Israel vote: ‘Things will be different’ soon,” The Hill,  
23 December 2016, http://thehill.com/policy/international/311703-trump-warns-un-after-
israel-vote-things-will-be-different-soon. 
 
Office of the Historian, “7. Briefing Paper Prepared by the Department of State,” Foreign  
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis, undated, 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d7. 
   
Office of the Historian, “71. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Interdepartmental  
Group for Africa,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXVIII, 






Office of the Historian, “553. Paper Prepared in the State Department, Southern Rhodesia,”  
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXIV, Africa, Washington, 
23 January 1967, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v24/d553. 
 
O’Neill, Barry, “Power and Satisfaction in the United Nations Security Council,” Journal of  
Conflict Resolution 40, no. 2 (1996): 219-237. 
Oye, Kenneth A., “Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies,” World  
Politics 38, no. 1 (1985): 1-24. 
 
Paris, Roland, “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?” International Security 26, no. 2  
(2001): 87-102. 
 
Patil, Anjali V., The Veto, A Historical Necessity: A Comprehensive Record of the Use of the  
Veto in the UN Security Council 1946-2001, (College Point, in-house Incorporated, Dr. 
Anjali V. Patil, 2001). 
 
Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier, Pilgrimage for Peace: A Secretary-General’s Memoir (New York: St.  
Martin’s Press, 1997). 
 
Pickering, Thomas, Interview by James S. Sutterlein, Yale-UN Oral History Project,  
Washington, DC, 3 April 2000. 
 
Rawski, Frederick, and Nathan Miller, “The United States in the Security Council: A Faustian  
Bargain?” in The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century, ed.  
Malone, David M. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 357-372. 
 
Roberts, Adam and Dominik Zaum, Selective Security: War and the United Nations Security  
Council since 1945 (Adelphi Paper No. 395, London: International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 2008). 




Sciolino, Elaine, “Threats and Responses: Discord; France to Veto Resolution on Iraq War,  




Sen, Samar, “The Rise in Importance of the Non-aligned Group,” in Paths to Peace: The UN  
Security Council and Its Presidency, ed. Nicol, Davidson (New York: Pergamon Press, 
1981), 288-303. 
  
Sengupta, Somini, “Calls Grow at U.N. for Security Council to Do Its Job: Keep the Peace,” The  




Security Council Report, “AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur Mandate Renewal,” What’s In  
Blue, 28 June 2016, http://www.whatsinblue.org/2016/06/au-un-hybrid-operation-in-
darfur-mandate-renewal.php. 
 




---------“Can the Security Council Prevent Conflict?” 9 February 2017,  
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/research_report_conflict_prevention_2017.pdf. 
---------“Children and Armed Conflict Open Debate,” 18 September 2012,  
http://www.whatsinblue.org/2012/09/children-and-armed-conflict-open-debate.php. 
 




---------“Council to Vote on Draft Resolution on South Sudan,” What’s In Blue, 8 October 2015,  
http://www.whatsinblue.org/2015/10/council-to-vote-on-resolution-on-south-sudan.php. 




---------“Draft Humanitarian Resolution on Syria and Briefing by Humanitarian Chief,” What’s  
In Blue, 11 February 2014, http://www.whatsinblue.org/2014/02/draft-humanitarian-
resolution-on-syria-and-briefing-by-humanitarian-chief.php. 



















---------“Middle East Open Debate,” What’s In Blue, 19 April 2017,  
http://www.whatsinblue.org/2017/04/middle-east-open-debate-2.php. 
 




---------“Renewal of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central  




---------“Resolution and Briefing on Sanctions,” What’s In Blue, 24 November 2014,  
http://www.whatsinblue.org/2014/11/resolution-and-briefing-on-sanctions.php. 
---------“Security Council Deadlocks and Uniting for Peace: An Abridged History,” October  




---------“Security Council Transparency, Legitimacy and Effectiveness: Efforts to Reform  
Council Working Methods, 1993-2007,” Special Research Report No. 3, 18 October 
2007, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/special-research-report/lookup-c-
glKWLeMTIsG-b-3506555.php. 
---------“Security Council Working Methods—A Work in Progress,” Special Research Report  
No. 1, 30 March 2012, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/special-research-
report/lookup-c-glKWLeMTIsG-b-5906427.php. 
 
---------“Security Council Working Methods: A Tale of Two Councils?” Special Research Report  
No. 1, 25 March 2014, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/special-research-
report/security-council-working-methods-a-tale-of-two-councils.php. 
 








---------“Syria: Addressing the Humanitarian Crisis,” What’s In Blue, 2 October 2013,  
http://www.whatsinblue.org/2013/10/syria-addressing-the-humanitarian-crisis.php. 
 








---------“Syria: Monday Vote on Draft Resolution on Cross-Border and Cross-Line Humanitarian  




---------“UN Mission in South Sudan Mandate Renewal and Adoption of Presidential Statement,”  
What’s in Blue, (13 December 2017), http://www.whatsinblue.org/2017/12/un-mission-
in-south-sudan-renewal-of-the-mandate.php. 




---------“Vote on Resolution Strengthening UN Mission in South Sudan Mandate,” What’s In  
Blue, 12 August 2016, http://www.whatsinblue.org/2016/08/renewal-of-un-mission-in-
south-sudan-mandate.php. 
 




---------“Working Methods Debate,” What’s In Blue, 9 February 2016,  
http://www.whatsinblue.org/2016/02/working-methods-debate-2.php. 
 
Shaikh, Salman and Amanda Roberts, “Syria,” in The UN Security Council: From the Cold War  
to the 21st Century, 2nd edition, eds. von Einsiedel, Sebastian, David M. Malone, and  
Bruno Stagno Ugarte (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2016), 717-740.  
 
Sievers, Loraine and Daws, Sam, The Procedure of the UN Security Council, Fourth Edition  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
 
Stiles, Kendall W., “The Power of Procedure and the Procedures of the Powerful: Anti-Terror  
Law in the United Nations,” Journal of Peace Research 43, no. 1 (2006): 37-54. 
Stavropoulos, Constantine A., “The Practice of Voluntary Abstentions by Permanent Members  
of the Security Council Under Article 27, Paragraph 3 of the Charter of the United 
Nations,” The American Journal of International Law 61, no. 3 (1967): 737-752.  
 
Stedman, Stephen John, “The United States in the Security Council,” in The UN Security  
Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century, 2nd edition, eds. von Einsiedel, 
Sebastian, David M. Malone, and Bruno Stagno Ugarte (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 




Strand, Jonathan R. and Rapkin, David P., “Weighted Voting in the United Nations Security  
Council: A Simulation,” Simulation & Gaming 42, no. 6 (2011): 772-802. 
 
Szasz, Paul C., “The Security Council Starts Legislating,” The American Journal of International  
Law 96, no. 4 (2002): 901-905. 
 
Talmon, Stefan, “The Security Council as World Legislature,” The American Journal of  
International Law 99, no. 1 (2005): 175-193.   
 
Tardy, Thierry and Dominik Zaum, “France and the United Kingdom in the Security Council,”  
in The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century, 2nd edition, eds. von 
Einsiedel, Sebastian, David M. Malone, and Bruno Stagno Ugarte (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2016), 121-138.  
 
Thant, U., View from the UN (London: David & Charles, 1977).  
 
Trenin, Dmitri, “Russia in the UN Security Council,” in The UN Security Council: From the  
Cold War to the 21st Century, 2nd edition, eds. von Einsiedel, Sebastian, David M. 
Malone, and Bruno Stagno Ugarte (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2016), 105-119. 
 
Trenin, Dmitri, “The Revival of the Russian Military: How Moscow Reloaded,” Foreign Affairs  
95, no. 3 (2016): 23-29. 
 
UN Population Fund, “Statement by UNFPA on U.S. Decision to Withhold Funding,” 4 April  
2017, https://www.unfpa.org/press/statement-unfpa-us-decision-withhold-funding. 
 
Urquhart, Brian, A Life in Peace and War (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1987).  
 
---------Hammarskjöld (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972). 
 
Voeten, Erik, “The Political Origins of the Security Council’s Ability to Legitimize the Use of  
Force,” International Organization 59, no. 3: 527-557. 
 
---------“Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action,” American Political Science  
Review 95, no. 4 (2001): 845-858. 
 
Waldheim, Kurt, In the Eye of the Storm: The Memoirs of Kurt Waldheim (London: Weidenfeld  
and Nicolson, 1985).   
 
Walt, Stephen M., The Origins of Alliances (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1987). 
 
Walt, Vivienne, “France’s Case for Military Action in Syria,” Time, 31 August 2013,  
http://world.time.com/2013/08/31/frances-case-for-military-action-in-syria/. 
 




Waltz, Kenneth N., “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security  
18, no. 2 (1993): 44-79.  
 
Warson, Joanna, “France in Rhodesia: French policy and perceptions throughout the era of  
decolonisation,” PhD diss., University of Portsmouth, 2013. 
 
Weber, Steve, “Shaping the Postwar Balance of Power: Multilateralism in NATO,” International  
Organization 46, no. 3 (1992): 633-680. 
 
Weiss, Thomas G., Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007).   
Wellens, Karel, “The UN Security Council and New Threats to the Peace: Back to the Future,”  
Journal of Conflict and Security Law 8, no. 1 (2003): 15-70 
 
Wenqi, Zhu, and Leng, Xinyu. 2016. China in the UN Security Council, in The UN Security  
Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century, 2nd edition, von Einsiedel, Sebastian,  
Malone, David M., and Stagno Ugarte, Bruno, eds., 83-103. Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers. 
 
Westad, Odd Arne, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our  
Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).  
 
Weston, John. Interview by Charlie Rose. Charlie Rose. PBS, 23 June 1998. 
 
White, Luise, “‘Normal Political Activities’: Rhodesia, The Pearce Commission, and The  
African National Council,” The Journal of African History 52, no. 3 (2011): 321-340. 
 
Woodhouse, C.M., “Attitudes of NATO Countries Toward the United States,” World Politics 10,  
no. 2 (1958): 202-218. 
